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Abstract 
 
The integration of vast numbers of migrants into European countries from North Africa and the 
Middle East continues pose challenges for policy makers. The many differences between these 
immigrants and the native population can make assimilation difficult. In order to increase trust and 
social cohesion between citizens and migrant populations, various forms of multicultural and 
assimilatory policies have been enacted with mixed success. This study challenges the usefulness 
of the current way people think about integration ideologies, namely as a choice between 
assimilation and multiculturalism. I hypothesize that we can better analyze public attitudes about 
integration by conceptualizing integration as a continuum of possibilities arranged along a scale 
of overall permissiveness. Using this continuum, we can entertain new and more effective 
ideologies as policy options. My field research conducted surveys with native-born citizens in the 
Netherlands and Belgium to gather information about the appeal and usefulness of these new 
integration ideologies. This paper finds evidence that the more moderate ideologies of 
interculturalism and “liberalism as identity” create stronger feelings of trust toward immigrant 
while minimizing in-group projection, overcoming the in-group projection problem. Furthermore, 
in Belgium, interculturalism is seen as more desirable to the respondents than the current more 
extreme policies of multiculturalism and assimilation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
.  In 2006, the Dutch Ministry of Interior Affairs outlined new rules for the assimilation of 
migrants seeking residency in the Netherlands. One new requirement was to watch an integration 
video “To the Netherlands”. This video is still considered controversial in some parts of the 
world, as it features clips of two men kissing and a bare-breasted woman. For immigrants 
coming from cultures that are far more reserved than the socially permissive traditions of 
Holland, these clips represented a violent, purposeful culture shock. The producers of the video 
even had to distribute an edited version for countries where the possession of such material is 
considered a criminal offense.  
 This controversy illustrates a widespread problem that has taken root in Western Europe, 
namely the processing of large numbers of migrants from around the world, particularly from the 
Maghreb and the Middle East into European society. While Europe has dealt with immigration 
since the formation of nation states, the disparities present between the host European culture 
and the culture of the migrant have rarely reached such politicized levels. Consequences of this 
phenomenon include perceptions of increased crime, feelings of social isolation, segregated 
migrant communities (such as the banlieues outside of Paris), heightened xenophobic political 
rhetoric frequently institutionalized by far right parties, and at its most extreme, the creation of 
the concept of “parallel communities” where migrants live entirely removed from their host 
culture.  
 The importance of this political issue is increasing. In 2011, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and French President Nicholas Sarkozy gave 
public speeches proclaiming the death of multiculturalism and the need for a “muscular 
2 
 
liberalism” (Cameron’s term), an ideology that vigorously promotes and defends the values of 
western culture and secular liberalism. Right-of-center and in some case far right parties with 
anti-immigrant appeals made strong gains in 2010 elections, such as those in Sweden and in the 
Netherlands. In light of the political upheaval in Libya and Tunisia, Italy requested EU patrol 
ships to interdict the new surges of people crossing the Mediterranean looking for a better life in 
the more stable region of Western Europe. Then in 2015, Muslim gunmen targeted the satirical 
magazine, Charlie Hebdo, in Paris as well as cartoonist Lars Vilks at a gathering in Copenhagen. 
Later that year, an Islamic fundamentalist opened fire on a train traveling from Amsterdam to 
Paris.    
 These events and the following backlash illustrate strains on the “social cohesiveness” of 
European countries. Violence and discrimination fuel distrust and suspicion, eroding the 
potential for good relationships between natives and immigrants (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 
2012, Adida et al, 2012). Prudent integration policies can address these shortcomings, but there 
exists fundamental (some may even say irreconcilable) questions involving how to structure the 
relationship between citizens and natives, including which parties have the responsibility to 
compromise and in what way (Scholten, 2011). This debate is traditionally structured in terms of 
a dichotomy between the policy frames of multiculturalism and assimilation, but this need not be 
the case. If these integration strategies represent extreme or ideal positions, it is possible that 
better policies may exist in between these extremes. This dissertation explores novel, 
theoretically moderate policy strategies as they exist in Belgium and the Netherlands. These 
countries have rich histories of negotiating identities and fostering dynamic public debates over 
the responsibilities of immigrants. This relationship is studied both through an analysis of elite 
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and national policies, as well as a public opinion survey done of long-term residents at the local 
level.  
 This dissertation is structured into four parts. In Chapter Two, the idea of integration and 
its relationship to identity is explored through an overview of the multiple literatures that 
converge in this topic. This discussion begins with an exploration of identity as a broad concept. 
It then narrows into an examination of the defining characteristics of national identities. The 
successful management of national identities and the differences in immigrant behavior relative 
to these identities are the primary motivators for integration as a process. The chapter then 
defines integration more generally as a multi-faceted and frequently contested concept. 
Integration imposes normative responsibilities on actors that are politically negotiated in the 
context of a power hierarchy between native residents and newly arrived immigrants. After 
discussing the rationale for integration, this chapter concludes with an identification of the 
anticipated products of successful integration (and therein evaluative elements of successful 
integration policies).  
 An important distinction must be maintained between integration as a concept and 
integration as applied through policy. As a nebulous idea, the purpose and intent of integration is 
not always neatly or uniformly expressed through policy products. Different nations have 
different approaches towards the same end of goal of social cohesion and are subsequently met 
with various levels of success. This dissertation addresses both the concept of integration and 
how it is made manifest in the Netherlands and Belgium at the national and local levels. It also 
observes how long-term residents react to different integration strategies. This more abstract 
strategy avoids some of the pitfalls commonly associated with measuring laws as written or 
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inferring the status of integration from various elements of related citizenship or naturalization 
policies (Michalowski and van Oers, 2012).      
  Chapter Three begins an in-depth exploration of different integration strategies divorced 
from policy implementation. Debates over the direction of integration policy revolve primarily 
around normative claims, as there are many ways to achieve integration’s ultimate goals of 
managing difference, creating equality and unity, and fostering trust. These different integration 
strategies are informed by ideologies or systems of ideas attached to normative values. Once the 
universe of ideas available integration strategies are discussed, this dissertation proposes 
restructuring the assimilation-multiculturalism dichotomy to produce a continuum, which then 
can be arranged as a typology. Especially at the mass-level, people frequently think about 
integration as structured around an artificial dichotomy between the ideologies of 
multiculturalism and assimilation. This frames the importance of maintaining immigrant culture 
as a yes-no question. Chapter three lays the theoretical framework for moving away from 
dichotomous thinking, opening up the option for immigrant cultures to be considered important 
within certain conditions and constraints. This restructuring increases flexibility in thinking 
about integration and therefore allows for the consideration of more moderate integration 
ideologies and policies. These moderate ideologies better reflect empirical findings in social 
psychology that claim people seek balance when relating to groups. Within these or any 
normative discussion are also empirical claims about the advantages and usefulness of each 
ideology. 
Chapters Four and Five lend empirical support to the theoretical restructuring proposed in 
Chapter Three by applying the ideas to actual national policies. This support is provided in both 
qualitative and quantitative forms, allowing for this exploration to be both context-sensitive and 
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scientifically rigorous. The dissertation uses the cases of the Netherlands and the Flemish region 
of Belgium, two regionally proximate governments with similar migrant populations. This 
situation aids in the construction of a most-similar research design, for despite their similarities 
Belgium’s regionalized government creates a system of multiple, sometimes conflicting national 
and regional identities which can confuse and undermine integration goals. Centralized 
Netherlands, however, has only one national identity, which helps make the goals of integration 
clear and uncontested. Furthermore, the Netherlands has a longer history of policy innovation 
when it comes to integration, whereas Belgium (due to its more complicated identity context) 
started focusing on integration much later. 
In Chapter Four, Belgian, Flemish, and Dutch integration policies are dissected. It begins 
by laying out current integration policies for these governments, as well as their historical roots. 
It then examines the integration materials that both governments provide to immigrants before 
they enter the country. These materials carry messages about how each government views their 
own policies which can be deciphered through observing their word choices and decisions on 
emphasis. The messages pulled from the integration materials are further substantiated through 
interviews with the government officials and contractors involved with the creation of integration 
examinations. In addition to studying integration policies themselves, this dissertation also 
includes policies that are related to integration in a larger context. Chapter four concludes by 
analyzing government programs such as requests for integration funding from the European 
Union and the nature of government burqa bans are also explored and incorporated into the 
overall analysis. 
Whereas in Chapter Four, I analyze the positions and outreach efforts of governments 
relative to the newly proposed understanding of integration, in Chapter Five I conduct a similar 
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type of analysis at the mass survey level. This analysis allows the dissertation to not only speak 
at the level of policy, but also speculate how changes in existing policy may reflect attitudes 
among the people at large. To conduct this analysis, I survey self-selected native respondents in 
the Netherlands and Belgium and gauge their reactions to two randomly selected vignettes out of 
a pool of four. I hypothesize that responses for those who are shown the new more moderate 
ideologies of “liberalism as identity” and interculturalism will be more favorable (creating higher 
levels of identity-based trust and being more desirable to the survey respondent) than the 
traditional integration ideologies of multiculturalism and assimilation. The study also tests the 
relationship between vignettes and feelings of ethnic and civic importance, projection, and 
meaningfulness of national identity. 
Results from these two empirical chapters are briefly discussed at their respective 
conclusions, as well as in greater detail in Chapter Six. Chapter Four and its qualitative study 
suggest the presence of two different integration policies in Flanders and the Netherlands. 
Despite their similarities, the government of Flanders has vigorously pursued interculturalist 
policies, or those that devote great attention on encouraging contact between the native and 
immigrant population. This strongly contrasts with the Netherland’s idea-oriented, generalized 
more-assimilationist approach. Instead of tailoring the integration process, the Dutch opt for a 
one-size-fits-all, approach. Interestingly, these approaches are also those supported by a majority 
of respondents in Flanders, suggesting a good symmetry between government policies and the 
will of the people. While the many hypotheses of Chapter Five are not always completely 
supported by the data, general trends include overall superior performance for interculturalism, 
generally poor performance for liberalism as identity, and interculturalism’s persistent group 
emphasis.  
7 
 
In Chapter Six, I explore venues for further research on this topic. This includes a deeper 
analysis of liberalism based identities and the inclusion of cosmopolitanism into the new 
typology of integration ideologies. Strategies to strengthen future quantitative studies are also 
explored and the policy implications of the paper’s primary findings are detailed. 
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Chapter 2: Integration and Identities 
 
 At the heart of integration is the concept of identity. The London and Madrid Bombings, 
the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoon controversy, the assassination of Pim Fortuyn and Theo 
Van Gogh, and the attack at Charlie Hebdo all involved immigration and personal dissatisfaction 
with the consequences of the lack of congruency between migrant and native cultures. Immigrant 
alienation is paralleled by suspicion from native citizens. Sniderman et al 2004 and Ivarsflaten 
2008 detail that immigration and considerations of national identity are leading factors 
contributing to exclusionary reactions and far right party membership. Successful integration, by 
contrast, is accomplished when immigrants are able to find a place in a country’s culture and 
society that both they and native citizens feel comfortable with. 
 Beginning with identity, I shall examine the role that national identity plays in the context 
and substantive content of integration. I first discuss the special characteristics of national 
identities in particular, as well as the special context in which national identities are considered 
when discussing integration. I then discuss the complexities of building inclusive national 
identities and the benefits in terms of trust that successful integration can bring.  
Identity as a Component of Integration 
 
 As discussed in Putnam 2007, the purpose of integration policy is to create communal 
identities and a sense of shared citizenship. By identity I refer to “the aspects of an individual’s 
self-image that derive from the (social) categories to which that person perceives himself as 
belonging” (Tajfel and Turner 1979). This means that any sort of identity has a number of 
important characteristics. Identity as a concept is personal. People may choose to opt into or out 
of identities. This self-categorization is also part of the interaction the person has with the 
external world. Society is structured into groups driven by the benefits associated with working 
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together and communal living, and the individual, through self-perception, can opt in or out of 
said grouping. These personal and communal aspects of identity are not entirely separate 
phenomenon. Prestige and position conferred through social groupings can enhance one’s self-
esteem, and one’s personal identifications can impact behavior, potentially impacting standing 
within group structures (Deaux, 1993). Implied in the definition is also the fact that identities can 
be multiple, and can be held at different intensities. For example, a left-handed African 
American can belong in both social groups, but may only feel that only one of these identities are 
particularly salient and valuable. It is up to the individual to arrange and prioritize their multiple 
identities. This arrangement is usually configured in a way that minimizes cognitive dissonance 
(Roccas and Brewer, 2002). The socially constructed components of identities mean that social 
groups (including governments) can play important roles in changing the personal identities of 
individuals.  
Nation Identities as Particular Kinds of Identities 
 
 Successful integration does not focus just on any sort of identities. Rather it concerns 
itself with a particular type of identity, the national one. Montserrat Guibernau defines national 
identity as a “collective sentiment” based on shared feelings of belonging and attributes that 
make a nation distinct from other nations. Such collective sentiments and shared ideas have long 
been viewed as essential for the existence and success of societies (de Tocqueville, 1835 (1991), 
Hobsbawm, 1990). These characteristics of national identities are not unlike those of 
superordinate identities in general. However, as Guibernau continues, there are a few distinctive 
characteristics of national identities. In particular, the relationship of national identities to 
territory and the coercive resources of the state makes national identity different and distinct. 
National identity can therefore be seen as particularly concrete, with its symbols and history tied 
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to physical things like currency, monuments, and land. National identities also have the capacity 
to be enforced by the state’s monopoly on power. National identity is an extremely powerful and 
politicized form of superordinate identity, used to create loyalty not only amongst immigrants, 
but also among conquered peoples and subnational units.  
 Perhaps due to the concept’s ambiguity, there have been only a few attempts to 
deconstruct national identity into its component parts. Keillor and Hult 1999, drawing from 
Herskovits 1948 and Huntington 1996, attempt to break national identity into four universal 
components (using the USA, Mexico, Japan, Sweden, and Hong Kong as test-subjects). These 
include a nation’s belief structure, heritage, ethnocentrism, and cultural homogeneity. Belief 
structure references the nation’s religious orientation and religiosity, heritage constitutes the 
country’s historical reference points, ethnocentricity references the importance individuals place 
upon the national identity, and homogeneity denotes the number of cultures found within a 
country. A strength of this approach is its inclusion of both individual and group components, 
reflecting this dual nature of identity. While Keillor and Hult’s five-country analysis lacks a 
large number of case subjects, it offers an exceptionally helpful theoretical tool for identifying 
and structuring the components of national identity.  
There are a number of ways liberal democratic governments have attempted to create 
identities so as to emphasize shared values. Here the conception of the nation and national 
identity (i.e., the superordinate group) is critically important. Scholars tend to study the content 
of national identities using two distinct schools of thought. One way to view national identities is 
in terms of “national models” (Bertossi et al 2015, Goodman 2012). Because identities are so 
tied to the history and mythology of a people and culture, national models preserve these 
elements as essential (though in the process sacrificing comparativeness). Brubaker 1992 
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identified two different types of nationalisms in his study of Germany and France. Following 
earlier scholars, he labels these categories “ethnic” and “civic” respectively, as they refer to 
conceptions of nationhood that revolve around either ethnic origins and histories (and thus often 
utilizing jus sanguinis as the principle means of acquiring citizenship) or civic responsibilities 
(and thus using the more open jus soli system). Greenfeld 1998 builds upon Brubaker’s work by 
incorporating conceptions of collectivity into Brubaker’s old dichotomy, creating three effective 
types of citizenship regimes/ideologies: collectivistic-ethnic, collectivistic-civic, and 
individualistic-civic.  
 Collectivistic-ethnic countries, claims Greenfeld, are those societies where citizenship is 
defined primarily as membership within a primordial ethnic community. State membership is 
exclusive and exists beyond the individual. Its membership is idealized as homogenous and is 
de-facto distinct from other ethnicities. Germany in the 1990s is often viewed as a typical 
collectivist-ethnic state (Weldon 2006). Collectivistic-civic regimes, on the other hand, try to 
remove ethnicity as a basis for national identification, replacing it with membership in a purely 
constructed civic identity. Best exemplified by France, the principles for which the state stands, 
the cultural symbols it uses, and civic duties become the basis for national membership. Lastly, 
individualistic-civic regimes forego the emphasis of creating similarities altogether. Difference is 
viewed as a right of the individual and from these differences come strength in the form of varied 
experience and enriched livelihoods. Strongly multicultural countries like Canada or Australia 
would be examples of countries with individualistic-civic citizenship regimes.  
 Greenfeld and Weldon’s works illustrate how conceptions of nation and citizen are 
connected and demonstrate the importance of ideas in this process. Weldon’s work in particular 
suggests that the ideas emphasized in determining national membership have some sort of 
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consequence, therefore integration strategies should as well.  However, their conceptualization is 
not without its weaknesses. In particular, the distinctions between civic and ethnic identities are 
not always clear and distinct (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010) and Greenfeld’s models have limited 
international applicability (Heath, Martin, and Sprecklesen, 2009).  
 Due to these shortcomings, a secondary school arose involving the consideration of 
national identities in terms of discourses and ideal policy frames (Scholten, 2011). Rather than 
seeing national identities and their associated integration policies as unique and monolithic, this 
discourse-based approach interprets national identities as a series of coherent normative stories 
that compete with each other and can be switched between over time. Associating a nation with a 
particular national identity or citizenship practice for too long (like the Dutch with 
multiculturalism) risks oversimplification and an under emphasis on the agency of policymakers 
(Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012, Renn and Schon, 1994). The ideal policy frame approach is 
argued to better account inconsistencies present within a nation, as well as changes that occur 
over time. It avoids distilling national identities into stereotypes and prevents tautological 
interpretations of policy. This paper adopts the secondary approach, viewing multiculturalism, 
assimilation, and so forth as competing, discrete interpretations that can be theoretically divorced 
from any one particular country and applied internationally.  
Integration and its Base in Identities 
 
 Europe’s evolving challenge of integrating its immigrant population must begin with 
national identities, as they are the foundations of the subsequent social clashes. But where 
national identities represent the raw material of the problem, “integration” as a concept is a 
process of incorporating identities. As discussed above, integration involves the creation of 
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superordinate, often national, identities. But there is more than just identity creation involved in 
this process.  
Integration is a nebulous concept that can be applied to many different levels of analyses 
and phenomena. Although discussing integration of an entirely different sort, the literature on the 
integration of nation states into the European Union can provide a structural framework for 
considering the integration of migrants into European nation states. Tariq Modood frames the 
problem of integration as one on how to properly handle the differences between people. Using 
Ben Rosamond’s analysis of European integration, we can structure this discussion about 
difference as a contrast between integration as a process and integration as an outcome 
(Rosamond, 2000). We can see this distinction in conceptions of integration at the micro-level. Is 
the offset and successful management of difference something that can be permanently 
accomplished, or is constant action needed to “maintain” a level of integration? 
Ernest Haas speaks to the “outcome” school of thought by defining integration in terms 
of shifting the loyalties of disparate political actors towards a new center (Haas, 1968). 
Integration ideologies differ widely in defining what this center may be, with options including 
the nation, tolerance, speaking a language, etc. Tilly 1997 discusses citizenship (and by 
extension, integration) as a one-time “contract,” where a person trades the acquisition of status in 
exchange for taking on duties and obligations. Adrian Favell elaborates upon and further applies 
this concept, referring to integration as the “glue” that holds society together (Favell, 2001). The 
goal, or outcome, is unity and togetherness. Such a togetherness necessitates not only a 
superordinate identity, but also a degree of significance and meaningfulness.  
 However, the “process” school of thought is also compelling, presented as the creation 
and maintenance of patterns of interaction among previously autonomous units (Wallace, 1990).  
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Under this conception, integration ideologies are seen as contestations over what that pattern of 
interaction might entail. Modood 2013 offers a compelling defense of defining integration as the 
equality of opportunity. He stresses that integration should be seen as a solution to racism, 
xenophobia, and other forms of discrimination and unfair treatment. He further notes that this 
equality must be deep and complete, extending into “subjective and symbolic” dimensions. The 
disadvantaged group must also be seen as equals in society and perceived as such by the 
advantaged/standard group. Integration can be seen as a correction of an imbalance that needs to 
be applied and sustained.  
The purpose of one ideology associated with integration, multiculturalism, is neatly 
packaged into a familiar phrase for most Americans, E Pluribus Unum, or in English “Out of 
Many, One.” In fact, many governments have mottos that emphasize unity and togetherness1.  
Like the concept of identity which underlies it, integration in either understanding can happen at 
both the individual and societal levels. Individuals can adopt traits to unify them with the overall 
population, or be subjected to processes that correct inequalities. This thesis, however, focuses 
on integration at the “macro-symbolic level” (as discussed by Modood 2013). Integration at this 
level concerns how (especially minority) groups are treated and their relationship to society at 
large. How differences are conceptualized at this level inform if they are viewed as something to 
be cherished or eliminated, and if they are viewed as static or persistent.  
The goal of creating unity among peoples (“turning the many into one”) has been well 
studied by social psychologists. Building on Tajfel and Turner 1979’s social identity theory, 
Gaertner and Dovidio 2000 propose their Common In-Group Identity Model (CIIM) as an 
optimal solution to bringing disparate groups together. They propose that the key to unifying 
                                                 
1 Examples include the motto of the EU, “United in Diversity”, Belgium “Unity gives Strength”, etc. 
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distinct groups of people is to create common in-group identities. Gartner and Dovidio note in 
their research that intergroup bias is rooted more in favoritism towards one’s own group than in 
antagonism towards an exterior one. Therefore, they argue, the key to reducing intergroup bias is 
to create superordinate groups through recategorizing dominant group identities into more 
inclusive forms (essentially, turning “us” and “them” into “we”). Research has demonstrated that 
strength of especially exclusive social identities have significant effects on how individuals feel 
and respond to immigration related policy (Breznau and Danielson 2014, Ackerman and Freitag 
2015).  
There are, however, challenges associated with this task. These new in-group identities 
must be constructed with the utmost care. Indeed, Dovidio et al 2009 noted that a frequent 
critique of the common in-group identity theory is that these new, more inclusive in-groups are 
difficult to maintain. Here they reference Marilynn Brewer’s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory 
(hereafter ODT) for explanation (1991). Brewer argued that people have competing desires for 
belonging and distinctiveness, and truly durable groups reflect this fact. If the identity upon 
which a group is based is defined either too broadly or too narrowly, it will not be desirable or 
important to its members. An identity that is overly homogenizing will not allow for the 
differentiation members require, harming individuality and personal agency. However, an 
identity that is too inclusive will not provide the sense of belonging people crave, marginalizing 
and ultimately rendering the identity irrelevant. The best identities are therefore those that 
balance these two competing imperatives.  
Figure one illustrates Brewer’s conception in a different fashion. As inclusion increases, 
the need for being part of a group (here referenced as “assimilation”), decreases. The group 
incorporates more individuals, which widens its identity to incorporate more individuals in a 
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more complete manner. However, as the group identity widens, the salience of its identity 
decreases. Salience here refers to the “relative importance of the group boundary” (Breznau, 
2014). The identity means less because more differences are included in the group, which makes 
the identity less capable of satisfying human needs for differentiation. The optimal identity is 
therefore at the point where the sum of these needs can be maximized, which would be some 
middle level of inclusion. This research suggests that national identities, as identities, will 
observe similar behavior.  
Dovidio et al 2009 note that if Brewer’s conception is correct, the creation of inclusive 
in-groups will always create backlash through their inability to satisfy their member’s needs for 
differentiation. Dovidio argues, however, that even if Brewer is correct, there is still some 
usefulness in constructing in-group identities, as even the effects of dissolved in-groups can 
increase the success of future attempts (Gaertner et al, 1988). Rather than see the optimal 
distinctiveness theory as running contrary to the Common In-Group Identity Model, the ODT 
can provide a guide to creating more successful inclusive in-group identities. The amount of 
inclusion within the common in-group can be adjusted according to Brewer’s recommendations 
to achieve the benefits observed by Gaertner and Dovidio without sacrificing in-group stability.  
Identity Hierarchies Present in Integration 
 
Considering national identities in the context of integration, another layer of analysis is 
the power dynamic between a privileged in-group (native citizens) and a disadvantaged out-
group (immigrants).  When there is a power differential between two groups, the resulting larger, 
or superordinate, group (all citizens) cannot too closely resemble the identity of the original in-
group, lest the out-group see their fusion into the in-group as a hostile attempt at subjugation. 
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Worse still, such actions could spawn discrimination towards the out-group and overall 
intergroup hostility (Branscombe and Wann, 1994). 
However, as the in-group has the power to create the new superordinate identity, they 
have an incentive to project whatever they consider to be their own identity onto the 
superordinate one. Such projection would increase the appeal of the superordinate identity to the 
in-group, as well as reduce any cognitive dissonance for in-group members (as both native born 
citizens and immigrants stand to benefit in being considered prototypical or “ideal” citizens). 
Wenzel et al. 2007 calls this phenomenon the “In-group Projection Model” (IPM). Avoiding the 
consequences of the IPM for migrant integration is particularly difficult. National identities, as 
they exist, are frequently supported by deep histories and the social and symbolic machinery of 
the nation state. However a national identity is defined, it is done so subjectively (Schinkel, 
2013). Even defining national identities in more inclusive terms (such as “modernity” or 
“individualism”) requires certain subjective criterion used to measure and conceptualize these 
ideas. National majorities usually have no incentive to refrain from projecting their own cultural 
identities on any attempt to create a superordinate identity.  
Sacrificing characteristics of national identities is a very demanding process, and 
minority groups like immigrants usually do not possess the leverage needed to persuade native 
citizens to undertake this task. Social psychology has yet to identify a solution for overcoming 
this in-group projection problem. The IPM illustrates the importance of national identities 
appealing to all groups involved in the integration process, especially (but certainly not 
exclusively) the needs of the native citizen. The theory also echoes the need for balance between 
inclusion and exclusion called for in Brewer 1991. Balancing the needs of the native population 
with those of the immigrant can be seen as an extension of this balance.  
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The Role of Trust in Integration 
 
One might wonder why the in-group would seek to create superordinate identities (or 
integrate) at all, instead choosing to enforce assimilation into its own in-group identity. Drawing 
again from the social psychology literature, it seems that the true value of a superordinate 
(national) identity comes primarily from the threat-neutralizing ability it has on out-group 
members. National identities provide a path for potentially “subversive” immigrants to 
homogenize into the national culture. If members of an out-group share some characteristics with 
the in-group, they may also share some preferences, and can therefore be better trusted to act as 
loyal agents of the in-group.  This desired increase in trust is particularly important to remember, 
as it is the primary purpose of integration policy-making (ie: to allow for more harmonious 
relations between new and native citizens).  
 It is therefore important to understand how trust is studied in the literature and what sort 
of trust integration policies seek to maximize. Scholars have conceptualized three types of trust 
frequently used in social interaction. There are particularized trust (trust shown towards people 
one personally knows), generalized trust (trust bestowed upon strangers), and identity-based trust 
(trust shown among people who share identities). Particularized trust is critically dependent upon 
past experiences, preferably repeated ones. It is from these experiences that actors can come to 
reasonably expect reciprocity, honesty, and fulfillment of promises (Berggren and Jordahl, 
2005).  
Generalized trust, however, is more closely associated with a person’s environment and 
upbringing. Culture and religion can instill a greater willingness to trust strangers, as can 
interactions with collective bodies of people, such as government and elements of civil society 
(Hardin, 2002). Additionally, levels of particularized trust can influence levels of generalized 
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trust. This phenomenon, known as the “transitivity of trust” comes from repeatedly trusting 
people who are known (particularized trust). This can create a habit of trust that can increase a 
person’s willingness to trust a stranger as well (Putnam 1995). This habit is a change of basic 
presumptions when interacting with people, namely that they are trustworthy instead of 
untrustworthy.  
 Identity-based trust is separate from both types of trust discussed above and is the most 
important type of trust for integration. Identity-based trust refers to the trustworthiness of one 
group of people relative to another. First formulated by Tajfel 1974 and elaborated upon by 
Tajfel and Turner 1979, the concept was meant to bridge a gap in the trust literature between 
generalized and particularized trust. Identity-based trust is neither constrained to specific 
individuals, as particularized trust is, nor is it bestowed upon people that are undifferentiated 
strangers, as generalized trust is. Rather, this type of trust refers to how people interact with 
groups and group identities. Identities shared between people (be it class, race, religion, etc.) can 
create a basis from which bonds of trust can be formed that are stronger than those found just 
between strangers. Psychologically, people are inclined to bestow positive attributes upon 
members of groups to which they themselves belong (Brewer, 1996).  Additionally, group 
identities can serve as a simplifying heuristic that can operate in information-poor environments 
(Stolle 2002). Because two people share group identities, it is presumed that they also share 
some preferences, and therefore can be trusted more. Also, a history of trust would not be 
necessary because a violation of trust based upon a shared identity once bestowed is often 
considered particularly loathsome. It would be an offense not only to the person betrayed, but to 
group norms as well (Stolle, 2002). Group censure is used as a strong tool to discourage 
violations of identity based trust (also noted in Fearon and Laitin, 1996).  
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Lewicki and Bunker, in Kramer and Tyler 1996, elaborate further on identity based trust 
from the perspective of labor and management. Identity-based trust (in this case referring to 
employee loyalty to their firm), can be strong or weak, depending on how strongly the group 
identity is developed. They discuss four ways in which this group identity can be made salient, 
drawn from Shapiro et al. 1992. They include 1.) the development of collective identity through 
the use of symbols, names, songs, titles, etc., 2.) a collocation in the same building, 
neighborhood, country, etc., 3.) the creation of joint products or goals, and 4.) commitment to 
commonly shared values. Shapiro’s recommendations directly apply to how states can increase 
the importance of national identity. Some of these recommendations, like collocation, happen 
automatically, but others, like committing to commonly shared values, are more difficult. This 
commitment to shared values is particularly important in developing salient and trust-inducing 
identities, as it ensures actors within a group evaluate situations in the same way as other group 
members do.  
By understanding the styles and components of trust, the success or failure of different 
integration approaches can be determined. While trust creation may not be the only metric for 
determining integration success, it provides needed contextualization for the endeavor of group 
building. Furthermore, the notion of identity based trust allows us to understand some of the 
components of identity salience and appeal (as they are the building blocks for the trust identities 
provide).   
Conclusion 
 
 Integration is a complicated process that involves overcoming both inequality and the 
power dynamic that is associated with it. The construction of effective superordinate national 
identities can be one way to further these goals at the macro-symbolic level. It involves not only 
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negotiating the religion and history of a country, but also the expectations, rights, and norms 
expected by the native citizens. When constructed properly, national identities will be attractive 
to immigrants, increasing trust and social cohesion in society. But when these superordinate 
identities are constructed in ways that are coercive or exclusive, national identities can lead to 
further prejudice and xenophobia. Immigrants may reject superordinate identities if the in-group 
projects too heavily. Conversely, if the need for differentiation is not met in a particular identity, 
native citizens may reject superordinate identities and form far right parties to contest the more 
inclusive national identity. The content of national identities ultimately varies by country, but 
one aspect we can study comparatively is Keillor and Hult’s “ethnocentrism” component, or how 
citizens and governments approach their own heritage. While many simplify this component in 
terms of “high” and “low”, there are a variety of different understandings about the macro-
symbolic nature of societies that can make a significant difference for the success of creating 
equality through integration.  
 These principles offer scholars a guide to better understand and evaluate integration 
policies. By using social psychological principles, previously abstract and normative concepts 
can be organized and evaluated. Integration in particular is usually considered as a dichotomy, 
pitting multicultural against assimilatory ideas. Using the principles discussed in this chapter, the 
strength of this conceptualization can be evaluated. The Optimal Distinctiveness Theory and In-
group Projection Model emphasize the importance of moderate solutions when it comes to 
creating common in-group identities. Both the degree of inclusion present in the identity and the 
favoritism shown towards native citizens must be balanced to achieve greatest durability. 
National identities are particular forms of identities, and therefore should follow the logic of 
these theories. As such, these theories suggest that a reconceptualization of integration is needed. 
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Rather than categorizing a complex phenomenon like integration into the two camps of 
assimilation and multiculturalism, the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory and In-group Projection 
Model suggest that a continuum might be most useful in creating situations where a maximal 
amount of trust is created through maximally durable in-groups.  
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Chapter 3: Deconstructing the Assimilationist-Multiculturalist 
Dichotomy 
 
Integration is commonly framed as a choice between multiculturalism (individualistic-
civic) and assimilation (collectivist-civic), which are together seen as the two primary modes of 
acculturating or changing cultures (Berry 1974, Sam and Berry, 2010). This happens because 
these two categorizations follow from answering the normative “yes-no” question on the value 
on maintaining immigrant cultural heritage. Answering “yes” entails multiculturalism and 
answering “no” entails assimilation. While it is tempting to simplify the world into these “black 
and white” categories, I argue that integration is far too complex of a concept to do this 
effectively. Even setting aside differences in national histories and cultures, popular decisions 
about the value of immigrant ethnicity should incorporate the “shades of gray” often found in the 
real world.  
I propose a reframed understanding of integration that relies on a fluid continuum, 
creating a more flexible understanding that should be more useful for the purposes of policy-
making. This theoretical argument is supported through a critical exploration of the existing 
dichotomy, as well as advocating for the inclusion of new integration ideologies. Furthermore, I 
support my arguments through pair of surveys, sampling undergraduates at the University of 
Illinois Urbana Champaign. The results suggest that the people recognize the distinctiveness of 
different styles of integration beyond assimilation and multiculturalism. They also demonstrate 
that respondents think about ordering integration strategies in the manner hypothesized by this 
study.  
By integration ideologies, I reference the sociopolitical and philosophical 
recommendations to establish and/or sustain the social component of a particular national 
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identity. These ideologies, also known as “ideal-typical” frames, are comprised of four 
components (Scholten, 2011). These include establishing a name and classifying groups as native 
or foreign, cultural or religious, economic or refugee. These integration strategies must also tell a 
story about how these groups interact and explain phenomenon such as violence, social 
disharmony, or racism. Furthermore, the story must also contain a normative component. The 
story describes not only what is, but what ought to be. These stories occur within particular 
countries, and so political elites can exercise some leverage in creating policies that intersect 
with these stories. Policy creation and revision can occur after a “frame shift” or “frame 
reflection” (Rein and Schon, 1994). These usually follow external perturbations that spur 
reflection about the consistency and coherence of story relative to observations about the world 
and the appropriateness of the solution that the frames offer. In the European case, frame shifts 
about immigrant integration in particular can occur when far right parties get seats in the 
government of center-right coalitions (Akkerman, 2012). They also can be brought about by 
consultative commissions called by the government, although there is some risk that these 
commissions themselves become politicized, weakening their overall impact (Scheider and 
Scholten, 2015). Because these ideologies concern constructed components of national identities, 
and because the nation speaks from a position of privilege regarding what its national identity 
should be, these frame shifts situate nations in different positions relative to the ideal-typical 
frame.  
Traditional Integration Ideologies: Multiculturalism  
  
 I begin this discussion about integration ideologies with well-known frames, and then 
work outwards towards new and more exotic ones. Multiculturalism is a difficult term to define, 
for while its basic qualities are easy to comprehend, there is no shortage of variant definitions, 
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depending on the country and philosophical starting point (Sijl, 2010). Beginning with two 
general definitions, Modood 2013 discusses multiculturalism most broadly as “being true to 
one’s nature or heritage and seeking with others of the same kind public recognition of one’s 
collectivity.” Modood rightfully notes that in Europe, multiculturalism tends to take a different 
meaning that, although not divorced from the larger meaning, tends to be somewhat narrower in 
nature. He notes this “narrow conception” of integration involves the recognition of group 
difference in the public sphere, including related to laws, policies, citizenship, and national 
identities.  
To further complicate matters, multiculturalism is frequently conceptually bifurcated into 
the multiculturalism of countries that have historically accepted mass-immigration like the 
United States and Canada, and those where mass-immigration is a new phenomenon, like 
countries found in Europe. This functionally translates into the “new world” countries having 
stronger federal states with more experience negotiating difference and protecting minorities. 
(Brewin, 1997). Will Kymlicka defines these countries as those who legally admit immigrants as 
residents and future citizens, as opposed to guest workers or refugees (Kymlicka, 2007). These 
countries have transitioned over time towards migrant-oriented multiculturalism. Kymlicka 
defines the important tenets of “immigrant multiculturalism” to include all or some of the 
following: a legal affirmation of multiculturalism, the adoption of multiculturalism in school 
curricula, “the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or 
media licensing”, ethnic exemptions from dress codes, dual citizenship, funding of ethnic 
organizations, and bilingual education, and an adoption of affirmative action for immigrant 
groups. Kymlicka is quick to note that these characteristics are most common ones and are 
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therefore likely to be controversial as a comprehensive definition of what multiculturalism 
entails in the policy sphere.  
 In the same book, Kymlicka later tries to narrow multiculturalism down to its essential 
elements, but the effort still leaves much to be desired. He mentions that multiculturalism is 
firstly “highly group differentiated”, targeting different minority groups with different minority 
rights. Multiculturalism also entails not just recognition, but the redistribution of power and 
resources from dominant towards non-dominant sociopolitical groups. Lastly, he notes that 
multiculturalism should not be considered anathema to nationalism (or assimilation). Rather, he 
asserts that multiculturalism serves as a moderating force to nationalism, pushing the national-
building process down paths that are “less likely to marginalize or stigmatize minorities.” This 
third point is particularly contested. It also takes a holistic view of the national-identity creating 
process, refusing to sever multiculturalism from nationalism as a separate entity. The strongest 
point in favor of this interpretation, as Kymlicka rightly notes, is that there exists no modern state 
that does not engage in some nation-building exercise. Even the most multicultural societies 
enforce the national language, fund museums, promote national imagery and symbols, and so 
forth.  
 In later pieces, Kymlicka adds considerable nuance to this viewpoint. He makes the 
distinction between the commonly held interpretation of multiculturalism and multiculturalism as 
he himself understands it. Kymlicka argues that most people consider multiculturalism as 
synonymous with cultural celebration. He calls this “3S” multiculturalism, borrowing from 
Brown 2001. The 3S stands for “saris, samosas, and steel drums”, a critique of the superficiality 
and distance that this conceptualization of multiculturalism fosters.  
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Kymlicka, however, views multiculturalism as new model of democratic citizenship 
(Kymlicka 2012). Here he defines multiculturalism as “constructing new civic and political 
relations to overcome the deeply entrenched inequalities that have persisted after the abolition of 
formal discrimination.” Echoing his prior work, he argues that this kind of multiculturalism is 
concerned with political and economic inequalities, obliges both migrant and native to uphold 
the values of human rights and civil liberties, and spurs interaction between native and migrant 
populations. Multiculturalism, according to Kymlicka, is thus a rejection of the idea that there is 
only one way to be a citizen of a country. Rather, it should best be seen as a “filter”, a way to 
bring plural conceptions of citizenship into line with liberal democratic principles. As state 
sponsored discrimination faded away in industrialized societies, affirmative action policies have 
stepped in to further dismantle the remaining power hierarchies.  
 Considering the current events in Europe, and explaining the “retreat from 
multiculturalism” present there, Kymlicka offers five factors that can foster or undermine 
multiculturalism in various countries. Not surprisingly, many of them apply quite strongly to the 
European countries, like the Netherlands, that are experiencing difficulties with multiculturalism. 
These factors include whether immigration has security connotations, whether the immigrant 
group is seen as a.) economically contributing to society and b.) invested in human rights, 
whether countries have control over their borders, and how diverse the immigrant group is. 
These are all important conditions for perceptions of risk, and as Kymlicka rightfully notes, this 
creates a difficult situation for multiculturalism. It is easy to adopt generous policies towards 
immigrants when the consequences are minor, and similarly easy to use harsh policies when a 
danger is near. However, Kymlicka argues that policy makers and voters must fight against these 
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easy urges, as assimilationist immigration policies further antagonize immigrants at the time that 
they need understanding the most.  
 Kymlicka’s elaborations on multiculturalism are clearly well thought out, blending 
political philosophy with empirical argumentation. However, the distinction between 3S 
multiculturalism and Kymlicka’s own “multiculturalism as citizenization” (hereafter, MaC) is 
problematic. Like Kymlicka’s own critique of Miller 1995’s idea of “radical multiculturalism”, 
“multiculturalism as citizenization” seems to lack applicability to how people think about 
multiculturalism. Kymlicka convincingly shows that MaC corresponds most closely with real 
world policies through his reference to the scores compiled in Banting and Kymlicka’s 
“Multiculturalism Policy Index” database (2010). However, he admits that the 3S understanding 
of multiculturalism dominates the literature critical of the concept (Kymlicka 2012). While this 
does not rule out the possibility of mass misunderstanding, there is something that drives the 3S 
vision and makes it convincing.  
Kymlicka tackles this point head on, attributing the prevalence of this vision to three 
sources, namely poisonous rhetoric and the rise of more exclusive and coercive civic integration 
policies. Kymlicka’s discussion of integration policies will be explored at greater length in the 
next section. However, his attempt to dismiss the 3S approach as rhetoric is unconvincing. While 
Banting and Kymlicka’s construction and use of their index is to be admired for its vision and 
comparative purposes, its coding is subjective. The indexes and decisions are informed by 
academic, political, and secondary sources, but there are no rules governing the inclusion of 
sources and the justification of scoring. The rules that the index uses are clearly elaborated and 
empirically backed, but at its core, the findings remain dependent on the flexible interpretations 
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of the reviewer or guidelines given by the index itself2,3. This, coupled with the index’s coarse 
granularity (10-20 years), limits its usefulness, especially when responding to other, more 
interpretive, narratives.  
Furthermore, his multiculturalism as citizenization runs into troubling philosophical 
problems. If multiculturalism does not embrace complete cultural relativism, then an internal 
tension develops within the concept. Inherently, this understanding of multiculturalism seems to 
erect social hierarchies, placing the liberal above the illiberal and mandating the illiberal to 
conform to the liberal and/or postmodern. While not racial or ethnic in character, these ideas 
have historical roots that tie them to certain cultures, peoples, and places. This is clearly seen in 
the case of Islamic immigration, which draws from entirely different cultures and 
rationalizations. For example, the wearing of the veil may be seen as oppressive to the 
Westerner, yet to the Muslim, it may be a statement of modesty (and in some more modern 
interpretations, a rejection of materialism).  Kymlicka tries to rescue multiculturalism from 
cultural relativism by noting that even the most multicultural Western countries do not exempt 
immigrants from standards prohibiting forced marriages or cliterodectomies. But does this 
originate from multiculturalism itself, or from aspects of assimilation that were not “filtered out” 
through the multicultural discourse? 
                                                 
2 This is not surprising, considering the subject matter involved.  
3 For example, one measure involves the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction. One point is 
given if the country funds bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction either for children or adults, a half point 
is granted if this is done in some provinces, states or areas, but not offered as a general rule, and no points are given 
if the country does not fund bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction. This rule has a number of ambiguities. 
For example, a country funding bilingual education for adults would be scored the same was as one giving mother-
tongue instruction for both (which indicates a much higher degree of commitment to multiculturalism). How many 
“some” is for a half point will either be arbitrary or suffer a similar problem of coding a country with 99% of the 
localities participating as the same as one where only one percent of the localities do so. Regarding the rule for no 
points, the rule leaves little flexibility for third parties offering these services and their varied relationships to the 
state. 
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It is not clear how Kymlicka’s “multiculturalism as citizenization” avoids the problem of 
creating hierarchies and delegitimizing cultures. By insisting on Western “human rights” values, 
this interpretation of multiculturalism ultimately loses its distinctness from assimilation. It is still 
assimilating immigrants to national ideals, however thinly defined. To characterize human rights 
as a universal ignores its Western origins and perspective. This tension about how value-laden 
multiculturalism should be further explored in future literature.  
Traditional Integration Ideologies: Assimilation 
 
 The literature on classic assimilation is not very large, as it is considered a default form 
of integration inherent in the nation-state system. Multiculturalism is usually presented as a 
unique deviation from traditional assimilation policies (as in Kymlicka 2007). The Westphalian 
system of nation-states implies that the land of a particular state be occupied and ruled by a 
particular nation of people. This nation is privileged and uses the state to “express its 
nationhood” (ibid). Integration policies are intended to be coercive tools meant to transform 
those who are not “nationals” into those who are.  Those who do not wish to conform to national 
characteristics are not seen as welcome within the nation state, a “love it or leave it” ideological 
approach.  
Within the assimilation literature, there is some debate about how robust assimilation 
needs to be. Alba and Nee 2003 introduce one approach, defining assimilation as “the decline of 
ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences”. They are quick to note that 
this doesn’t mean the complete abolition of ethnicity, only its decline in salience and relevance 
when used in relation to others. Assimilation is not ethnic; it works against the notion that 
national membership is a closed system translated through ancestry. Rather, the other elements 
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of ethnicity such as the shared culture, language, religion, and history are considered most 
important. These characteristics, while unique and people-specific, can be adopted by anyone. 
This understanding of assimilation does not veer far from Greenfeld’s “collectivist-civic” 
nationalism as opposed to her “collectivist-ethnic” one. Instead of becoming like native citizens, 
this conception of assimilation focuses on the seeking new ethnicity-neutral ways to relate 
between individuals.  
Writing within the acculturation literature, Berry 1997 takes a more robust approach, 
defining assimilation as an active rejection of one’s own culture and its importance. Berry notes 
that instead, those wishing to assimilate seek “daily interaction with other cultures.” He argues 
that the end goal of assimilation should be to make those integrating “like those in the dominant 
society.” While ethnicity obviously cannot be imparted into immigrants, this understanding 
advocates a maximization of shared characteristics as opposed to simply preferring native 
cultures over non-native ones.  
 Kymlicka does a great service by discussing civic integration policies, as this provides a 
way to properly contextualize assimilatory policies and their relationship to multicultural ones. 
Seeing multiculturalism as an offshoot of liberalism, he deems illiberal (and therefore 
incompatible with multiculturalism) civic integration policies that are coercive or involve closed 
conceptions of national identity. If multicultural policies are about disassembling hierarchies, 
then these sorts of assimilatory civic integration policies maintain and enhance them. Kymlicka 
also asserts that assimilation tends to be more duty-based, insisting that immigrants fulfill certain 
tasks or requirements before they are admitted into their host society as full members. This is 
contrasted to the more multicultural account of integration as a “right to integrate” or join 
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society. This approach is accompanied by a variety of tools used to help the immigrant in doing 
so.  
The Interculturalist Alternative 
 
 From ascendant far right parties to migrant ghettoization, there are signs that the 
multiculturalism-assimilation dichotomy forces policymakers into picking between two 
suboptimal situations.  The dominant way of categorizing integration ideologies as multicultural 
or assimilatory excludes a number of novel alternatives that should be considered. While there is 
plenty of debate over the relative merits of multiculturalism and assimilation, there is much less 
about the alternatives to these two. What literature does exist is primarily normative or 
specialized to particular subfields such as education.  
One of the alternative integration ideologies is known as “interculturalism”. According to 
Berry 1997, this approach first arose in the French literature as an alternative conceptualization 
for assimilation. Clanet 1990 defined interculturation as “the set of processes by which 
individuals and groups interact when they identify themselves as culturally distinct.” We can see 
from this definition an emphasis on interaction and an assumption that group identities are real 
and distinct. Berry adds to this discussion that interculturation focuses more on the creation of 
new cultures as opposed to the maintenance of a dominant one. These dueling priorities 
accurately reflect interculturalism’s nuanced position. It acknowledges that individuals belong to 
distinct, non-hierarchical cultures, yet at the same time seeks to create completely new cultures 
that bring people together. Interculturalism later took the first steps towards policies in the field 
of cross-cultural education (Booth 2003). 
Interculturalism began to take shape as a viable policy alternative after the findings of the 
2008 Bouchard-Taylor report in Quebec. The authors begin by noting that it has been long 
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observed that Quebec’s approach to integration has historically sought to balance the ideas of 
unity and ethnic recognition (Gagnon, 2000). This balance was never specifically defined as 
“interculturalism”, but functioned as a principle in the political background. They then discuss 
the need for the existence of a “minimum of cohesion” in Quebec. Such a minimum is necessary 
for the establishment of a cultural solidarity and for mobilization in times of emergencies. These 
things are particularly important in Quebec, where its French-speaking majority is already a 
minority within Canada. The report sought to determine the bounds of reasonable 
accommodation multiculturalism must allow foreigners and migrants. Within this report, 
Bouchard and Taylor discuss moderating Canada’s robust multicultural policies, and name their 
new set of recommendations “interculturalism”. 
In the resulting scholarship, four common themes have emerged that attempt to define 
interculturalism, mirroring some of the initial components discussed by Clanet and Berry. 
Outlined by Meer and Modood 2011, these are:  
 
1.) increasing “communication” and interaction between majority and minority groups 
(such as arranged contacts and exchanges, debates, initiatives and joint projects),  
2.) multidirectional dialogue that changes all cultures involved, not just minority ones 
3.) a stronger emphasis on unification and the needs of majority cultures  
4.) the ability to criticize illiberal culture and escape cultural relativism  
 
Watt 2006 adds to this discussion by noting that multiculturalism as commonly adopted 
fosters only a superficial understanding of difference, not promoting enough interaction between 
groups and wrongfully assuming that the state is a neutral broker within the assimilation process. 
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He discusses further how Ireland (observing Canadian recommendations) is developing 
integration policies that create interaction between groups, rather than passively presuming it 
will occur.  
It is important to note that Bouchard and Taylor did not wish to abandon ethnically 
sensitive policies in general (especially since Quebec benefits from such policies). They argue 
that ethnic groups serve an important transition role for newly arrived immigrants. These 
beacons of familiarity can bridge transitions, providing the recognizable and familiar in an 
unfamiliar land (eg: Duc Do, 2006). Bouchard and Taylor argue that the increased emphasis on 
interaction overcomes any social fragmentation created by these groups. 
Outside of Canada, an example of interculturalism in Europe can be seen in the positions 
of the outspoken mayor of Rotterdam, Ahmed Aboutaleb. Born in Morocco, Mr. Aboutaleb has 
been widely advocating what he calls a “we-society”, a social situation founded on tolerance and 
acceptance which emphasizes cooperation between peoples (Aboutaleb, 2015a). In his CNN 
interview, Aboutaleb recognized the presence and value of diversity, speaking particularly about 
Rotterdam, the most ethnically diverse city in the Netherlands. With this fact in mind, though, he 
emphasizes that this diversity underlines the necessity of the rule of law. No culture can be given 
preferential treatment in light of so many living together. Only principles that build community 
and togetherness can serve as stable grounds to unite a community.  
Aboutaleb, taking an unusually strict stance for a member of the Dutch labor party, 
continues by saying that if individuals opt out of the community, or threaten it, or “go to Yemen 
to learn how to use a Kalashnikov”, then those people should no longer be welcomed in the “we-
society” (ibid.).  In a separate piece, he notes that people in the “we-society” have 
responsibilities to the Dutch constitution’s principles of tolerance (Aboutaleb, 2015b). He 
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advocates for a society where everyone can be what they’d like, so long as they are willing to let 
others do the same. Even radicals are welcome in the “we-society”, so long as they behave 
within the limits of the law.   
Interculturalism’s primary conceptual weakness lies in its similarities to multiculturalism. 
Tremblay 2009 begins this discussion, noting the difficulties in distinguishing interculturalism 
from multiculturalism. He asserts that the former shares a number of qualities with the latter, 
including most importantly an emphasis on diversity and non-hierarchical nature. Sticking 
closely to the content of the Bouchard-Taylor report, Tremblay notes how that its interactivity-
intensive recommendations align with recommendations for dialogue and community frequently 
mentioned by leading multicultural authors such as Kymlicka. Meer and Modood 2011 build 
upon this argument that interculturalism is not intellectually distinct from multiculturalism. They 
argue that each of the four common themes they use to describe interculturalism is foundational 
to multiculturalism.  
This problem of distinctiveness ultimately stems from the ambiguous definition of 
multiculturalism.  Tremblay, Meer, and Modood use Kymlicka’s understanding of 
multiculturalism as citizenization, which is more assimilatory in nature than 3S multiculturalism. 
However, as discussed in the prior section on multiculturalism, there are some philosophical 
problems with “multiculturalism as citizenization” that may serve to reinforce hierarchies and 
delegitimize cultures. Meer and Modood’s critique of interculturalism is critically dependent 
upon the legitimacy of Kymlicka’s version of multiculturalism, which attempts to claim some of 
interculturalism’s advantages as its own.  
 In light of this tension between cultural relativism and multiculturalism, I will argue that 
interculturalism can be distinguished from multiculturalism by its insistence on increasing 
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intergroup unity and escaping cultural relativism. 3S multiculturalism will be used here due to its 
consistency for hierarchy dissolution and cultural respect. Interculturalism will be treated as a 
quasi-assimilationist ideology that upholds certain universal principles beyond multiculturalism’s 
necessary tolerance for diversity. For the purpose of this study, this universal principle will be a 
strict necessity for cooperation and dialogue between groups. Despite this principle, 
interculturalism remains closely tied to multiculturalism in its formation of a superordinate 
(national) identity enriched by diversity. If multiculturalism is commonly referred to as the 
“salad bowl,” interculturalism would be best considered as a burrito, a variety of mixing 
ingredients surrounded and encapsulated by minimal robust values and principles whose sole 
purpose is to keep the ingredients mixed together. 
Liberalism as Identity as Another Option 
 
 Related to this discussion of interculturalism is another neglected assimilation ideology 
this paper will identify as “liberalism as identity” (LAI) (Joppke 2008). Like interculturalism, 
LAI rejects the multicultural frame by prioritizing shared universal principles. However, LAI 
infuses these principles with more meaning, giving them a stronger role in the integration 
process. Liberalism as identity emphasizing that the universality of classical liberalism and 
liberal values grants them a superiority that allows liberalism morally trump any aspect of 
diversity which runs counter to them. Whereas interculturalism requires only enough universal 
principles to ensure dialogue and engagement, LAI prioritizes all of the ideals associated with 
the liberal ideology, including controversial elements like the primacy of reason over 
superstition. Whereas interculturalism allows for the majority culture to change as a result of 
cultural mixing, LAI holds changes in liberal tenets as out of bounds.  
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 Joppke 2008 , drawing from Gray 2000, discusses how liberalism, from its conception, 
has had two competing sides, one stressing tolerance (also known as modus vivendi or simply 
vivendi liberalism) and the other stressing an ideal way of life via human autonomy and use of 
reason (also known as Republicanism, drawing from its French heritage). In his earlier 2007 
piece, Joppke also refers to these competing sides of liberalism as “Rawlsian Liberalism” and 
“Foucauldian Liberalism” respectively. He ties the coercive side of liberalism that LAI embodies 
to Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” or the building of ties between government and 
modes of thought (Foucault 1982, Lemke 2002). While Goodman rightfully notes that these 
bridges between governed and government are present in all forms of coercive integration 
policies, path dependency can lead even the most innocent and liberal of beginnings to coercive 
destinations (Goodman 2012).  
Joppke points to European history to justify the existence of the liberalism as identity, 
discussing tension between religious and scientific powers during the Age of Enlightenment. He 
further argues that each of these sides, “liberalism as tolerance” and “liberalism as identity” 
respectively, periodically grow stronger than their counterpart, with liberalism as identity 
dominating Europe’s colonial era and liberalism as tolerance dominating the era after the Second 
World War. Joppke 2008 further argues that with the debate over Muslim migrants in Europe, 
liberalism as identity is enjoying a return to prominance, though without its former imperialist 
trappings. We can see calls for this very type of “muscular liberalism” in the statements of Prime 
Minster Cameron, President Sarkozy, and Chancellor Merkel in 2011. Joppke was not alone in 
tying these facts to contemporary politics. Habermas also acknowledges the competing faces of 
liberalism in his reflections on secularism’s relationship with Islam in western society (Habermas 
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et al, 2008). Like Joppke, he ultimately calls for dialogue and balance between these two faces of 
liberalism.  
 In both pieces, Joppke regards Liberalism as Identity with an abundance of caution. Its 
assertion of detailed universal and superior values carries with it the threat of fanaticism and 
intolerance. LAI divides the world into liberals and illiberals, commanding the later to conform 
to the wishes of the former. However, many scholars do not view this development as 
unexpected. Talcott Parsons discussed the trend towards “value generalization” that follows in 
the wake of globalization (1971). Similarly, this kind of aggressive liberalism is suggested by 
German political philosopher Carl Schmitt. An ardent realist, Schmitt defined politics as the 
process of creating friends and enemies. Liberalism, he critiqued, has difficulty doing this, which 
constitutes arrogance and a weakness. He therefore suggests a type of liberalism later called 
“Schmittian Liberalism” that is able to take forceful measures to defend itself against those 
seeking to do it harm (Schmitt, 1996). This type of liberalism is not unlike Joppke’s “liberalism 
as identity”, advocating (in times of crisis) illiberal means to promote liberal ends 
(Triadafilopoulos, 2011).  
It is these sorts of contradictions present in LAI that make it so peculiar. It is at once 
universal enough to be open to everyone, yet particular enough to form a salient, even 
compelling, identity. Nothing formally bars the illiberal from embracing such a national identity 
outside of that individual’s own conviction or belief. And the very same principle that works to 
protect that individual’s belief also firmly denounces it. Likewise, it protects liberalism through 
the use of illiberal means. In countries such as the Netherlands (whose popular far right party, the 
Party for Freedom, seems to be embracing an ideology that is very close to LAI), the answer to 
the tension between freedom and tolerance tends to favor tolerance. A society that favors 
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liberalism as identity will prioritize open, tolerant, and respectful behavior even if these ideas are 
elastic. As Schinkle 2013 notes, even tolerance and openness to modernity can be used to 
exclude individuals that fall outside of their arbitrary definitions.  
Liberalism as Identity represents a peculiar form of universal, yet strongly collectivist, 
identity. Joppke 2013, arguing that liberalism can be considered as an identity, notes a similarity 
shared with Nazism and Communism. Like liberalism, the ideas of communism and socialism 
have been considered particularly powerful identities, despite all three having universalizing 
tendencies. It is this universality of values, transcending the nation state, which distinguishes 
liberalism as identity from collectivistic-civic/assimilationist regimes. Some collectivist-civic 
regimes claim to protect the same universal ideals that LAI does, such as freedom, justice, 
equality, etc. However, these claims are filtered through the nation-state. The nation-state 
becomes the provider of these values, and they take on certain national characteristics as a result. 
LAI flips this relationship between values and nation in favor of values. A citizen who believes 
in LAI would consider him or herself first a liberal, and second a 
Dutchman/Frenchman/Englishman, instead of the inverse. Liberty and freedoms are not products 
or privileges of the state, but rather are channeled and protected by them.   
Towards a New Integration Typology 
 
We see in the political philosophy literature a ferocious debate which tends to revolve 
around the competing integration ideologies of assimilation and multiculturalism. On a 
theoretical level, scholars led by Will Kymlicka (2001) have argued that the neutrality of 
assimilationist regimes is a sham. They point to the persistence of an exclusive culture and 
ethnicity in such states, and decry the lack of tolerance the emphasis on collectivity creates. 
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While the identity may be open to all in theory, by privileging one nation of people, it creates a 
hierarchy that continuously oppresses those who fall into the lower levels.  
 Other scholars, such as Barry 2001 and especially Joppke 2004 point to the failure of 
multiculturalism to create cohesion within the nation state and its normative inconsistency in 
combating discrimination with reverse discrimination. Furthermore, it is argued that 
multiculturalism discourages the mixing of people by emphasizing their unique contributions. 
Additionally, multiculturalism has been accused of privileging power structures within the 
immigrant group, as they are given guardianship of their group’s cultural significance.  Of the 
very few empirical pieces that attempt to moderate this debate, Weldon 2006 stands out with his 
findings that more civic and individualistic regimes create better levels of social and political 
tolerance than more ethnic and collectivistic regimes.  
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the multiculturalism-assimilation 
dichotomy stems from framing the value of maintaining ethnic culture as a yes-no question. 
However, conceptualizing this question in such a manner excludes a number of potential 
responses that reside between “yes” and “no”. Immigrant cultural heritage can be valued, but 
within certain boundaries or attached to certain caveats. There can be other sources of allegiance 
outside of the “the nation” for assimilation, and either tolerance or “human rights” for 
multiculturalism. By abandoning the yes-no dichotomy, this study will open up new ways of 
thinking about the integration of migrants.  
In reframing integration, it is useful to have a theoretical frame as guidance. Due to its 
focus on identities in general, social identity theory can be useful here. It both illuminates 
problems present in the multiculturalism-assimilation dichotomy and suggests solutions. 
Remembering Brewer’s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, it seems that the identity associated 
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with multiculturalism fails to provide the distinctiveness required for continuous and meaningful 
social cohesion (as argued by Fukuyama 2006, Joppke 2004, and Huntington 2004). However, 
more assimilationist conceptions of nationhood run into problems with Wenzel’s In-group 
Projection Model. In its naked coercion, assimilation is seen as unappealing by out-groups in 
democratic societies. Particularly when facing onerous requirements for citizenship and rigid 
conceptions of national identity, the incentive for the creation of ethnic enclaves and parallel 
societies increases. 
 As Gaertner and Dovidio argue, the most salient and attractive identities are found where 
the human needs for differentiation and assimilation are maximized. If the assimilationist / 
collectivistic-civic mindset is too homogenizing (low differentiation) and the multicultural / 
individualistic-civic mindset is too open (low assimilation), then the Optimal Distinctiveness 
Theory suggests that the most durable, meaningful national identities will be found in between 
these ideal poles. I argue here that integration should be seen as a continuum, informed by the 
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, with assimilation and multiculturalism as its poles. In between 
then, we can find better preforming integration policies, such as “liberalism as identity” and 
“interculturalism”. If the social psychological analyses of Brewer 1991 and Gaertner and 
Dovidio 2000 are correct, the identities in this middle ground should foster more identity-based 
trust in the respondents and should seem more attractive than the current universe of normative 
ideologies.  
Figure Two represents the universe of assimilation possibilities according to a continuous 
understanding of integration. Their locations are not exact, relative to the overall scale. The 
inverted-u represents the theoretical overall effectiveness of these integration policies, drawing 
from Optimal Distinctiveness Theory. This effectiveness is drawn as a logical consequence from 
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the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory and the Common In-Group Identity Model. If the most 
effective identities are those that balance inclusion and distinctiveness, this should also hold for 
the national identities that guide the integration process. The best theoretical policy would be one 
that closest approaches the maximum, located half-way between assimilation and 
multiculturalism.  
The ordering of the ideologies is theoretically driven. I utilize Koopman et. al’s 
conception of differential rights based on group membership as my x-axis. Assimilatory regimes 
such as France stand on one end of the scale, representing strong state loyalties that emphasize a 
robust understanding of civic requirements and a prioritization of the importance of the nation 
and national culture. Keeping with Koopman’s terminology, I call this viewpoint “cultural 
monism” On the other end of the continuum, I place more multicultural regimes such as Canada 
and Australia, representing the full breadth of the individualistic-civic vision on protecting 
cultures and disassembling the hierarchies established by overly harsh national identities and 
civic integration measures. This viewpoint will be referred to as “cultural pluralism.” In between 
these poles, I place liberalism as identity and interculturalism in the middle ground. The Y axis 
plots the overall effectiveness of policies in a particular society. The parabolic line reflects the 
need for balancing assimilation and differentiation as per the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory. 
The curve represents the total amount of need satisfaction in a society, maximized at the 
intersection/optimum point (see Figure 1 for reference). At each extreme, there will be 
individuals that are satisfied with assimilation and multiculturalism, however, additional social 
happiness is gained when policies move towards the center. It is important to note that figure one 
theorizes identity characteristics at the individual level, while figure two attempts to model them 
at the social level.   
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The placement of the ideologies between the poles is justified according to the amount of 
meaning attached to an overarching national identity. Because every country is different, the 
points here are ideal strategies, able to be plotted on a single dimension due to their shared 
quality of carrying meaning and content. Assimilationist regimes carry the most content, 
emphasizing the importance of civic traditions, symbols of nationalism, and other historic and 
cultural elements associated with the state. Moving slowly down the continuum from most to 
least content, liberalism as identity only emphasizes transnational values such as democracy, 
liberalism, and an importance of reason. Next then would be interculturalism, which emphasizes 
only the importance of cooperation and working together. This has even less normative content 
than LAI, as cooperation can happen between any two people that seek to do so. Lastly is 
multiculturalism, whose emphasis on tolerance asks for even less from its participants. Whereas 
interculturalism asks its participants to engage actively, multiculturalism asks only passive 
tolerance.  
This again assumes 3S multiculturalism, as Kymlicka’s “multiculturalism as 
citizenization” would require more beliefs attached to the importance human rights. According to 
my continuum, Kymlicka’s multiculturalism would fall near LAI. Like LAI, multiculturalism as 
citizenization comes with ideological values, namely those of human rights. Unlike LAI, 
however, Kymlicka advocates for minimal coercion, similar to 3S multiculturalism. The tension 
between these two priorities illustrates another difficulty associated with the concept of 
multiculturalism as citizenization.  
Integration ideologies are complicated and multifaceted.  While the continuum in figure 
two captured only one aspect of their arrangement, this expanded reconceptualization of 
integration can account for additional relationships between ideologies that a coarser dichotomy 
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may overlook. The typology presented in table one is one such way to account for these 
differences. This typology uses a number of unconventional metrics for thinking about 
integration. The “focused” measures on the columns refer to where allegiances are constructed. 
Inward focused ideologies (the traditional pair) expect that immigrants make changes inside 
themselves (either internally adopting a national culture for assimilation or tolerance for 
multiculturalism)4. Inward focused integration focuses on changing how immigrants think. 
Outward focused ideologies expect immigrants to be responsive to the practical needs of a 
collective (either by cooperating for interculturalism or behaving as liberals for LAI). While it is 
true that liberalism is also a set of internally-oriented ideas, the content of the ideas are outward 
in nature. Unlike assimilation, it does not contain enough internal content to be a traditional sort 
of identity. This references its universal characteristics. And unlike multiculturalism, liberalism 
as identity requires certain active behaviors such as voting and respecting the equality of all 
people. Tolerance only requires an internal decision not to act. A multiculturalist would respect a 
sect’s worship, even if they themselves find it abhorrent, whereas a liberal would actively defend 
that sect’s right to worship freely. Liberalism is classified as outward focused because it 
demands action above and beyond the passivity of multiculturalism. 
The distinction between the row columns is much simpler. The direction of the 
integration policy measures who the policy affects and where burdens are being placed. This 
measure roughly approximates coerciveness. One-way integration policies expect immigrants to 
conform to be integrated into a society. Illiberal natives or those natives who do not culturally 
identify with the nation are exempt and not targeted by the government. Two-way integration, 
however, expects both natives and the immigrants to change and meet at a middle point.  Both 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that here, “multiculturalism as citizenization” could also fit into the typology.  
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cooperation and tolerance are not something that only immigrants must do. Both interculturalism 
and multiculturalism require adherence to their respective ideologies, regardless of whether you 
are a native or a migrant.  
This alternative conception does not replace the continuum presented earlier in the 
section. In fact, it can be neatly overlaid onto it. Figure three visualizes this claim. Because 
sidedness, coerciveness, and homogenization tend to be conceptually linked, the integration 
ideologies explored in this paper can remain in their positions on the continuum.  
The new formulation allows scholars to talk about unconventional forms of assimilation 
that have since been discussed at the margins of the field and have not been formally integrated 
into integration scholarship. These concepts (particularly interculturalism) have all been raised as 
either solutions to the dilemma of integration, or curious consequences of the process of 
grappling with integration policy-making.  By moving closer to the middle, these new 
superordinate identities strike a better balance between homogenization and differentiation, 
which would allow for feelings of shared preferences and loyalties to be constructed in less 
coercive manners. This would help lower feelings of threat. Migrants may be seen as acting 
differently in public, or adhering to a different values, but at least they would be “playing for the 
same team” as the native population, remaining loyal to their national identity (and thus the in-
group as well). 
Prior Models of Integration 
 
 Exceptionally few studies have explored the macrosymbolic dimensions of integration. 
Modood 2013 stands alone as a structured exploration of different modes of integration. Modood 
also abandons the multicultural-assimilation dichotomy, favoring four modes of integration 
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arranged along a dimension of openness or permissiveness. Keeping with common 
understandings, at the extremes of Modood’s integration scale are assimilation and  
multiculturalism. These are understood primarily in the same way as this paper, with assimilation 
seeking to promote conformity to a national standard and multiculturalism celebrating difference. 
One exception is that Modood uses Kymlicka’s understanding of “multiculturalism as 
citizenization,” therefore presuming a universal acceptance of liberal democratic norms.  
 Between them, Modood sets a pair of ideologies named “individualist-integration” and 
“cosmopolitanism”. These do not neatly fall along the hypothesized scale of this thesis, and 
therefore deserve attention. Modood notes that only assimilation is a one-way “mode” of 
integration, meaning that liberalism as identity is not included. In its place (meaning that it is 
placed closest to assimilation) is “individualist-integration.” Where LAI prioritizes liberalism 
and interculturalism stresses cooperation, individualist-integration focuses on the individual. 
This is a logical conceptual middle-ground between LAI and interculturalism, as individualism is 
both an important tenant in liberalism and a required prerequisite for interculturalism’s 
requirement of cooperation. Individualist-integration is best understood as a blend between these 
two conceptual markers.  
Closer to multiculturalism is the idea of cosmopolitanism. This idea has a much longer 
intellectual history, first recognized as a changing form of identity brought about from 
globalization and modernization (Waldron, 1991). Cosmopolitanism as an integration strategy 
recognizes difference, but not groups. This puts it somewhere past multiculturalism, as all group 
associations are discouraged. Interculturalism, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism are all 
diversity-friendly modes of integration, but increase in demandingness relative to the dominant 
culture. Interculturalism stresses only cooperation, building bridges between the majority and 
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minority cultures, but not dismantling either of them. The hierarchy between the two is present 
but not coercive. Multiculturalism maintains the groups as entities, recognizing the role that 
groups play here and formally acknowledging them in government and society. Multiculturalists 
argue that difference is robust and requires group acknowledgement and structure to best protect 
minority interests. Cosmopolitanism goes one step further and attempts to dismantle the idea of 
majority culture entirely, emphasizing instead a global citizenship and a global culture.  All 
people are human beings, and therefore share certain realities associated with this fact.  Modood 
places cosmopolitanism between assimilation and multiculturalism because cosmopolitanism is 
less free in its permitted associations than multiculturalism, despite cosmopolitanism asking 
more of both groups. Cosmopolitanism is less permissive, but more evenly two-way directional.  
It is clear that Modood’s two additional integration pathways are distinct concepts that 
can be plotted onto this thesis’ hypothesized scale. However, they will not be included into the 
following chapters for a number of reasons5. Individualist-integration is partially captured by 
liberalism as identity. While LAI is more coercive in that it calls for all elements of liberalism, 
many of liberalisms tenants, including items like democracy, rest on an implicit valuation of 
individualism. LAI can be argued as a more “applied” version of individualist-integration, and 
perhaps even capturing Joppke’s conceptualization of “liberalism as tolerance”. Because the 
difference is so fine, and because LAI as Schmittian Liberalism gets more attention by far right 
groups, individualist-integration shall be left aside. 
As for cosmopolitanism, its inclusion would negate the premise of the study. While non-
group difference can serve as a viable principle for the orientation of human social living, 
                                                 
5 In addition to the conceptual reasons outlined in the main text, adding two more integration strategies would 
require considerably more respondents to properly test this thesis’ hypotheses. Their exclusion was therefore as 
much theoretically driven as it was practical.  
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cosmopolitanism’s call for the dissolution of national identities seems both practically 
impossible and runs counter to thesis’s purpose of exploring different bases for national 
identities. By calling for the dissolution of the dominant national identity, cosmopolitanism 
cannot be studied as a proper integration option. It would require too much absolute change from 
the majority group and would never be admitted as a viable alternative while the nation-state 
system remains intact.  
Conceptual Boundaries between Integration Strategies 
 
The section so far offers theoretical justifications for reframing of integration with the 
four conceptual markers of assimilation, liberalism as identity, interculturalism and 
multiculturalism. To support this conceptualization, I supplement this discussion with an 
empirical analysis of how people actually think about these ideologies. This is important step to 
make sure that the posited ideologies could actually exist as distinct and discrete entities in the 
real world. Prior studies suggest that national identities exist as “discrete entities on 
multidimensional scales”, and so there is reason to believe that integration ideologies should 
function in a similar manner (Breznau and Danielson, 2014). For this purpose, I use the results of 
my quantitative study (Chapter 5), where vignettes are used to package the ideologies into 
generally accessible terms accessible6. The sample here is drawn from 902 native Belgian and 
Dutch citizens7. 
If the vignettes offer conceptually distinct ideologies, we should expect responses for 
each one to have a low probability of being answered in the same way. Stated differently, we 
                                                 
6 Table 6 and Appendices E and G discuss in great detail the wording and decision-choices involved with the 
creation of these vignettes.   
7 Further information about the nature of the sample can be found in Appendix D 
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should expect that exposure to the vignette had an impact on answers in a statistically 
meaningful way, making them unlikely to be samples of a larger shared population.  I use two-
tailed Welch’s t-tests to test the probability that the results from different vignettes were drawn 
from the same two underlying populations. These results were gathered from a sample corrected 
for ordering effects8. The results for each question, in each country, for each ideological dyad are 
presented in table two.  
The results show is that for almost every possible vignette-pair, at least one question 
differs in a statistically significant way. For example, according to these results, there is only a 
one percent chance that the set of answers given by those who got the assimilation and 
“liberalism as identity” vignettes for question three (the importance of ethnic culture) are 
actually from the same type of group of respondents. Because almost every dyad has at least one 
area where the responses are significantly different, this suggests that the ideologies themselves 
are distinct. They may not be very distinct (example: interculturalism and multiculturalism), but 
they are distinct all the same. 
  The only exception to this is the distinction between assimilation and liberalism as 
identity in the Netherlands, which were apparently evaluated in the same way. This is a curious 
result considering that the vignettes did indeed differ in the content variable of the vignette. This 
suggests that in the Netherlands teaching “history and language” and teaching “liberal values” 
are interpreted in non-distinct ways (an interesting commentary on their cultural thought!). This, 
intersects, interestingly, with Duyvendak and Scholten’s argument that the Dutch have had 
experiences with both of these models, separately (Duyvendak and Scholten 2010). This finding 
may suggest that their distinction between these two phases of Dutch integration policies are not 
                                                 
8 See Chapter 5 for a further discussion of this.  
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very distinct. As this pairing in Belgium does show some significant difference, this finding is 
not enough by itself to suggest that LAI and assimilation are theoretically non-distinct concepts. 
However, in future studies, their distinction should be carefully monitored. 
The results from this study have the ability to adjudicate the blurry line between 
interculturalism and multiculturalism present in Meer and Modood 2011. While the answers are 
statistically indistinguishable in both countries for most questions, we see that being shown the 
interculturalism or multiculturalism vignette does have an effect in evaluations regarding the 
importance of the individual versus the group (question four). This speaks the core of the 
theoretical distinction between the two (passivity versus activity) and lends credence to the idea 
that they are distinct concepts. This claim is further strengthened by the construction of the 
vignette, which skirts Meer, Modood, and Kymlicka’s potential critique over what 
multiculturalism entails. While the vignette was constructed with 3S multiculturalism in mind, 
the multiculturalism specific elements of non-coercion, tolerance, and involvement of the native 
populations do not explicitly conflict with multiculturalism as citizenization.  
Conceptual Ordering of Integration Strategies 
 
The prior section concluded that all four ideologies can be understood as conceptually 
distinct from each other. However, it said nothing regarding their relationship relative to each 
other. In order to confirm these relationships, a specialized survey was distributed to 279 
American undergraduate students voluntarily participating in the Political Science subject pool at 
the University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign during the spring 2014 semester.  It asked 
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respondents to rank four randomly ordered integration philosophies, presented as hypothetical 
vignettes9. 
If the vignettes are properly constructed to reflect a continuum of 
permissiveness/openness, then if presented the opportunity to rank the full selection of the 
vignettes from best to worst, I hypothesize that respondents will order their ranking accordingly: 
Assimilation, Liberalism as Identity, Interculturalism, and Multiculturalism. This would reflect 
an overall preference for more closed identities. This ordering would also be valid in reverse if 
the respondent favors more open policies. 
The total number of possible combinations for arranging the four vignettes is four 
factorial or 24.  If the vignettes do not reflect a changing degree of openness, we should expect to 
see each combination happen with a 1/24 chance (random), and the pair of typology-conforming 
combinations with a 1/12 chance. As table three shows, we see typologically conforming 
combinations occur at nearly twice the expected rate, leading to a healthy chi-squared of 53.44 
and a p-value of less than 0.001. 
These results demonstrate that the construction of the vignettes used here and in the rest 
of my dissertation can be interpreted to align with the hypothesized continuum. Combined with 
the finding that each of these vignettes are distinct, this means that respondents both see the 
vignettes as distinct from each other and recognize the intended continuum-based logic behind 
them. Most importantly, the results validate my rationale for arranging the new ideologies of 
liberalism as identity and interculturalism in the manner proposed. These claims are strengthened 
by the fact that the ALIM-MILA pair – in other words, responses that ordered the vignettes 
                                                 
9 The wording of both the vignettes and the question can be found in the appendix. 
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according to the continuum I have proposed- is the only statistically significant pair of responses 
present. 
Widening our lens to look at the characteristics of the non-hypothesis conforming 
combinations, a number of interesting observations can emerge. These findings are outlined in 
table four. We notice, for example, that the ideologies of assimilation and liberalism as identity, 
as well as the ideologies of interculturalism and multiculturalism are together (ie: paired) for four 
out of the five of these combinations. This further supports the proposed continuum, and 
suggests that the directionality of integration may be a more important signal than where the 
identity’s focus is located. Additionally, throughout the results, the pairs of 
assimilation/interculturalism and LAI/multiculturalism are less often together than they should 
be if their relationship was random. If the relationship was random, two-thirds of all possible 
combinations would contain the pairs of assimilation/interculturalism or LAI/multiculturalism, 
yet only 57% of the respondents gave at least one of these combinations. This result is 
statistically significant with a chi- squared value of 10.9 and a p value of 0.001. It further 
supports the logic of the alternative typology, as assimilation-interculturalism and “liberalism as 
identity”-multiculturalism are in categories furthest removed from each other. By pairing these 
ideologies less frequently, the respondents recognize this fact.  
Conclusion 
 
Together, these discussions and studies give support to a reconceptualization of 
integration and integration policy-making. Limiting our understanding of integration to 
assimilation and multiculturalism artificially obscures a host of creative but less orthodox 
methods of unifying disparate people. By exploring the ideologies, we see that they can be 
arranged according to permissiveness/openness, with liberalism-as-identity and interculturalism 
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in between. I also propose a typology to order the various characteristics of these ideologies, 
arranging them according to the scope and nature of the identities they promote. These 
theoretical claims are supported by empirical research, done both in Europe and the United 
States. By revising our prior held notions about integration in ways that correspond with how 
people conceptualize groups, more effective policies can be explored and implemented.  
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Chapter 4: Differing Elite Strategies Promoting Integration 
 
 It is always the responsibility of governments to craft effective policies. Yet integration 
presents a special challenge due to the sheer complexity associated with creating social cohesion. 
In providing integration services, governments need to be able to communicate expectations 
about the very complicated processes associated with national culture and the opinions of native 
citizens. Failure to do so risks creating unrealistic expectations that breed resentment and 
alienation. Due to the complexity of the task and the high risk of failure, it becomes very 
important to research the nature and intent of government policy, regardless of their 
consequences. 
 It is extremely difficult to accomplish an analysis of integration policies without a 
detailed and holistic treatment of the national situation, including histories, cultures, 
implementation strategies, and policy content. Even institutional characteristics may influence 
the propensity for one type of integration policy versus another (Manatschal and Bernauer, 
2015). Using measures drawn from current integration databases like the MIPEX and CIVIX 
(Goodman, 2010) requires adopting significant amounts of coder interpretation. Furthermore, 
these databases often measure a wide variety of theoretically incompatible factors that make 
constructing new variables difficult. As Michalowski and van Oers 2012 comment, it is 
exceedingly difficult to do theoretically cohesive integration policy analysis solely on the basis 
of integration policy-content. The symbolic and normative nature inherent in integration policy 
significantly complicate any theoretically grounded statistical analysis of integration.  
 To accommodate this, my research includes a multifaceted qualitative analysis of 
integration policies in Belgium and the Netherlands, including interviews with government 
officials responsible for various parts of the integration process and textual analyses of 
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integration resources available to newly arrived immigrants. My research finds that despite their 
shared histories and characteristics, Flanders and the Netherlands pursue very different policies. 
These differing philosophies are made evident not only through their programs, but are also seen 
in the words they use and the goals they pursue.  
After changes in the mid-2000s, we see the Dutch pursuing an assimilatory strategy, 
placing the heavy burden of assimilation squarely on the migrant through tests, fees, and an 
overall emphasis on the importance of “self-integration.” In neighboring Flanders, integration 
policy uses an interculturalist approach that engages the immigrant through offering free courses, 
a personalized integration plan, and the emphasis on communal living. Immigrants into the 
Netherlands are expected to have very high degrees of knowledge and competency upon entry 
into the country. While in Flanders, immigrant competency is viewed as something to be 
developed over time. High expectations upon entry can be viewed as another type of cultural 
expectation. The Netherlands expects immigrants to assimilate into these standards, whereas the 
Flemish authorities work together with the immigrant to build up to the skill of autonomy. This 
is another example of their interculturalist approach, holding standards but approaching them 
communally.  
Historical Context of Dutch and Flemish Integration Policies 
 
Belgium and Flanders 
 
 Before analyzing the integration policies, it is important to discuss how Belgium and the 
Netherlands arrived at their current policies.  In Belgium, immigration and integration policies is 
formally split between the federal and regional levels. The federal state maintains competence 
with regards to the intake and monitoring of migrants, as it alone has the capacity to police the 
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national borders (Doomernik and Jandl, 2008).  However, the bifurcated federation leaves 
integration in the hands of the regions. While French Wallonia has adopted a very 
relaxed/multicultural policy towards immigration, Dutch Flanders has attempted to go down a 
more restrictive route, prompted by demands to define itself in ethnic terms so as to underscore 
its claims for greater regional autonomy. However, because integration policy is not enforced at 
the national level, the regions have a difficult time enforcing integration requirements. They can 
predicate integration for regional benefits, but the migrant can always chose to forgo such 
benefits, relying instead on federal benefits or moving to regions like Wallonia where 
requirements are more relaxed (MIPEX, 2011).  
 Additionally, due to the variation between the Belgian regions, it is unique in that the 
hypothetical integration-reluctant migrant has a choice as what sorts of pressures he or she has to 
face in daily life. As stated above, Flanders has the most restrictive immigration and integration 
policies. Perhaps not surprisingly, it also has the smallest percentage of migrants as a portion of 
its population (~5%). Wallonia and Brussels are entirely different in that respect. Because 
immigrants in French-speaking Belgium are courted heavily by the Socialist Party, they have an 
incentive to keep their integration laws minimal. In the 2009 regional elections in Brussels, at 
least a third of the Socialist Parties 21 elected seats are held by Muslims. The French speaking 
Socialist Party (SP) also managed to shepherd an amnesty bill through the Belgian congress in 
2009 for approximately 25,000 migrants. This powerful and immigrant-friendly party benefits 
from the 10% population of immigrants in Wallonia and the enormous 28% immigrant 
population in Brussels. The three regions provide a wide variety of choices for the newly arrived 
migrant: a more assimilationist Flanders, a rural migrant-friendly Wallonia, or an urban strongly 
multicultural Brussels. Belgium’s German speaking community does not figure strongly into my 
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quantitative analysis because Muslim migrants usually settle in heavily urban areas like 
Antwerp, Brussels, and Charleroi. They will be included, however, in my qualitative analysis.  
Belgium’s federal system complicated the formation of formal integration policies at the 
national and regional level. With reform of the federal government’s capacities in 1980, Belgian 
regions gained the authority to make integration policies. In the beginning, they modeled their 
policies after the old Dutch multicultural system (Verlot 2001). The goal was to make a policy 
that was “multicultural with an intercultural exchange” (Loobuyck and Jacobs, 2006). Here 
interculturalism is meant in its literal sense, referencing movement between cultures and not the 
Quebecois-inspired integration system discussed above. 
 In the 1980s, Flemish integration policy began with attention to cultural and social 
aspects. In the 1990s, however, this changed with the “Strategic Plan for Ethnocultural 
Minorities” adopted in 1996. This policy redefined integration in a more welcoming direction by 
stressing the importance of full social participation of the immigrant, in addition to government 
responsibilities towards meeting their basic needs. In 2004, the government adopted its latest 
“grand vision” integration policy, “Living Together in Diversity”. This policy established the 
basic foundations of Flemish integration as it currently exists, establishing integration classes, 
personalized integration trajectories, and providing language training. This policy was designed 
to be implemented and monitored into 2010, which it successfully did. Currently the Flemish 
government is in the process of considering new integration policies. In July 2013, the 
government released a one year plan outlining its intentions and observations on the “Living 
Together in Diversity” status quo. While a majority of the proposed actions in the report are 
relatively minor developments of existing programs, one notable change is an increased 
expectation of Dutch proficiency, from level A1 in the Common European Framework of 
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Reference for Languages towards the higher A2 level. This represents a jump from a beginners 
towards an elementary knowledge of the language (Bourgeois, 2013). While language itself is 
fairly value-neutral from an integration perspective, its purpose as a conduit for communication 
(as opposed, for example, to a less-practical integration requirement such as a knowledge of state 
holidays) supports an emphasis on interculturalism.  
The Netherlands 
 
 The history of Dutch integration policies is a bit more dynamic than the Flemish instance. 
Scholten 2011b frames Dutch integration policy into four distinct periods, ordering which this 
paper will also utilize. It is important to remember that much of what followed after the 
Minorities Policy of the early 1980s represented a critique of the multicultural model it 
established and more importantly, its lasting legacy and legend (van Reekum and Duyvendak, 
2012). This persistent retreat from multiculturalism is mirrored in the Netherlands’ longitudinal 
Migration Policy Index scores10. 
 Like many European countries, throughout the 1970s, the government was still under the 
impression that the immigrants would return home (Dukes and Mosterd, 2012). Because of this, 
there was not a set integration policy in place despite the fact that the issue was gaining salience. 
Countering a string of train hijackings by disgruntled Moluccan immigrants, a second stage of 
Dutch integration policy began with the debate and eventual passage of the 1983 Minorities Bill, 
one of the most multicultural integration policies ever adopted. While their familiar 
“pillarization” policy was fading from mainstream Dutch politics, Dutch policy makers felt that 
                                                 
10 The Netherlands MPI scores are 2.5, 5.5, and 2, corresponding with the measurement years of 1980, 2000, and 
2010. 1980 was before the Minorities Bill of 1983, which explains its more nativist leanings. Belgium exhibits a 
more steady progression towards multiculturalism during this period, moving from 1 to 3 to 5.5.   
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it could apply for their integration policy (Joppke 2004). In practice, this meant officially 
recognized, funded, semi-autonomous communities of immigrants (Nagel and Hopkins, 2010). 
This bill was enforced for approximately seven years, and granted minority groups explicit 
recognition for the purpose of receiving government aid to help develop their communities. 
This policy began to change in the early 1990s, as the Dutch shifted focus from 
promoting different cultures towards a more mainstream reduction of racism and discrimination. 
The next major Dutch shift was preceded by the release of a highly critical report by the 
Scientific Council for Government and Policy in 1989. The report pointed out a number of 
perceived flaws in the 1983 legislation and urged Dutch politicians to strongly encourage 
minorities to participate in Dutch society rather than preserve their own ethnic identities. 
Everyone was equal in their identities, and the report argued that it was not the government’s 
business to get into policies and the politics of identity (ibid.). This report was so controversial 
that it prompted the also established “Advisory Committee on Minorities Policy” to issue a fierce 
counter-report. They claimed the Scientific Council’s report was not properly conducted, and 
was political in nature (Duyvendak and Scholten, 2009). Additionally, controversial comments 
by respected politician Fritz Bolkestein in 1991 about the suitability of Islam in the integration 
process moved this discussion into the public sphere (Penninx et al. 2005).  It was around this 
time that migrant integration began to become politicized in the Dutch media, a trend that would 
persist throughout the 2000s (Scholten, 2012).  
In 1994, the Dutch adopted their new Integration Policy, representing a step backwards 
from the Minority Policy and the beginning of the third stage of Dutch integration policy 
according to Scholten 2011b. The definition of integration in this act clearly illustrates Dutch 
backpedaling from their history of multiculturalism, defining integration as “a process leading to 
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the full and equal participation of individuals and groups in society, for which mutual respect for 
identity is seen as a necessary condition” (Contourennota 1994 in Entzinger 2003, Vasta 2007). 
Here we see the old definition of mutual respect for identity being reduced to a stipulation for 
another goal, the participation of individuals and groups in society. This policy introduced 
integration and language classes, and is the one modeled by the Flemish government. The 
Integration Policy also introduced the possibility of fines for those who did not take the classes. 
In 1998, the Dutch government passed the Civic Integration of Newcomers Act. This act 
strengthened and standardized the programs outlined in the Integration Policy, including new 
penalties tied to attendance versus course completion and the addition of an “end exam.”     
The events of September 11th, as well as the rise and assassination of both Pim Fortuyn 
and Theo Van Gogh propelled Dutch politics even further away from the multicultural 
sentiments expressed in the Minorities Bill (Vasta, 2007).  In 2004, the Dutch government 
changed integration policies even more, beginning the fourth and current stage of Dutch 
integration policy. In the New Integration Act, the Dutch dismantled their extensive system of 
classes and put the responsibility for integration entirely upon the immigrant. The testing regime 
was expanded to include more subjects, and fines were automatically imposed if the migrant 
failed to complete the formal integration requirements within five years. These fines are enforced 
by the municipality in which the immigrant resides, and vary accordingly. For example, in the 
municipality of Amsterdam, the fine is 200 euros, doubling to 400 euros every year after until 
integration requirements are fulfilled (City of Amsterdam, 2009). In the municipality of 
Eindhoven, the fine is 500 euros every two years, with good conduct and overall financial 
hardship taken into account (City of Eindhoven, 2011). And in the municipality of Tilburg, the 
fine is 40% of the immigrant’s monthly social assistance stipend, as well as a one-time one 
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thousand Euro fine if not completed in the time period (City of Tilburg, 2013).  In 2011, the 
integration plan Integration, Bonds, and Citizenship strengthened these provisions, increasing the 
knowledge expected from the migrant, cutting subsidies to Muslim groups and strengthening 
sanctions for those who fail to meet their integration responsibilities (Integration, Bonds, and 
Citizenship, 2011 and Kern, 2011). This Dutch focus on cultural knowledge and the high barriers 
they erect for entering citizens looking to integrate supports an assimilationist interpretation. 
Immigrants are expected to meet the requirements expected of them or face the consequences.  
 Throughout their history, the Dutch can be seen as an innovator with regards to 
integration support measures. As discussed in Michalowski 2009, the Netherlands is also the 
only country in Europe that has experimented with a privatized system of migrant integration. It 
is clear, argues Michalowski, that the Germans emulated the Dutch model in creating their 
integration laws in 2005, which require that immigrants must be versed in German prior to their 
arrival in Germany. Likewise France has adopted some elements in its integration policy similar 
to the Dutch model. While France provides classes from its incoming immigrants free of charge, 
these classes must be completed abroad and teach not only French, but the ideals of the French 
Republic. These policy ties to other countries and the evidence of learning across European 
governments increases the appeal of using the Netherlands as a case study when observing 
immigration and assimilation. Due to this teaching role, studying the Dutch case is exceptionally 
important, as it has indirect relevance to other European integration policies. 
 
Current Policies of the Netherlands and Flanders 
 
 In Flanders, a regional authority, the Agency for Internal Affairs, is responsible for 
integration across the Flemish provinces. Participation in the Flemish integration program is 
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mandatory for most foreigners living in Flanders, enforced by a system of fines. The Flemish 
integration program consists of a number of different obligations, including language education 
and a “civic integration” course, which will be the primary focus of this study. For these 
requirements, the people living in the Brussels region are considered exempt11. In order to be 
considered “integrated,” migrants are required to attend eighty percent of the classes for each 
part of the program. No examination or testing is required. Classes take place in integration 
offices, or onthaalbureaus, which are present in each of the five Flemish provinces, as well as 
the major cities of Ghent, Antwerp, and Brussels. For some, there exists a test-based exemption 
from the civic integration requirement. Access to this test is reserved primarily for those who 
have lived in Belgium for some time but have not had the chance to integrate, such as asylum 
seekers. 
 In the Netherlands, integration is measured through achieving a passing grade in a series 
of state-sponsored integration exams. There are no mandatory classes. The first exam is known 
as the Basic Civic Integration Exam Abroad (BCIEA). As this is the first exam immigrants must 
take, it is their first exposure to the requirements of the Dutch state. These exams take place at 
the Dutch embassy in the immigrant’s native country. The second exam is the expanded and 
more difficult Civic Integration Exam (CIE), which must be passed within three years of arrival 
or fines would be assessed. Integration offices exist, as in Belgium, but they are different in 
purpose. DUO, the Education Execution Service, maintains regional offices where the BCI is 
administered and where services related to the exam are centralized. There are also locality-level 
integration offices that are more oriented towards helping immigrants take advantage of local 
                                                 
11 Brussels is considered exempt because, while the city is located in Flanders, it is technically its own 
administrative unit. The Flemish government provides integration services there for those people living there that 
wish to integrate into Flemish culture.  
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services. Dutch integration offices do not provide integration services in the same way Flemish 
centers do. They are similar to middle men, facilitating communication as opposed to being a 
final destination for integration.  
The BCIEA is a three part exam that tests knowledge of Dutch society and the ability to 
speak Dutch. The full list of questions for the knowledge of Dutch society (KNS) portion of the 
BCIEA is available for those who purchase the “Naar Nederland” packet, and the rest of the 
language exam involves the ability to speak and read Dutch. Because of the test’s public nature, 
it is easy (not to mention legal!) to examine the nature of these questions. For this part of the 
BCIEA, thirty questions are randomly chosen out of a list of 100. Some of these questions are 
value neutral, such as the five questions about geography (ex: “Which country lies to the south of 
the Netherlands?”), while others seek to test an understanding of Dutch values (ex: “Is 
discrimination against homosexuals illegal or permitted?”).  Additionally, some questions are 
very simple, such as a visual question where the respondent is asked to identify the person 
depicted in a painting of William of Orange, with their other alternative being the current Dutch 
Queen consort, Maxima. Other questions, however, are quite difficult to those who have not 
watched Naar Nederland or lack familiarity with the Netherlands (ex: “At what age must 
children [in the Netherlands] attend school?”12).  
The BIC is a five part exam that tests both knowledge of Dutch culture as well as the 
ability to read, write, speak, and listen to Dutch. The KNS portion of the BIC is randomly chosen 
from an electronic bank of thousands of carefully crafted questions, all of which are not available 
to the public. Classes are available through private firms to help immigrants prepare for their 
examination. The immigration exam is not free, and migrants must cover the cost of their 
                                                 
12 Answer: From age five.  
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participation (250 Euros in total). DUO offers loans to immigrants for that amount based upon 
need.  
 The structure of the Dutch examination can give some insight into what the Dutch 
government considers to be important. The largest portion of the exam is the “Knowledge of 
Dutch Society” section (Kennis van Nederlandse Samenleven, or KNS), with 45 questions about 
living in the Netherlands. The questions in the KNS focus primarily on practical issues like the 
procedures required to start a business, raise a family, rent an apartment, handle disputes at work, 
and so forth (Teletoets, 2014). The contents of the KNS are so important that they are subtly 
written into the other parts of the ICE exam. For example, one part of the writing portion of the 
Dutch language exam involves immigrants being able to comprehend and properly fill in 
government forms. 
Research Design for Qualitative Study 
  
In order to further understand the results of my quantitative study, it is important that a 
more qualitative study is conducted. Ordinary people understand integration through their 
preferences and experiences, which are related to a country’s integration policies. Studying a 
country’s integration policies will also establish the closest thing to “objective” understandings 
of how a country views its own identity. There have been plenty of studies about the nature of 
national identities and how individuals relate to them. Far less work has been done on 
governmental efforts to create and establish national identities. While national identity is a 
largely abstract and personal concept, it does concretely intersect with government at the level of 
citizenship and integration policy. In these policies, government agencies set the two important 
elements of national identity. These include the important elements of my typology: where 
citizens are expected to place their allegiance and what the requirements of integration will be in 
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relation to those who already are citizens of a country. They also stipulate other important 
elements, such as which identities are being used as grounds for entry and how strongly they 
wish to emphasize these identities.   
 Country-specific characteristics are extremely difficult to measure empirically, especially 
when it concerns identity. The closest one can get to an objective understanding of a national 
identity is by looking at what the governments say they are. As national identity exists on the 
personal level, the usefulness of this “objective standard” is limited. However, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, national identity consists of both internal and external components. The integration 
literature grants this study leverage on the external element, on what immigrants are integrating 
towards. Additionally, any variation between the “official” policy and the personal 
interpretations of those who participated in the survey would be important to judge the 
effectiveness of different integration policies in creating cohesive identities and reflecting the 
desires of the native population.  
I use two different methods to gauge the policies of the government. The first involves 
interviewing officials who directly oversee integration programs. These people are the ones most 
familiar with how the laws work and apply to everyday people.  The second involves what is 
communicated through integration packets. These items form some of the first impressions that 
immigrants have of their host society and government. This study will take a look at the kinds of 
knowledge governments expect their migrants to know, as expressed either through the content 
of their integration courses or through questions asked on their exams. It will also compare how 
these countries spend European Integration Funds, and what this prioritization suggests at the 
policy level.   
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In the spring of 2014, I interviewed a variety of officials from the Netherlands and 
Flanders. In Flanders, this includes an official who oversees the integration program in the 
province of East Flanders (in which Ghent is included). Another interviewee is an official from 
the “Agentschap voor Binnenlands Bestuur” or Agency for Local Government. This agency is 
responsible for the policies that the local official follows, and is also in charge of administering 
integration exams for the Flemish region for those people that seek exemptions from the Flemish 
integration course system.  
Due to the nature of the Netherlands’ integration system, local officials are not involved 
in the integration process in the same way they are in Belgium. The Dutch test-oriented system 
does not offer as many points of entry for the conduct of interviews. The Dutch Education 
Execution Service, DUO, is involved in the execution of the exam, and primarily does secretarial 
work. The Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment is responsible for the guidelines 
governing the integration process in the Netherlands. However, the agency does not grant 
interviews for academic purposes. Therefore, in order to interview similar types of officials, I 
chose to interview a representative from the private testing firm, Bureau ICE, which created and 
currently oversees the Dutch Civic Integration Exam.  This service is an important middle link in 
the Dutch integration process, and provides insight on the processes at the federal and individual 
levels.   
For every interview, English is used as the primary mode of communication. While this 
may introduce some translation issues, all respondents are highly educated and from cultures 
where English is widely used. I ask a modified version of the survey I administered in the 
quantitative portion of my study. Examples of such modified questions would include items such 
as the logic the government uses in creating its policy (more assimilatory or multicultural), how 
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strongly ethnicity and shared values correspond to official citizenship, and how the role of 
migrant customs fit within the current national identity as seen by the government. These 
questions were open-ended, and allowed for the official to say as much or as little as he or she 
would like. The second section of the survey involving ideal migration policy preferences would 
not be needed in the interviews, as the ideal policy for the government is always the current one 
(by virtue of the government theoretically having the power to change it). However, asking the 
officials how they would classify their own policy could be insightful. The questions I ask can be 
found in the appendix. 
While interviews are excellent means to collect information about how institutions 
actually function, official government statements are also important. To determine this, it is more 
helpful to observe the official documentation provided to immigrants before they arrive in 
country. In Belgium and the Netherlands, these come in the form of welcome packets that 
contain a variety of helpful items: from elementary Dutch language instruction to advice on what 
paperwork will needed to be completed in the next stage of the integration process. For the 
purpose of this study, I focus on the documentation provided that offers advice on making the 
adjustment to Dutch and Belgian society. For the Netherlands, I use the official packet “Naar 
Nederland” (“To the Netherlands”) and the “kennis Nederlandse samenleving” (knowledge of 
Dutch society), or KNS, DVD. For Belgium, I use the packet “Migreren Naar Vlaanderen” 
(“Migrating to Flanders”) and their booklet on maatschappelijk oriëntatie (social orientation), or 
MO. 
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Findings from Expert Interviews 
 
Flanders 
 
From these interviews, a nuanced and multifaceted picture emerges of the integration 
system for these two countries. While the two countries may be similar, their integration systems 
are anything but.  
 In Belgium, we see an exceptionally welcoming integration system eager to 
accommodate the needs of those entering their country. Welcome packets are tailored to 
individual groups. The DVD included in the packet contains integration advice tailored to each 
migrant group. The Flemish government also prints their integration materials in fifteen different 
languages, from Dutch to Russian to Sanskrit. Even the integration examinations are offered in 
languages other than Dutch, in particular English and French. In Flanders, the preferred route 
towards integration is hands-on and occurs in the classroom. Here a variety of topics are 
emphasized, including information about welfare, hospitals, unions, and education. This type of 
practical information focuses less on the characteristics of the country and more on the services 
to the individual. Immigrants are also encouraged in these courses to ask questions about their 
integration process and engage with the official understandings of what it means to be 
Belgian or Flemish.   
This approach corresponds with the principal focus of Flemish integration, where 
immigrants are pushed towards the conceptual goal of “greater autonomy” (see Figure Four). 
Autonomy as a conceptual end-goal for integration is interesting, as it is both subject and 
government oriented. Autonomy aims for the immigrants to live more fulfilling and personally 
satisfying lives. Autonomy is intended to serve the migrant, giving the individual power and 
pushing them towards parity with the native citizen in terms of agency. At the same time, 
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autonomy also encourages migrants to rely less (or not at all) on government assistance, though 
perhaps not at first. It’s also interesting to note that part of the process of becoming individuals 
with greater autonomy includes steps such as “openness to diversity” and “self-evaluation and 
regulation.” How these items relate to autonomy is not self-evident, and is likely value-laden.  
Integration in Flanders is person-centric. Classes emphasize the needs and empowerment 
of the individual and the program goes to great lengths to reach out and personalize the 
integration experience. In addition to its extensive efforts to translating integration materials into 
the home languages of the immigrant, integration courses are also tailored to the city or province 
they take place in. These details are meant to help aid immigrants in orienting themselves to their 
immediate surroundings. Flanders also assigns immigrants to a personal advisor who shepherds 
them through the process. This includes steering the migrants’ integration process towards their 
eventual career goal, in either education, professional, or sociocultural fields.  
 The Flemish plan for integration borrows from a number of integration ideologies. By 
placing a priority on autonomy, the plan clearly focuses on people. Integration is seen as less 
about imparting ideals and more about improving individual wellbeing. Furthermore, the level of 
coercion used by the Flemish integration system is low. The success of the immigrant is seen as 
critically dependent on the migrant getting what they need. It is no coincidence that the first two 
steps in figure four involves acquiring insight and expertise, items the state works to supply to 
the migrant. Integration in Flanders happens in the classroom, where free communication and 
problem solving can occur and incorporate working together in groups and interacting with 
others. In this respect, the state seeks to create a good example and first impression. 
Additionally, “openness to diversity” can be read as a call for a more engaged form of tolerance. 
The Flemish integration policy critically depends on conceptualizing openness as an active idea. 
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It involves not only the tolerance to permit actions that one might not agree with, but it also 
involves some recognition that these actions may be a net-positive for personal or social 
enhancement. 
 Furthermore, Flemish authorities seem actively concerned about how to promote more 
interculturalist thinking. By bringing integration to the most local level possible, they are able to 
give migrants more tools to interact with their daily realities. Furthermore, an official at the 
AvBB noted that there was some concern within the agency about how to properly bridge the 
integration gap. For although the Flemish provide detailed services, there has not been enough 
success with the program to demonstrate that their methods are superior. A study from the 2006 
King Baudouin Foundation found that poverty is considerably higher among immigrants than the 
native population (Robaeys and Perrin, 2006). 10.16% of native Belgians earned less than 60% 
of the median income in 2001, compared to 55.5% of Morrocans and 58.9% of Turks. This effect 
seems to be confined to Muslim immigrants in particular, as only 21.49% of those with Italian 
heritage were at these lower levels of income.   
It is perhaps due to this persistent poverty that we also see an increased willingness of 
Belgian Muslims to fight for ISIS in Syria (Zelin, 4/2013 and 12/2013). According to a report 
from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, there are 
between 76 and 296 Belgian foreign fighters in Syria, representing 27 per one million Belgians. 
This compares to between 29 and 152 Dutch foreign fighters, or 9 per one million Dutchmen.  It 
is because of this poverty and threat of radicalization that the AvBB are worried about painting a 
falsely positive picture of their country. While the informal atmosphere of the integration class 
may be able to expose immigrants to a deeper reality of what living in Flanders is really like, 
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ultimately some responsibility lies with the ethnic Flemish in accepting and accommodating the 
migrants.  
 The importance of activity is present everywhere in the Flemish integration program. In 
its documentation, the Flemish government refers to integration as “not something you just do 
inside a classroom.” Integration offices also actively work to bridge the gap between the native 
and immigrant populations. As local offices, this job is easier to accomplish. Their services 
include having native volunteers organize outings and work to help immigrants get membership 
in certain clubs and civic organizations. Additionally, the onthaalbureaus encourage their 
immigrants to go out and do voluntary work. Affiliated organizations like “Dzjambo” in Ghent 
hold monthly meetings where native citizens and new comers can meet in a welcoming space to 
talk, dance, eat, drink and play games. While Dzjambo may be small (286 Facebook followers, 
roughly 20-30 people per event), it is an active group, holding multiple events per year. Such 
events include skating, ethnic cooking sessions, trips to museums, and outdoor sports like soccer 
and kickboxing. Although their impact may be small, the presence of volunteer groups like 
Dzjambo give immigrants state sanctioned options they may not normally have the chance to 
enjoy.  
 The Flemish system also appears to be dynamic and evolving. Flemish officials openly 
acknowledge their investigations into integration systems in other parts of the world, with the 
Dutch and Quebecois systems being mentioned in particular. They also are paying attention to 
the traditional “old countries of immigration”, such as the United States and Australia. In doing 
so, the Flemish hope to learn why these countries are so much more successful in integrating 
their immigrants than the countries in Europe. Due to their involvement in the integration 
process, the Flemish have also been able to gather more data on the functioning of their 
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integration processes. This includes information at the provincial level about things like language 
preferences and career trajectory.  
The Netherlands 
 
 In their insistence on exams, the Dutch philosophy of integration is clearly more top-
down in nature. Integration research is spearheaded by “quasi-independent research institutions” 
like the Netherlands Institute for Social Research and the Scientific Research and Documentation 
Center (Schinkel, 2013). Their recommendations, along with those of Dutch policymakers, are 
translated into tangible integration exams, overseen by private test companies (CINOP for the 
BCIEA and ICE for the CIE at home) that review the quality and relevance of the questions used 
on the exam every year. Standardization, objectivity, and professionalism are very important to 
Dutch authorities. The type of personalization found in Belgium consequentially falls to the 
wayside.   
Integration has been defined using very exclusive terms. The Netherlands Institute for 
Social Research has defined integration as “participation... requiring that all immigrant learn the 
Dutch language and adopt the norms, values, and forms of social conduct prevailing in [the] 
country” (Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2006). While measuring Dutch language 
competency is a more straightforward task, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research 
recognized that the social aspects of integration are much more difficult to account for. In 2009, 
they attempted to clarify these aspects by defining them as the degree of intra-ethnic contact, 
cultural orientation, and religious identification and behavior, which still only questionably 
clarify these topics (Netherlands Institute for Social Research 2009, Schinkel 2013).  
 The construction of the tests girding the integration process reflects this care and focus of 
attention. For this section, we will look more closely at KNS portion of the CIE. The BCIEA is a 
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relatively easy exam that most people pass. It is the first contact migrants have with Dutch 
society, but the tougher CIE is the real gatekeeper to full Dutch membership. This is reflected in 
their pass-rates, with the BCIEA having a pass-rate of about 95%, whereas the CIE has a rate 
ranging between 75% and 85% (for the first try).  Since 2007, the CIE is also a component in the 
process of acquiring citizenship.  
 The KNS portion of the CIE conforms to preset “end-terms” decided by the Dutch 
government in consultation with a variety of expert support groups. The exam borrows from 
research done by a private consulting firm in Rotterdam in 2005. It outlines eight themes of 
information that the test is designed to measure. These themes are discussed in some detail, and 
are used by test prep firms to help educate their customers. The themes are: 
 Work and Income 
 Manners, Values, and Norms 
 Housing 
 Health and Healthcare 
 History and Geography 
 Government Bodies / Institutions 
 State government and law 
 Teaching and Education 
 
 
As in Flanders, integration takes into consideration both practical and normative values. 
However, in forgoing local details, the Dutch exam spends more time on national level 
characteristics. For example, its history section expects immigrants to be familiar with the 
history of the Netherlands during the Second World War, including the fact that the United 
States, Canada, and the UK helped to liberate the country. It also expects knowledge of major 
holidays (Christmas and Easter included) and tolerance for less important, more religiously 
themed holidays like Ramadan, Pentecost, etc. Additionally, it expects immigrants to be familiar 
with the more liberal value-system present in the Netherlands, such as a “respect for forms of 
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cohabitation other than marriage.” However, an official at ICE hinted that there is continued 
interest in moving away from more normative and values-oriented questions and towards a 
greater emphasis on more practical and objective elements of integration.   
 The Dutch attempt to become pertinent at the daily level by achieving some symmetry 
between the objectives of the KNS and the objectives of the language-oriented parts of the 
integration exam. The KNS is in Dutch, and therefore requires some knowledge of the language. 
Similarly, the parts of the integration exam meant to measure language skills often are about 
living in the Netherlands and situations that arise while doing so. Such spillovers include things 
like reading a newspaper article, making an appointment with a doctor, or talking with a police 
officer. Still, it is not clear that these exercises found in the language exam can properly 
substitute for the amount of attention a class-oriented integration strategy can provide.  
 This overlap between the language and cultural parts of the integration exam is 
purposeful, and is also reflected to some degree in the DVD “Naar Nederland”. Language and 
culture are seen to be tied together. Culture shapes what words and expressions are used in the 
language, and the language offers full access and a deeper understanding of the culture. 
According to an official at ICE, the integration exam should best be seen as a positive element. 
ICE sees the exam as an educational tool, something used to help people make a very delicate 
and important transition. With proper guidance and the instruction that an exam can provide, 
immigrants will be able to live more successful and fulfilling lives in their new country. This 
viewpoint is infused with a gritty realism. There is a reality out there that is hard and 
unforgiving, and immigrants need to be able to conform to its dictates. This does not mean that 
immigrants are unworthy of respect, help, or tolerance. Nor does it mean that they need to 
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abandon their ethnic cultures. But it does recognize a real concrete Dutch identity that is 
relatively non-negotiable.  
Textual Analysis of Integration Requirements 
 
Integration requirements themselves only tell part of the overall story of integration. They 
communicate the end-goals of the integration process. However, there should also be attention 
paid to the moment of first contact, and how the government chooses to introduce itself. Here 
integration documents are helpful. While discussing similar topics in similar areas of the world, 
the Dutch and Flemish integration documents are quite different. Beginning with composition 
and nature of the documents, the Dutch welcome packet, “Naar Nederland” costs over one 
hundred Euros, to be paid by the immigrant. It is a much more extensive resource, both for 
language and for the KNS DVD. That DVD, for example, has a runtime of just less than two 
hours. It is also noteworthy that most of the documents, the DVD included, are either in Dutch or 
with the native language dubbed over Dutch. The Flemish integration packet, “Migreren naar 
Vlaanderen” is completely different. It is a small packet, provided free of charge, in both Dutch 
and the native language of the immigrant. In addition to the MO booklet, it also contains an 
integration DVD. The booklet is only 28 pages long, and the DVD has a run time of just under a 
half hour. 
 Turning to the content of the documents, I have counted the frequency of words used in 
the KNS DVD and the MO brochure: for illustrative purposes, the frequency count is presented 
in the Word Cloud in Figures Five and Six. The MO DVD was not used because, unlike the 
brochure, the DVD content does not stay the same among different immigrant groups.  
As table five shows, there is a fair amount of overlap between these two documents. Most 
are unsurprising, like Dutch, the shared language of the countries. Words like work, children, 
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and school are also unsurprising, as these are important aspects of integrating into a new society. 
However, there are some important distinctions. For example, the Dutch DVD contains many 
more severity indicators, stressing the seriousness of integration. Words like “important”, 
“really,” and “need” are all present in abundance, whereas they play a much smaller role in the 
Flemish document.  
Outside of word frequency, other interesting differences can be seen between the two 
documents and the messages their governments give through them. The Flemish document, for 
example, offers a much more welcoming picture to the incoming immigrant. The document, a 
quarter of the size of the total Dutch KNS DVD, includes information on maternity and geriatric 
services. While some services like employment agencies are mentioned in “Naar Nederland”, it 
does not mention these more generous social services.   Furthermore, the Flemish document 
frames integration more in terms of rights than the Dutch document. The MO document 
mentions rights twice as frequently per page as the Dutch document. It also balances this 
discussion by discussing the duties of citizens to pay taxes and uphold Belgian social norms. 
Respect is also mentioned twice as frequently as the Dutch document per page. Respect is 
characterized as important in creating sustainable living situations.  
 In contrast to the more positive, equality-enforcing Flemish packet, the Dutch document 
strikes a considerably more negative tone. While both orientation packets stress difference, even 
using the same phrase of “culture shock”, the Dutch document stresses this to a stronger degree. 
It uses words like “different”, “problems”, and “punishable” far more frequently per page than in 
the Flemish document. The Dutch DVD even takes time to outline the reality that new 
immigrants may find themselves living in low-income housing. It describes the low quality of 
these housing complexes, as well as the crime and social problems that frequently happen in 
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these neighborhoods. Interestingly, this is a message the Dutch government fairly reliably 
communicates, including to workers from Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe (“Housing EU 
Migrant Workers”, 2013).  
 Additionally, because of its length and its place as testable material, the Dutch DVD 
covers a far wider breadth of knowledge, including history and a very detailed look at the 
government of the Netherlands. Lastly, the Dutch document is quite individually oriented. It uses 
a wide-variety of self-oriented words, such as “own,” “yourself,” “independent,” “responsible,” 
etc. This corresponds with the current Dutch stress on “self-integration.” From acquiring the 
integration packet to preparing and passing the integration exam, the onus in Dutch society is on 
the migrants to accomplish their own integration. 
 It is interesting to note the similarities between “self-integration” and the Flemish concept 
of autonomy. It is not surprising that these goals overlap, as it is in any state’s interest to have 
immigrants be self-sustaining and productive members of society. The difference is that in 
Flanders, autonomy is an end goal that is reached through care and diligence in its integration 
efforts. The Netherlands, on the other hand, assumes some degree of autonomy as a prerequisite 
for integration. To pass the BCIEA and the CIE, immigrants need to be willing and able to 
assume the responsibility necessary for preparing, paying for, and ultimately passing these 
exams.  
Flemish Integration as an Example of Cultural Tailoring 
 
 As mentioned in prior sections, a primarily characteristic of the Flemish integration 
program is its tailoring to particular groups. This tailoring is most fully expressed in the DVDs 
that come with their integration packet. Here, the Flemish government invites four immigrants 
from their respective immigrant groups to speak about life in Flanders.  
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 Presented below are three examples of speakers from the Flemish immigration DVDs. A 
full list of larger speaker images can be found in the appendix. We see immediately a number of 
different cultural cues, some overt and some covert. In figure seven, for example, we see covert 
signs of reaching out in the form of ethnic Turkish cuisine. In figure eight, copious amounts of 
Russian symbols are seen, including Russian stacking dolls, a calendar with Eastern Orthodox 
imagery, and even a picture, in the foreground, of St. Basil’s Cathedral in Moscow. Finally, in 
figure nine, we see a very overtly presented Moroccan flag, clearly demonstrating that although 
the DVD is in Arabic, the Flemish government realizes that this language is used in a wide 
variety of different cultures. In the appendix, you can also see a variety of ethnic wall 
decorations, tea pots, and cups. For all speakers, food and drink are involved, perhaps signaling a 
feeling of ease and welcome to the viewer. Men and women are equally represented, and in some 
cases ethnic clothing is worn. It is worth noting, however, that the headscarf and veil are 
noticeably absent. It is also worth remembering that these speakers communicate in the video in 
their native tongue. 
Upon careful examination, we can also observe certain similarities that the Flemish 
government maintained between the videos. Figure ten demonstrates that they used the same set 
for all of their filming. The door frame behind the speaker was either left open or covered 
strategically with different kinds of fabrics. We also note some reuse of particular items. For 
example, the table cloth from the speaker in the top left is re-seen as the table cloth in the rear 
table on the far right. However, for the Russian speaker, the rear table is covered with a plain 
(perhaps ethnically neutral) fabric. Other reused items seen clearly in Appendix C include lamps, 
background flowers, and other table cloths.  
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In stark contrast, figures 11 and 12 show the first and second immigrant speakers 
presented in the Naar Nederland, the Dutch integration DVD. There is no tailoring here. 
Immigrants from many different lands are presented, all speaking Dutch. The background is a 
non-descript red cloth, and there are no symbols of their prior ethnicity to be seen.  
The videos here elegantly illuminate the principal difference between national approaches. The 
Flemish approach infuses the integration process with familiar images and a welcoming 
atmosphere. The Dutch approach, however, emphasizes a coming together and adoption of a 
unified cultural identity. 
Differing Priorities Through EU Integration Funding 
 
 Welcome materials given to (or purchased by) the immigrant provide some of the most 
direct understandings of how the state views itself and how it approaches welcoming immigrant 
populations. However, these documents cannot exclusively encompass a government’s 
integration policies. By analyzing relevant grant requests and government positions on sensitive 
and related cultural laws, the conclusions drawn from the welcome documents can be better 
nuanced and contextualized. 
 
European Fund for the Integration of Third Party Nationals (2007-2013) 
 
One useful avenue in understanding the differences between Dutch and Belgian 
integration programs is to leverage the basis for comparison introduced by the European Union. 
The EU offered “integration funds” to assist national governments in the integration of their 
citizens from 2007-2013 (Council Decision 2007/435/EC). Funding was allocated on the basis of 
reports submitted to the Commission arguing their need, so the amount of funds allocated was 
less important. Countries that were experiencing less immigration would be less successful in 
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getting large amounts of funding. However, seeing what countries chose to spend this money on 
can reveal much about the priorities of their integration programs. Upon analysis, Flemish 
funding priorities reflect their commitment to interculturalism through their high levels of 
spending on immigrants and outreach, whereas the Dutch tend to reserve their integration 
funding for research and quality control.  
 These EU integration funds were allocated by the European Commission on the behalf of 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council. It was meant to be spent towards four priorities. These 
were 1.) the development of indicators used to measure successful integration, 2.) supplementary 
funds towards the betterment of national policy-making, 3.) creating a platform for the exchange 
of ideas and experiences, and 4.) the fulfillment of the eleven “common basic principles” set 
down as European guidelines (European Commission, 2005). It was towards this last goal that a 
majority of the spending in each country is allocated. The principles present at the European 
level included a variety of different objectives, such as the promotion of respect for European 
values (#2), access to employment and  government institutions (numbers three and five), and 
knowledge of a host country’s language, history, and institutions (#4). Interestingly, it also 
contained a directive emphasizing integration as “a dynamic, two-way process of mutual 
accommodation” (#1) and “frequent interaction between immigrants and member state citizens” 
(#7)13. The EU’s increasing power regarding immigrant integration adds further complexity to 
the analysis of integration policies in Europe. While these principles currently give states quite a 
bit of freedom in the utilization of EU funding, this may change in the future as more immigrants 
                                                 
13 See website below for full text: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/;ELX_SESSIONID=ymKGTnjd1T5GWz24Njbp84zLg4n5NtJ9kn79bJNwTSBPvWLBh5JJ!-
778669188?uri=CELEX:52005DC0389 
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attempt to arrive in Europe via increasingly desperate means. They are both sufficiently broad to 
accommodate a variety of different goals, and sufficiently vague to give states freedom in doing 
so.  
 Belgium spent around 2.4 million Euros of the 4.6 million allocated to the country 
through the integration fund program (for fiscal years 2007-2009). This amount is distributed at 
the federal level, going to all four communities: Brussels, Flanders, Wallonia, and the German-
speaking region.  For the Flemish region, all money spent went to priority four, satisfying the 
EU’s principles. In particular, the Belgians used the funds for a variety of personalized coaching 
and expert support present in their integration process. There was also money spent to develop 
integration projects to be used in their countries of origin (like what is done in the Netherlands). 
In short, the money was spent on their immigrants, and helped co-finance their national 
integration system. Belgium noted in their report that because the EU expected the nation to be 
the principal beneficiary of the funding, this complicated their efforts in properly distributing the 
funds to their sub-national communities.  
 The Netherlands used their funding a little differently. They used 4.5 million euros of an 
allocated 5.5 million euros (also for fiscal years 2007-2009) to fund large educational projects 
researching integration, as well as to coordinate and attend integration conferences abroad. One 
of their educational projects, for example, focused on gauging the importance of participation in 
the integration process, while the other involved increasing dialogues between native and 
immigrant residents in schools, among young people, and among women. The Dutch report that 
European integration funds are less useful for their country because the amount is small relative 
to their yearly integration spending (around 580 million euros), and limited in its application to 
only newly arrived third party nationals (therefore not applicable to programs for dual nationals 
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or second/third generation immigrants). The Dutch view these provisions as unduly restrictive to 
the proper use of this funding in their country. 
Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (2014-2020) 
 
 In 2014, the EU reorganized its funding in the area of immigration, combining the 
European Refugee Fund, the External Borders Fund, the European Integration Fund, and the 
European Return Fund into one grant, called the Asylum, Migration, and Immigration Fund, or 
AMIF (EU Parliament, 2014). Because of the recent nature of the program, spending details 
about the new plans are scarce. However, the more comprehensive nature of the fund has spurred 
more government interest. 
 In the Netherlands, a “New European Immigration Funds” department has been 
established with the purpose of transitioning, coordinating, and overseeing these new grants. 
According to their nation government’s program, the Netherlands will be entitled to 
approximately 80 million Euros over the grant’s seven year cycle (Programmaplan Nieuwe 
Europese Migratiefondsen, 2013). According to the Union of Dutch Municipalities’ 2014-2020 
European Grant Primer, the Netherland’s National Plan for the use of the AMIF funds has not 
yet been finalized (Langhorst and van Diemen, 2014). This is likely because the grant utilizes a 
new “policy dialogue” procedure by which national authorities engage in intense conversation 
with the European Commission to avoid subsequent negotiations between these parties during 
the span of the grant. 
 Flanders has also undergone a little less governmental restructuring in anticipation of the 
new AMIF. Because it already had a robust integration program in place, the Flemish integration 
program will retain responsibility (The Kingdom of Belgium, 2014). However, a new change is 
the incorporation of the European Social Funds office (ESF) as the management authority for the 
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AMIF (The Government of Flanders, 2013). Like the Netherlands, Belgium has not yet issued a 
call for programs, currently scheduled for the fall of 2015. However, Flanders has issued a 
policy-note outlining their priorities for the years that overlap the range of the AMIF. In their 
policy note, the Flemish government discusses their goals of “horizontal” integration (Flemish 
Government, 2013). The “horizontal” approach acknowledges that integration is the 
responsibility of not only the entire Flemish government, but also “social partners, educational 
partners, social organizations, local authorities, media and associations of people with a migrant 
origin.” Such a communal approach helps make integration something that isn’t just constrained 
to a government classroom or course. The same policy note states that the Asylum, Migration, 
and Immigration Fund will be “maximally deployed” to assist this horizontal integration, with 
special emphasis on promoting “stimulating and interesting” integration plans that solve new and 
existing challenges.  
Integration through Differing Burqa Bans 
 
 Differences in EU funding and prioritization illustrate how governments approach 
integration outside of their direct efforts via their welcome documents. But these decisions are 
largely decided at the elite level, far from public scrutiny. Sometimes, however, important 
integration decisions must be made very publically. Legislation involving the wearing of burqas 
in public is one such example. While not contained in any government welcome packet, these 
decisions are important in establishing the overall tone of integration and intergroup relations 
within a particular government. Here too, Belgium and the Netherlands pursue different 
approaches that are in-line with their overall emphases on interculturalism and assimilation, 
respectively.  
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Belgium’s stress on intercultural principles has manifested itself in strict ways. Belgium 
is one of the very few countries in Europe (France being the other) that has instituted an overall 
ban on Muslim women wearing the burqa. This ban entered into force in 2011 at the federal 
level, and was passed almost unanimously by the Chamber of Representatives (van der Schyff 
and Overbeeke, 2011). It was immediately referred to the Belgian Constitutional Court, which in 
2012 upheld the ban on the grounds of public safety and the promotion of ‘le vivre ensemble’ / 
‘samenleven’ / ‘living together’. The law was further upheld in 2014 by the European Court of 
Human Rights, where Belgium was a party to a pre-existing challenge to France’s burqa ban. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in the case S.A.S. v. France, agreed that the use 
of the burqa interfered with the goals of living together and creating social bonds. The court 
noted that seeing one’s face is an exceptionally important element to this end (European Court of 
Human Rights, 2014). Discrimination on the grounds of religion is therefore avoided through 
this narrow and fairly utilitarian interpretation.  
 Considering the strict Dutch integration process, we might expect the Netherlands to also 
observe a harsh burqa ban. However, this has not been the case. A ban on burqas had been 
seriously discussed in the Netherlands since Pim Fortuyn rose to political prominence in 2002. 
After the Dutch election of 2010, resulting in a conservative minority coalition with far right 
support, the first Rutte coalition passed a burqa ban in Janurary 2012. Following the French and 
Dutch example, the ban would penalize the wearing of burqas, as well as ski-masks and 
motorcycle helmets in inappropriate places. However, the coalition fell apart in April after failed 
negotiations over austerity measures. When the centrist second Rutte coalition formed in 
November, they severely curtailed the areas where the ban would apply, limiting it only to public 
transportation, healthcare, schooling, and government buildings (Smouter, 2014). The original 
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law from 2012 was still in effect, banning the burqa in public, but it was not being strictly 
enforced on a national level. In May 2015, the Dutch government formalized these burqa ban 
restrictions into law. The new law is narrower than the 2012 law as written, but can now be 
enforced more reliably. The new law also includes details about the fines for those who break it, 
currently are set at 405 Euros (Back, 2015).  
 These differences in emphasis further highlight the principal distinction between Belgium 
and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, a burqa ban was the brainchild of Geert Wilders and his 
PVV (Party for Freedom/Partij voor Vrijheid) party, who leveraged his party’s position of power 
to strong-arm the legislation through. The process was met with strong resistance throughout, 
including the non-binding, advisory “Council of State” (NOS.nl, 2012). This Council was 
concerned that the ban violated religious freedom, a value strongly protected in Dutch society. 
Proponents of the law side-stepped this criticism by referencing Article 6 of the Dutch 
constitution, which notes that religious freedom can be curtailed in the interest of protecting 
health, traffic, order, and safety. The current stipulations on burqa usage are directly drawn from 
this article’s provisions.  
 The implementation of these bans emphasizes the different approaches each country uses 
when negotiating cultural differences. In Belgium, where interculturalist norms of cooperation 
are emphasized and religious practice challenged by understandings of the French laicite found 
in Wallonia, the government interprets usage of the burqa as asocial and uses the law to 
encourage people into contact and socialization when in public. Such an insistence is maintained 
even in the face of strong protest from Islamic radical groups like sharia4Belgium. Such protests 
have included rioting, such as those that occurred after the arrest of Stephanie Djato of Brussels 
in 2012 (Hilburn, 2014). The Dutch, focused more on assimilation and the principles it entails, 
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are more willing to extend religious protections to immigrants, as long as it doesn’t endanger the 
safety of the public or sensitive areas. Religious freedom is an important element of the Dutch 
identity narrative, and this includes Islam and its religious tenants (van Reekum and Duyvendak, 
2012). Any decrease in socialization or cohesion is outweighed by fidelity to principle so long as 
it does not endanger the lives of others.  
Discussion 
 
 Through this series of comparisons, it is clear that the Dutch and Flemish are engaging in 
different sorts of integration policies. The engaged Flemish government pursue policies with an 
interculturalist bent, focusing on increasing the agency of individuals and their deepening 
interactions with society around them. This is communicated in a variety of different ways, from 
how the program is structured, to what it directly communicates and how it acts and spends its 
resources. It is a person-centric program. Its focuses on moving immigrants towards greater 
autonomy and brings them into close contact with native citizens. While Dutch is stressed as 
important, getting migrants the knowledge necessary for them to function is of a higher priority. 
Their insistence on the practical over the principle is particularly strong signal of intercultural 
thinking.  
 The Dutch integration program has a different, more assimilatory focus. It also seeks to 
communicate knowledge, but the type of knowledge stressed is less readily applicable to daily 
living. It has less flexibility built into how the migrant integrates. There are set priorities and 
knowledge of these priorities overrides the particularities of the immigrant’s local or personal 
situation. By including history and culture on the integration exam, it grants this type of 
knowledge an importance far beyond the level stressed in the Belgian system. In many ways, the 
Dutch system is a type of shock-treatment for the immigrant. It forces the immigrant to be 
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competent and responsible. The onus is on the migrant to acquire the material, training, and 
funding necessary to integrate properly. In going through the process and taking the initiative, 
immigrants learn how to do things for themselves. This also fosters autonomy, but in a different 
sort of way. Unfortunately, as a consequence of this set-up, there are fewer state sponsored 
methods to encourage cooperation between the native and migrant populations. The immigrant is 
reminded of the importance of reaching out to the natives, but this cannot be done so easily 
without state sanction.  
 Both countries stress the importance of reaching out, of cooperation, tolerance, and a 
respect for difference.  But there are a number of important differences. In interculturalist cases 
such as Belgium, an active role is taken to promote engagement and communication. It is built 
into the very core of the system, not above value and information transmission, but on a similar 
level. More assimilatory countries like the Netherlands proclaim similar goals, but neglect an 
active cooperation in favor of passive personal expectations. It is important to note that that like 
multiculturalism, the Dutch make clear the values of tolerance and respect for differences. 
However, these values are treated similarly to any other nationalist expectation, be it respect for 
the flag or the knowledge of an anthem. The onus is entirely on the immigrant to internalize 
these norms.   
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Chapter 5: Mass Opinion on the Integration of Immigrants 
 
 The success of any integration policy ultimately resides with the beliefs and behaviors of 
the public. Even the best integration policies will fail if they are not internalized by individuals 
and lived during day to day interactions. It is in public where people socialize and where 
different values and beliefs can interact with each other. It is therefore essential that any 
complete exploration of integration policies in contemporary European politics include a mass 
survey. When people interact, a complete picture requires looking at a relationship from both 
sides. Studying immigrants and their opinions can tell researchers the actual effectiveness of 
immigration policies, which may include observations that run counter to popular expectations 
(see: Wright and Bloemraad, 2012).  
This chapter, however, focuses on the other side of the relationship, namely how natives 
view their own integration policies. Regardless of the actual effects of integration policies, 
natives (who do not need to worry about integrating themselves) will have opinions about what 
should be expected of immigrants and how successful their country’s integration policies are 
relative to how they should be. These opinions can condition how natives view immigration in 
their country and the amount of trust (or not, according to Sniderman and Haagendorn 2007) 
they offer those who are different. Even perfectly integrated immigrants can be isolated and 
marginalized by a native population unwilling to accept difference. To study these important 
actors, I conducted a large sample survey of established residents in the Netherlands and 
Belgium. I asked those who agreed to participate to evaluate a pair of vignettes describing 
hypothetical policies informed by one of the four integration ideologies presented above. The 
survey demonstrates clear preferences for more permissive policies, and suggests clear 
advantages for intercultural policymaking.  
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The Netherlands and Belgium as Test Cases 
 
As discussed in prior chapters, this dissertation is conducted in two countries: the 
Netherlands and Belgium.  These countries have been chosen for their differences in context, as 
well as their unique qualifications to contribute to the study of national identity and identity-
based trust. Chapter Four provided an analysis about the Dutch experience and their 
dissatisfaction with multiculturalism, as well as Belgian challenges grappling with its dual ethnic 
identities. These characteristics make the people in these countries very familiar with the 
intricacies and difficulties of constructing and negotiating national identities. 
 Outside of their overall expertise in immigrant integration, the Dutch and Belgian cases 
are well suited for a most-similar research design, as so many characteristics are shared between 
these two countries. While Belgium has its unique federal system, the consequences of this 
system for Belgian national identity (and its influence therefore on integration) will be of interest 
in comparing Belgian and Dutch subjects. Belgium and the Netherlands are excellent cases for a 
most similar research design.  The two countries share histories, neighborhoods, and are in a 
number of shared international organizations (down to the regional BeNeLux organization). 
They are also roughly similar in terms of population, GDP per capita, and land area. Perhaps 
most importantly, their modern migrant populations also look similar (Turks and Moroccans) 
and they share the same language usage (Dutch in Flanders and a passive knowledge of English 
everywhere). These similarities will make it easier for the effect of the differing immigration and 
integration policies to be observed.  
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The Netherlands 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the Netherlands provides a helpful political environment to 
discuss immigration and migrant assimilation in Western European countries. Features that make 
the Netherlands an attractive case study include a popular national narrative that prides itself on 
progressivism and liberalism and a history of innovative approaches to integration and 
assimilation that are shared or modeled by other countries in Europe.  
 Another advantage of the Dutch case is the rich debate in the country about the limits of 
tolerance, the appropriateness of multiculturalism, and a thoughtful consideration about the 
appropriateness of the scope of the social revolution of the 1960s. This debate is an exciting one 
to consider in terms of the progression/history of ideas, and can be seen in the discourse 
surrounding the Dutch far right. Since the New Integration Policy in 2004, their modified 
xenophobic appeals have represented a strong alternative to more mainstream liberal 
multicultural leanings. This debate has reached a prominence in the Dutch public discourse 
relatively unmatched by other Western countries over the past decade. Said dynamic 
appropriately justifies the Dutch conception of the Netherlands as the gidsland, or mentor state 
with regards to modern social liberalism (Herman, 2005). This notion of the Dutch as a cultural 
leader makes the Netherlands all the more credible as a case where we can see the limits of 
multicultural / individualistic-civic citizenship. 
 According to Collinson 1994, the Netherlands is the only West European country that 
has attempted to explicitly endorse multicultural values in a coherent policy framework (though 
Sweden has also attempted a similar policy)14. Considering their lengthy experience with 
                                                 
14 See Chapter Four for a more complete discussion the historic experience of multiculturalism in the Netherlands. 
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multiculturalism, it is reasonable to expect that the strengths and weaknesses of this ideology 
will be more apparent to Dutch citizens than to people living in other countries.  
Belgium 
  
Belgium is another useful laboratory for the study of the immigration and integration of 
Muslim immigrants into Western Culture. Despite the similarities with the Dutch case mentioned 
earlier, Belgium offers potentially valuable variation. As Chapter Four noted, the Belgian state 
has no form of integration or language tests, it possesses an internal regional variation that 
permits migrants to favor a “path of least resistance”, and it has very immigrant-friendly laws 
and programs.  
  At the federal level, Belgium is an attractive place to study immigration with respect to 
the Netherlands because it provides more support for incoming migrants. If reluctance to 
assimilate stems from too much hostility from the in-group (coupled with identity projection), we 
should see this minimized in the Belgian case. Some figures from the Migrant Integration Policy 
Index (MIPEX) III clearly illustrate this point. Using the Netherlands as a point of comparison, 
Belgium has 2.3 times as many foreign born people in their society as the Dutch do. In 2009, the 
Belgians approved 23% more family unification permits than the Netherlands and naturalized 
27% more long term residents. Despite its smaller population and economy, Belgium still had 
34% more migrants entering their community in 2009 than the Netherlands. While migrant 
unemployment is over three times higher in Belgium than in Holland (29.40% vs. 9.30%), this 
lack of employment opportunity does not seem to deter increasing numbers of migrants from 
entering Belgium. 
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Hypotheses 
 
 There are two types of hypotheses that will be tested by the on-site surveys. The first two 
test the nature and characteristics of the four integration strategies: multiculturalism, 
assimilation, liberalism as identity, and interculturalism. The claims for these hypotheses will be 
informed by the alternative typology presented in table one. The second set of hypotheses (i.d.: 
the following five ones) will test the claims of the optimal distinctiveness theory and in-group 
projection theory.  
 
Typologically Informed Hypotheses 
 
The first two hypotheses test the alternative typology discussed in table one. Multiple 
sources of evidence from the United States supporting the spectrum understanding of integration 
can be found in Chapter 3. The typology, however, requires a more sophisticated survey to tease 
out the various aspects of the integration ideologies. Starting first with the directionality of the 
ideologies, the survey asks about the importance of ethnic culture. This is a useful proxy variable 
for directionality, as ethnic culture is something that belongs to one group in particular. A policy 
that favors one group in particular is clearly more mono-directional than a policy that is open to 
many different cultures and traditions. Translated in terms of my study, I predict: 
 
H1: Those evaluating one way ideologies like assimilation and liberalism as identity should 
evaluate the vignettes as making ethnic culture more important than those evaluating two-
way ideologies like interculturalism and multiculturalism. 
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Looking at the other element of the typology, my survey also examines what the 
vignettes consider important and worthy of loyalty. I ask respondents if the vignettes presented 
make individuals or groups more important. This maps directly onto the question of if an 
ideology is community or ideologically focused. Respondents should rate community oriented 
vignettes like “liberalism as identity” and interculturalism as making groups more important than 
individuals. Conversely, assimilation and multiculturalism should make individuals seem more 
important than groups.  
 
H2: Evaluations on the outward focus of the vignettes should score highest for the 
interculturalism and liberalism as identity ideologies. 
Social Psychologically Informed Hypotheses 
 
The next two hypotheses test the optimal distinctiveness and common in-group identity 
theories. In hypothesis four, I test the relationship between different types of integration and 
salience/importance of a respondent’s national identity. In his 2006 study, Weldon determines 
that individualistic-civic countries (multiculturalism) have higher levels of tolerance than their 
collectivist counterparts (assimilation). His study, however, does not address the theoretical 
downside of these citizenship regimes in the form of decreased identity salience / 
meaningfulness. Few studies have observed the relationship of identity salience to content in an 
empirical, cross-national fashion. This hypothesis serves as a test of Brewer 1991’s optimal 
distinctiveness model. If there is a necessary trade-off between inclusiveness and differentiation, 
then we should see responses for those shown more multicultural vignettes to rate their 
perception of national identity meaningfulness lower than those shown more assimilatory 
vignettes. In short: 
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H3: The closer a vignette advocates a multiculturalist perspective; the more likely 
respondents will evaluate the policy as harmful to the meaningfulness of their national 
identity.  
 
 Hypothesis four tests the contention that the intermediate ideologies of “liberalism as 
identity” and “interculturalism” (following the proposed structure of the vignette) are more 
attractive to people than the polar ideologies of individualistic civic (multiculturalism) and 
collectivistic-civic (civic nationalism). If the social psychology literature is to be believed, an 
intermediate ideology would be more desirable than an ideology at either extreme. 
 When considering the optimal distinctiveness theory, it is important to remember that as 
any identity grows more defined, it also grows more exclusive. This applies also to well-defined 
civic identities, as few people completely identify with a civic identity. There are Frenchmen, for 
example, who may agree with the French ideals of liberté and fraternité, but not égalité. Such 
people would be considered by others to be less “French” than if, in an alternate world,  égalité 
was not considered an important component of Frenchness. If social identity theorists are to be 
believed, people should gravitate towards a definition of Frenchness that includes them (and is 
thus broader). Such an example would apply to almost everyone, from the atheist seeking a more 
secular national identity, to the racist seeking a less egalitarian one, and to the libertarian seeking 
a freer one. In short, people have a preference to minimize cognitive dissonance between their 
personal ideas and the ideas of the group by configuring their own interpretation of the group to 
include them. Claims that the United States is “a Christian nation” are examples of this type of 
thinking.  
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 Brewer’s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory therefore entails that personal desire for an 
equilibrium national identity fall somewhere between complete assimilation and pure 
multiculturalism. Given the ability to rank ideologies, we should therefore see interculturalism 
and liberalism as identity being more attractive to native citizens than multiculturalism and civic 
nationalism. Hypothesis four tests if individual preferences gravitate towards the center now that 
my expanded conception of assimilation ideologies has created one. Stated more formally: 
 
H4: Given the choice, more survey respondents should prefer the middle pair of 
assimilation ideologies (interculturalism and liberalism as identity) to the outer pair 
(collectivistic civic and individualistic civic citizenship regimes).  
 
Hypothesis five builds on hypothesis four in testing the details of the relationship 
between the ideological center and periphery. Whereas hypothesis three tested gravitation 
towards the center, this hypothesis tests that this gravitation is operating in a manner predicted by 
notions of political distance. According to the typology, interculturalism can be considered a 
more moderate version of multiculturalism. Similarly, liberalism as identity can be considered a 
more moderate version of civic nationalism. If this is true, we should expect to observe these 
preference pairings in respondent evaluations of these ideologies. For example, people who do 
not identify closely with their national identity should find interculturalism and then 
multiculturalism (because of H4) more favorable than liberalism as identity and assimilation 
(collectivistic civic regimes). Stated formally: 
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H5: Those survey respondents expressing low attachment to the state should exhibit a 
higher preference towards interculturalism than LAI or civic nationalism. Similarly, those 
expressing higher attachment to the state should exhibit higher preference towards LAI 
than interculturalism or individualistic-civic citizenship regimes. 
 
The Belgium and the Netherlands are fascinating places to study migrant integration. 
Belgium shares many important similarities with the Netherlands, yet exhibits important 
variation in the strength of national identities. Hypothesis six tests this notion by observing 
differences in levels of attachment to the state between Belgians and Dutchmen. If it is true we 
should see Belgians expressing lower levels of connection to the state (and thus, according to 
H5, exhibiting stronger preferences for interculturalism). Stated formally:  
 
H6: Belgian respondents should exhibit lower levels of attachment to their state than Dutch 
respondents. This will translate into greater Belgian support for multicultural policies, 
especially interculturalism.  
 
 For my final hypothesis, I will be looking at how levels of identity-based trust (identity 
meaning national identity), identity salience, and in-group projection vary among the four 
potential integration ideologies. Questions gauging the respondent’s baseline preference towards 
assimilation or multiculturalism will condition the results reported and will be accounted for 
within the survey. In order to truly claim that interculturalism and LAI are better performing 
ideologies relative to the dominant integration ideologies of collectivistic-civic citizenship and 
multiculturalism, they must demonstrate the ability to create stronger levels of trust based upon 
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the national identity, while at the same time maintaining as low levels of in-group projection as 
possible. To this end, we can create a composite scale judging the strengths of each of the 
ideologies according to social psychological theory. If t represents levels of identity-based trust 
and p represents perceived in-group projection, the best policy would be one with the highest 
value (v) according to the formula: 
 
v = t - p 
 
We can expect identity salience/importance to be an appropriate proxy variable for identity-
based trust value, as Brewer 1991 and Gaertner and Dovidio 2000 assert that only salient 
identities are able to create the group expectations required for the creation of identity based 
trust. Only salient identities carry enough meaning to create the expectations in how one acts or 
what one believes. It is from these similarities that trust arises. As for projection, it must be 
subtracted from trust to faithfully replicate the tradeoff found in social psychology. High levels 
of trust, for example, coupled with strong in-group identification would ultimately produce an 
unsatisfactory policy, as migrant groups would see the resulting superordinate identity as 
threatening to their own subordinate identities. Stated more formally, the hypothesis is: 
 
H7: The middle integration ideologies (interculturalism and liberalism as identity) will 
have higher values for “v” than the outer integration ideologies (collectivist-civic and 
individualist-civic). 
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Design of the Survey 
 
This study surveys primarily at the individual level, as national identity and trust strongly 
vary from person to person. While the discussion has this far centered on integration ideologies 
at the level of national policy, the ideologies that underpin the policy are accessible and resonant 
to the average person. In an increasingly globalized world, personal conceptions of national 
identity are constantly challenged by interactions with immigrants and their cultures. While the 
average citizen may not be sophisticated enough to understand the difference between 
interculturalism and multiculturalism in abstract terms, framing this difference in terms of 
concrete examples about what national identity means and how people should interact with each 
other will better speak to such citizens. Additionally, individuals live within nations that chose to 
actualize certain integration ideologies. A person who lives within a strongly multicultural 
country may not have ever heard about multiculturalism in an academic sense, but he or she 
certainly interacts with multicultural expectations and consequences on a daily basis.  
Vignette Construction Details 
 
In every survey, each respondent is presented with a pair of vignettes designed to prompt 
evaluations of the different integration ideologies. This includes a question on the respondent’s 
preference between them. The construction of these vignettes is critically important, as they are 
the vehicles through which the integration ideologies are presented and evaluated In order to 
minimize noise within the vignettes, variation between them was restricted to three places. This 
is illustrated in the formula for the vignette below: 
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“The policy [suggests / requires] attending a government-run integration course for immigrants 
entering the country from outside the Netherlands. The importance of [ideological value] would 
be especially emphasized under this policy. This message [would / would not ] be communicated 
to native citizens” 
  
 Ideally, the least noisy vignette would vary only the second sentence in this formula. This 
second sentence is most important, as it incorporates the heart of the meaning for each vignette. 
However, this research does seek to measure the effect of particular words on people’s 
responses. Ideologies are complex entities that cannot be encapsulated in one word or a pair of 
words. For example, it is difficult to accurately reflect what a word like “liberalism” or 
“egalitarianism” mean in one word. Is “liberalism” equality, freedom, or change? Does the 
equality in “egalitarianism” apply to all people, all the time, in all circumstances? Does the 
separation of powers in “federalism” apply to all branches of government in the same manner? 
Assimilationism, multiculturalism, and the rest of the vignettes suffer from these same problems. 
In order to better portray these ideologies without completely sacrificing comparability, I include 
flanking sentences with dichotomous variables to both add nuance and more detail to the 
vignette. While evaluations of these vignettes must remain holistic, the limited, constrained, and 
sometimes overlapping nature of the first and third sentences allows social scientists to 
understand (and in some cases isolate) the nature of the variation they are seeing. Table six 
illustrates the logic behind the vignette construction.  
The coerciveness variable in the first sentence approximates the expectations loaded 
within the ideology about what is required from the immigrant. This distinction helps to illustrate 
one of the fine and often-overlooked differences between interculturalism and multiculturalism. 
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Kymlicka’s warning about the incompatibility of excessive coercion in civic integration policies 
support multiculturalism’s use of “suggests” in the coerciveness sentence, a helpful symmetry 
between the 3S and citizenization conceptualizations of multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 2012). 
 The content variable provides unique substance for each vignette.  Some choices here, 
like “tolerance” and “cooperation” were fairly easy to make, and accurately summarizes the core 
of the vignette. These words can be viewed as symbolic commitments to belief systems/frames, 
which can significantly impact attitudes towards immigration (Jeong, 2013). LAI and 
Assimilation, however, require a little more explanation. The principal challenge here was to 
make these items comprehensible and relatable to the average respondent. For LAI, “our liberal 
values” was utilized. “Liberal” is used the same way in Dutch as in English (Dutch: liberalisme), 
as does its adjective form, liberale. As in the United States, liberale is sometimes used to 
describe political parties (usually the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy in the 
Netherlands and the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats party in Flanders). The inclusion of 
“our” is used to prevent misunderstanding here, as it would be nonsensical to presume a priori 
that the respondent votes for these parties. The few respondents who did ask for clarification here 
were provided it, being informed that the word was used in this context to reference liberalisme.  
As for assimilation, the problem was that assimilation can be used to mean many things, 
including the adoption of the national language, religion, customs, holidays, clothing, and more. 
Compounding this problem is that not all of these elements are considered of equal importance. 
Knowledge of the national language, for example, would be considered very important, as 
suggested by the integration material in Chapter Four. Conversely, celebration of national 
holidays would be considered not all that important at all, as they tend not to carry much 
significance. To escape this problem, I chose to characterize assimilation in terms of a high and 
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low salience ideology, respectively: language and knowledge of history. This choice tempers the 
enthusiasm most respondents would show for a language-only vignette, and demonstrates the 
multifaceted nature of assimilationist policies.  
 The final sentence of the vignette involves the importance attached to the 
communication of integration to the native citizens. This emphasizes the fact that integration 
may not be only a one-way street. It directly addresses the one versus two-way variable of the 
alternative new typology of integration presented in chapter three and positively nuances the 
presentation of the intercultural and multicultural vignettes. 
The construction of these vignettes is empirically validated by studies presented in 
Chapter Three. The results of these studies demonstrate that respondents were able to evaluate 
the vignettes in the manner sought by the study, validating their construction. While this study 
was given to American students, I believe the responses should remain valid for Dutch and 
Belgian citizens. The vignettes were presented in plain language regarding a relatable situation, 
and therefore should be able to apply to all Western liberal democracies. 
Questionnaire Construction Details 
 
 For this study, I conduct a paper-based survey with third generation or greater immigrants 
about their opinions on migrant integration15. This means that only individuals whose parents 
were born in the country were admitted into the survey. This choice was made to ensure that the 
subject’s dominant national identity was the same as their home countries, free from any possible 
international influence arising from their parent’s upbringings. The questions presented in the 
survey correspond directly to the hypotheses of the study. Each respondent is first asked to 
                                                 
15 A good deal of thanks goes to Brian Gaines for helping me with the construction of this survey questionnaire. 
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evaluate their attachment to their nation. This question serves as a check against projection by 
taking into account any pre-existing feelings of national identity and attachment in the 
respondent. Following this first question, the respondent is then presented with a random choice 
of one of four vignettes. They are then asked to evaluate the vignette on their value focus (H1), 
directionality (H2), strength of national meaningfulness (H3), and trust creation and identity 
projection (H7).  
Immediately after completion of the first evaluation, respondents are asked to do an 
identical evaluation with a different vignette randomly chosen from the remaining pool of three. 
Differences between the vignettes are highlighted and bolded to aid in emphasizing the 
distinction between this exercise and the one preceding it. Any differences between responses 
given to the first and second vignettes will be particularly important as they would suggest 
strengths or weaknesses of particular integration ideologies. Finally, respondents are then asked 
to express their overall preference towards one policy or the other (H4-H6). 
In conducting the survey as a two distinct steps, the possibility of ordering bias is 
introduced into the second vignette of the survey. For example, a respondent who reads about 
assimilation first may be more or less generous in evaluating the second vignette if it is about 
multiculturalism than if the multicultural vignette was shown first. Because the first vignette will 
not suffer from ordering bias, this can serve an unbiased standard to test for ordering bias in the 
second vignette. Those responses that exhibit said bias are removed from the study, while those 
free from it were included in the final sample.    
Because the survey is conducted entirely on paper, question order randomization is not 
possible. To accommodate this problem, the question order of the survey was determined in such 
a way so as to narrow the breadth of the questions as the survey progresses (McFarland, 1981). 
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This prevents any discrepancies between questions and minimizes the chance for the details of 
one question to bias the responses of the other. Additionally, this design minimizes acquiescence 
bias by not presenting respondents the option of disagreeing with any statement. This includes 
the first screening question about how strongly the respondent relates to their nation. The 
demographic portion of the survey is also non-randomized, as the questions presented there are 
straightforward and not very prone to ordering biases. The only thing randomized in the survey is 
the ordering of the vignettes.  
The survey is based primarily on semantic differential scales to minimize acquiescence 
bias. The possible responses to a question are never presented to the respondent in a particular 
order16, rather questions are always presented at once, all together. This avoids the tendency for 
respondents to mark or acquiesce to the first response given. This is particularly important when 
discussing immigration, a polarized political topic with anti-immigrant stances being associated 
primarily with radical far-right parties. There is evidence suggesting that semantic differential 
scales handle acquiescence bias in these situations much better than Likert scales (Friborg et al, 
2005). Unfortunately, this bias mitigation comes at the expense of consistency, as semantic 
differential scales are cognitively more complex for respondents to evaluate. However, as 
Friborg demonstrates, this loss of consistency is generally within the accepted threshold of α > 
0.70. The polarity of these questions is not ordered according to any meaningful or consistent 
manner, and this should not have any impact on the results of the survey (Dickson and Albaum, 
1975) 
 
                                                 
16 For example, a choice of answers presented as a.), b.), c.), d.).  
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Sampling Details 
  
The full sample for my research consists of four sub-samples, two for each country. In 
Belgium my samples focus on the city of Ghent, both a student sample drawn from the 
University of Ghent and from pedestrians found in the squares of town. In the Netherlands, my 
sample is drawn from students at the University of Tilburg and pedestrians found in the squares 
of Eindhoven. Tilburg did not allow sampling in their main squares during a large portion of the 
week, limiting my ability to collect non-student samples there. Similarly, the University of 
Eindhoven does not offer social science courses, making any student sample there difficult to 
compare with the students sampled in Ghent. Therefore combining these Dutch cities creates a 
sample maximally parallel to the one found in Ghent. Figure 13 shows the positions of the cities 
relative to each other, and Figure 14 shows them relative to the Dutch/Belgian border.  
This study opted for city based sampling based upon findings that Dutch cities tend to 
have fairly wide autonomy when it comes to addressing immigration (Scholten, 2013). 
Immigration is national by nature as it focuses on residency in a state and membership into the 
national “family” of citizens. However, it also has a distinct local character, as the lives of 
immigrants and their interactions with people happen every day in municipal neighborhoods. 
Enforcement is also particularly local in nature. Due to this issue being a widely recognized 
problem, all levels of governance have incentives to address immigration. Since there are often 
disconnections between municipal and national government in composition and in salient issues, 
policy divergence is common and can be quite dramatic (ibid). By keeping this mass-level public 
opinion survey local in character, the effect of local characteristics is acknowledged and can be 
controlled.  
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Theoretically, the sample only needs to be composed of third generation immigrants or 
greater. This is required in order to assure that the respondents are adequately exposed life in 
their country and that their national identity is uncontested by other national identities (in 
Belgium, of course, strong regional identities complicate matters in interesting ways). The city 
choice, however, is important in creating a convincing “most-similar” case design. All three 
cities (Ghent, Tilburg, and Eindhoven) are nearby the border with the Netherlands and Belgium, 
they are all in traditionally Catholic areas, and they all are in regions that speak Dutch or a 
regional variant thereof (Flemish)17. 
Beyond these basic characteristics, the cities share a number of more detailed 
commonalities. They are roughly the same size, falling between approximately 207,000 people 
in Tilburg and 248,000 in Ghent. In all towns surveyed, social-democratic parties were winners 
in the 2012 elections (federal elections in the Netherlands, local elections in Flanders). As for far 
right parties, they perform modestly. Vlaams Belang gets 6.5% of the vote in Ghent whereas the 
Party for Freedom gets 9.8% in Eindhoven and 10.4% in Tilburg. Each city also contains sizable 
numbers of immigrants, with Tilburg having 14.6% and Eindhoven having 17.5% of their 
population from non-Western origins (Mulder, 2013). Ghent has roughly the same number of 
immigrants. About 19.7% of the population has origins from outside the European Union 
(Agentschap voor Binnenlands Bestuur, 2013). With such a prevalence of immigrants in the 
population, it is likely that native Dutch and Belgians living in the cities will have opinions about 
integration, multiculturalism, national identity, and immigration. 
                                                 
17 Some may wonder why Antwerp was not selected as the Flemish city, as it too is a major metropolis with a 
university, even closer to the Dutch border. Ultimately, Antwerp was a little too large (twice as large as Eindhoven), 
and a little too conservative (it is a political stronghold of Vlaams Belang, for example).  
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The survey is comprised of only fourteen close-ended questions, lowering the opportunity 
costs respondents would incur in taking it (Crawford, 2001). Additionally, the content of the 
survey is salient to the population being surveyed (immigration), and is customized to the target 
population with references to the Netherlands/Belgium and to the Dutch/Flemish; both of which 
increase my response rate (Sheehan, 2001) 
Methodology of the Survey 
 
For the student sample, I arranged for my survey to be given at four classes in Ghent and 
Tilburg. These classes were all social scientifically oriented, and were all given at the university 
level. The similarity in type of classes and type of institution helps to control possible bias in the 
audience of the respondents. Instructions were given in English, and were collected at the break 
and end of each class. A short power-point presentation supplemented the instructions to ensure 
clarity, as individualized attention could not be given to each respondent in these cases. 
Additionally, the screening questions about their parent’s birth and place of residence were 
added to the beginning of the survey. This addition substitutes for screening questions that were 
done verbally at the beginning of the non-student sample. Further details about these surveys can 
be found in Appendix D.      
For the non-student sample, I used a random number generator to pick three city squares 
in Ghent and Eindhoven and spend a number of hours per day holding a sign which asks in 
Dutch if they would wish to participate in a short internet survey on immigrant integration. This 
choice is semi-random, as certain municipal laws prohibit completely free access to these squares 
(see Appendix D for further details). Respondents self-select into participation through stopping 
and doing the survey, but all people passing through the public space will see the invitation to do 
so. This self-selection does introduce a bias towards more outgoing people, but this kind of bias 
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is present in all types of surveying. Even using random digit dialing techniques, more reserved 
respondents are less likely to answer the phone, or to hang up when the survey is offered.   
It is worth noting that there is not much literature on sign-based recruitment methods for 
surveys. As discussed in greater detail in Appendix D, the need for sign based recruitment arose 
as a solution to the prevalence of solicitors using clipboards. Without signs, respondents 
presumed I was asking for money, and many refused to participate in the survey before it was 
introduced to them. Furthermore, signs have the advantage of more easily recruiting bicyclists, as 
riders can see their message as they pass. Signs also have the advantage of exposing anyone who 
sees it to the recruitment message, and doing this in a very non-confrontational, polite manner. 
While not enough data was collected to draw sound empirical conclusions about this 
methodology, the experience of this study was very positive. Response rates increased over 50%, 
rising from four to six people per day to about ten people. Furthermore, these people were very 
happy taking the survey, due to its more passive presentation. In areas where solicitors use 
aggressive tactics to pressure people to donate or buy products, the quiet nature of the 
recruitment was very effective. In fact, it was not uncommon for respondents to thank me for 
recruiting in the fashion I did. It is likely this gratitude contributed to the increased response rate. 
My study suggests that sign usage may be a very effective tool for future surveying in high 
traffic urban areas. It may be very illuminating to test this recruitment method in future studies, 
controlling for as many items as possible outside of the recruitment method. 
Summary Statistics of the Sample 
 
 Surveying was done in autumn of 2013. In total, 902 respondents agreed to take the 
survey. Table seven outlines the breakdown of this number between the Netherlands and 
Belgium, and between samples taken on the street and in the classroom. The sample skews 
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female, but not dramatically so. 58% of the respondents in Belgium and 60% of respondents in 
the Netherlands identified as women. With so many students being surveyed, the sample also 
skews young. In the Netherlands, this breakdown between young, middle age, and old 
respondents is 64%, 26%, and 10%, respectively. In Belgium, this skew is even more significant, 
both because the student sample is a larger portion of the overall sample gathered and because 
Belgian youths were more likely to self-select into the survey. Flemish culture tends to be a little 
more reserved than Dutch culture, and this did depress response rates. Belgium has a respondent 
age profile of 90% - 7% - 3%, respectively. 
 
Ordering Effects in the Sample 
 
Each respondent was asked to evaluate a pair of vignettes. In order to make sure the second 
vignette is not biased by the one preceding it, ordering bias must be controlled. Tables eight and 
nine outline the P-values that were obtained using a two-tailed Welch’s t-tests for every question 
on every combination of vignettes. In Belgium, only 22% of the 72 question-vignette pairs 
exhibited ordering effects (that is, the sample of responses had a five percent or less chance of 
coming from the same underlying population as the sample where the vignette came first). For 
the Netherlands, only 11% of the question-vignette pairs exhibited this ordering effect. All 
responses that exhibited ordering effects were removed from the sample to control for this source 
of error.  
For those questions not exhibiting ordering bias, the responses are pooled together with 
the results from the first-shown vignettes to increase the number of responses for the survey. 
From 902 total respondents, this allows for the study to increase the total number of vignette 
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evaluations upwards to a range between 1479 (for Q4) and 1694 (for Q1).  Tables ten and eleven 
outlines the number of responses per country, per vignette, per question. 
Hypothesis-Oriented Results 
Typologically-Informed 
 
 For the hypotheses involving the typology proposed in table one, the results are 
surprising and unexpected. The results for each question are outlined in tables twelve and 
thirteen.  
 H1 predicts that the vignettes for assimilation and liberalism as identity should have the 
strongest ethnic evaluations, displayed under the variable “Ethnic”, as a focus on ethnicity 
suggests. However, what we see is that in Belgium, multiculturalism and assimilation are viewed 
as making ethnic culture most important. In the Netherlands, the results run completely counter 
to the hypothesis, with interculturalism and multiculturalism making ethnic culture most 
important. While assimilation does rank highly in Belgium, multiculturalism is clearly viewed as 
most ethnically-oriented ideology. The Belgian results suggest that idea-based ideologies may 
have better abilities to create ethnic feelings than group-based ones. This results seem counter-
intuitive on face value, as ethnicity is a group-based phenomenon. However, ethnicity is also an 
abstract notion that may be best communicated at an ideological level.  
For the second hypothesis measures the nature of the loyalty produced by each ideology. 
It predicts that liberalism as identity and interculturalism should be most group oriented (most 
negative in table 5) and multiculturalism and assimilation as least group oriented. This question 
was measured through question four.  In both Belgium and the Netherlands, interculturalism is 
the most group oriented, confirming the hypothesis. Similarly, multiculturalism is always in the 
upper half of the most individually oriented hypotheses, also confirming the hypothesis. 
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However, liberalism as identity does not behave in the expected manner. The respondents’ 
evaluation of LAI is consistently more individualistic than expected. It is viewed as most 
individualistic in Belgium, and second most in the Netherlands. It is very difficult to speculate 
why this might be the case. Not only does liberalism as an idea involve ideas on the proper 
function of groups, but the vignette even has the word “our” in it! 
 The above analyses involved using simple comparisons of means to observe the 
relationship between vignette choice and the six principle variables of interest for this study. 
Such an analysis, of course, ignores a number of important demographic variables such as 
gender, age, and the screening question of national pride / attachment. As table fourteen 
demonstrates, all three of these variables play significant roles in influencing their dependent 
variables, though only rarely do they surpass the impact of the vignettes. In all both countries, 
the model tested had low r-squared, meaning they do not explain much of the variance. This is 
not surprising, as many of the dependent variables such as trust are complex items that cannot be 
captured in the streamlined models.  
The regression analyses unfortunately fail to provide much support to the paper’s 
hypotheses. Referencing hypothesis one, only one vignette significantly alters perceptions of 
ethnicity, namely liberalism as identity and only in Belgium. While this is one of the 
hypothesized vignettes, along with assimilation, its sign is not in the direction hypothesized, with 
liberalism as identity actually lowering the perceived importance of ethnicity. Mirroring the 
aggregate results in tables twelve and thirteen, interculturalism consistently and significantly 
impact the respondent’s view of their vignette as being more group oriented (six percent in 
Belgium and approximately eight percent in the Netherlands). Liberalism as identity continues to 
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not behave as hypothesized, however, but the regressions suggest the results are statistically 
insignificant rather than running contrary to the hypothesis.  
Some interesting differences can be noted between Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Unsurprisingly, national pride/attachment plays a much smaller role in Belgium than in the 
Netherlands, with the variable losing all significance in the latter country. Both models are 
interpreted in comparison to a respondent seeing the multiculturalism vignette, so it make sense 
to see more significant values associated with the assimilation and liberalism as identity 
vignettes. The regressions further support the notion that interculturalism and multiculturalism 
are conceptually distinct when evaluating the concepts in terms of collectivity versus 
individuality. In the Netherlands, people who saw the interculturalism vignette evaluated their 
vignette as eight percent more aligned to conceptions of individualism. In Belgium, this value 
was around six percent 
 Tables fourteen and fifteen used a limited set of variables in order to preserve the size of 
the sample. Models sixteen and seventeen used the fullest set of available variables while still 
controlling for heteroscedasticity. When considering the vignettes in these full models, only one 
vignette became significant, with liberalism as identity creating significant feelings of group 
orientation in Belgium. The rest of the changes were vignettes losing significance. In Belgium, 
the effects of liberalism as identity generally remained significant between models, while 
assimilation and interculturalism lost significance. In the Netherlands, no vignette has significant 
effects on their dependent variable except assimilation’s on integration direction and 
interculturalism on group feelings. It is curious that liberalism as identity had such different 
effects between countries. 
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New variables are introduced into the models in Tables Sixteen and Seventeen. These 
new variables did not reveal any consistent results. None of the new variables were significant in 
both the Netherlands and Belgium, or over the many dependent variables. Income was seen as 
significantly impacting projection in the Netherlands and feelings of ethnicity in Belgium. 
Likewise, knowing immigrants as coworkers in the Netherlands significantly decreases the 
amount of importance respondents perceived their vignettes creating on civic importance.  
Whereas knowing immigrants as friends in Belgium significantly increases the amount of 
trust respondents perceive their vignettes fostering. The latter observation is particularly 
interesting, as it is the only significant effect18 in these expanded models that increases trust. In 
the shorter models with larger sample sizes, national attachment was perceived as significantly 
increasing trust in the Netherlands, but that curiously disappears in the extended model. The 
adjusted R2 values, while remaining small, increase in the larger models for seven of the twelve 
dependent variables, while decreased for five of the models. 
 
Social Psychology-Informed 
 
 The paper’s third hypothesis tests the tradeoffs between the meaningfulness and 
exclusivity of national identity. Under this hypothesis, the multicultural vignette, which defines 
identity only in terms of tolerance, should have the least meaning (and also cause the most harm 
to any existing meaning). Likewise, a vignette with a “thick” or laden understanding of national 
identity (that is, assimilation) should have the most meaning, and do the most to make national 
identities meaningful. This hypothesis, tested through question one, does not hold up in either 
country. For both the Netherlands and Belgium, liberalism as identity is evaluated as 
                                                 
18 Barring the intercepts 
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strengthening national identities the least. In Belgium, interculturalism best strengthens the 
meaning of national identities, whereas in the Netherlands, multiculturalism does this best.  
 These findings were further confirmed by the regression analysis done in table fifteen. 
Liberalism as Identity and Assimilation (only in the Netherlands) were seen as harming the 
importance of national identity relative to those exposed to the vignette for multiculturalism. 
This more negative impression of the vignettes’ impact on national identity ranges from five to 
seven percent.  
 For the fourth hypothesis, social psychological principles predict that people should 
gravitate towards the vignettes informed by the middle ideologies of liberalism as identity and 
interculturalism. The trade-off between the exclusivity of collectivistic-civic/assimilatory 
thinking and the inclusivity of individualistic-civic/multicultural thinking should drive people to 
pick these “balanced” middle policies. The choices in each country are outlined in tables 
eighteen and nineteen below. 
The data does demonstrate gravitation towards the center, but only in one pair of 
ideologies per country. In Belgium, the more balanced interculturalism is favored over 
multiculturalism. Similarly in the Netherlands, liberalism as identity is favored over the more 
extreme assimilation. In both countries, more welcoming integration polices are preferred, with 
inter- and multi-culturalism getting approximately two-thirds of all preferences shown. 
Breaking this data down into each vignette dyad fails to shed additional light on this  
mystery. This can be seen in table 20 above. As with the aggregate data, multiculturalism and 
interculturalism triumph when paired against any ideology except themselves (in both countries). 
Interculturalism is also preferred in both countries when paired against liberalism as identity. For 
the hypothesis, we see assimilation preferred to liberalism as identity in Belgium, but it is less 
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clear in the Netherlands. The pairing between interculturalism and multiculturalism is even less 
clear, as each country has different results depending on the ordering. There are hints here that 
hypothesis four might be supported by the data, but more research is called for here. 
 My fifth hypothesis tests the relationship between pre-existing attachment to the state and 
vignette preference. Those who have low attachment to the state should favor policies that trend 
towards favoring the individual. Normally this would be multiculturalism, but considering H4, I 
hypothesize that these individuals should actually prefer interculturalism. Conversely, those with 
high attachment to the state should favor assimilation and therefore, through social psychological 
principles, liberalism as identity. Attachment, measured in quintiles, is measured against vignette 
choice in table 21 and 22. Hypothesis five has mixed results. In Belgium, only the second least 
attached group, as well as neutral, exhibits a strong preference for interculturalism over other 
integration forms. 
Curiously, the groups indicating most attachment to the state also prefer interculturalism 
or even multiculturalism. In the Netherlands, both less attached groups favor interculturalism, 
but like Belgium, the groups with higher-levels of attachment to the state do not exhibit any drift 
towards liberalism as identity or even assimilation.  It is worth noting in these response groups 
that the numbers of respondents indicating the least attachment to their state are very small. 
Those findings in particular should be considered with caution.   
 The sixth hypothesis of the paper concerns the differences between Belgium and the 
Netherlands as a whole. Because Belgium has a weakened central government compared to the 
Netherlands, we should see Belgians respond with lower levels of attachment to their state. 
Following the thinking in H4, we should therefore see them embracing interculturalism more 
strongly that respondents found in the Netherlands. The data, as presented in table 23, does 
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support the hypothesis that Belgians do feel less attachment to the federal state of Belgium. 
Similarly, Tables fourteen and fifteen also show that Belgians favor interculturalism more than 
the Dutch do (33% to 31.7%). Not only do Belgians support interculturalism more, but it is also 
the most popular vignette for the country, managing to compete with multiculturalism 
successfully. While the difference might not be much, hypothesis six is supported by the data. 
 Lastly, hypothesis seven speculated about the ability of interculturalism and liberalism as 
identity to bring about normatively desirable results. It suggested that policies which maximize 
trust while minimizing projection would be most desirable. Trust is most valuable when it is able 
to be created between disparate people and groups. It named this normative value as v, which 
was defined as the levels of trust that the vignette created subtracted by how homogenizing the 
vignette was perceived to be.  Values for “v” are given in tables thirteen and fourteen.  
In Belgium, hypothesis seven was confirmed by the data. Both interculturalism and 
liberalism as identity had the highest levels of v of the different vignettes. It is interesting to note 
that in all countries, for all vignettes, this value was measured as negative, suggesting that any 
type of integration reduces this durable type of trust. However, interculturalism and liberalism as 
identity reduced this trust less. In the Netherlands, the results were not so clear. While 
interculturalism again reduced trust the least of all the vignettes, liberalism as identity reduced it 
the most. In the Netherlands it was multiculturalism that was seen as the second least destructive 
policy in the creation of social trust.  
Data Subsampling 
 
 This far, the results have been analyzed in terms of the full sample. However, certain 
demographic groups can contain interesting trends that are obscured when placed in larger 
samples. Basic observational characteristics were gathered about the respondent’s gender and 
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age for all surveys, and all of the above as well as skin-color for the surveys gathered in the 
public setting. Because the sample size of the full pool was smaller to begin with, the usefulness 
of these subsample analyses are limited.  
 Tables 24 and 25 outline the choice of vignette preferences for males and females in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Differences between Belgian males and females are small, with 
males favoring assimilation slightly more than females, and females doing likewise with 
multiculturalism. In the Netherlands, the differences are a little more pronounced, especially 
concerning liberalism as identity and interculturalism which were favored by males and females 
(respectively) by six to seven percentage points.  
 Tables 26 and 27 outline the choice of vignette preferences for young, middle-aged, and 
elderly respondents in Belgium and the Netherlands. Differences between age groups are also 
small, and in some instances, hindered by the sample size. Younger respondents tended to favor 
interculturalism in Belgium, whereas in the Netherlands multiculturalism was the clear victor. 
These preferences were reversed in both countries for the small number of elderly that opted to  
take the survey. 
 
The Flemish Student Subsample 
 
Unfortunately, due to the constraints involving how the data was collected, detailed 
analysis about the role of subject characteristics (beyond sex and a rough indicator of age) are 
scarce. The demographic section of the pedestrian-based survey was optional, and therefore often 
neglected by busy pedestrians, fatigued after completing the longer and mentally intensive 
integration questionnaire. However, this fatigue was mitigated for the surveys that were 
completed in the classroom setting. As captive audiences, the students that participated in my 
classroom surveys had no incentive to neglect this demographics section. Luckily, my study was 
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able to capture a student subsample from the University of Ghent that included 398 respondents, 
of which 385 respondents participated in and 201 completed all of the questions. The class was 
an introductory political science course and took place in a large lecture hall on campus. Because 
of the Ghent student sample’s large size, extensive participation, and single surveying location, it 
represents an opportunity for a more in-depth exploration of all of the data gathered in the 
survey. Table twenty-eight explores the relevant dependent variables for this study19. Because 
this is a subsample, the values associated with the vignettes are already accounted for in Table 
Fourteen and Sixteen. However, Table 28 allows for the consideration of education, religious 
membership, and self-assessed partisanship. 
 The muted impact of the additional variables here is surprising. Increased education 
creates a small increase in trust, and religious membership decreases the willingness to project 
(perhaps through its emphasis of differences). Most surprisingly, one’s ideological position on a 
left-right scale did not meaningfully impact the subject’s evaluations of their vignettes. This is 
curious because attitudes about migrants are the subject of frequent and often spirited political 
posturing. While the individuals may not have politicized their associated national identities 
(necessary as per Miller et. al 1981), the popular political climate should have accomplished this 
in some respondents. It may be that the question was too far removed from people’s conceptions 
on migrants, with the intermediary concept of “national identity” preventing people from making 
the connections between their political beliefs and what would be their logical immigration 
preference.  
 One notable exception to this is age, which is a more-refined alternative to the “older” 
variable tested in table fifteen. Whereas the variable in table fifteen reflects three aged-based 
                                                 
19 The model explored in Table 28 represents a model that minimizes the amount of data lost due to incompleteness. 
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categories based on reviewer classification, this age measures self-reported years. This less-
coarse measure provides a more reliable understanding of age’s effect. Measuring years, we see 
that with each additional year that a person has, respondents become one-third of a percent less 
likely to view their vignettes as making their institutions and civic obligations important, one 
half of a percent less likely to see their vignettes as making their ethnic culture less important, 
and one half of a percent more likely to see their vignettes emphasizing groups over individuals. 
Of these variables, only group emphasis was seen as significant in table fifteen (also with a 
positive relationship).  
 Revisiting the hypothesis, the Flemish subsample largely confirms the findings, but with 
a few alterations. Liberalism as identity once again rejects its hypothesized emphasis on 
ethnicity. While interculturalism once again does increase the perceived importance of groups 
relative to individuals, here liberalism as identity significantly increases individualism, actively 
rejecting the hypothesis. Finally, liberalism as identity is seen in the subsample as harming the 
perceived importance of national identity, running against the expectations of the third 
hypothesis. Interestingly, these results are much closer in line with Modood 2013’s 
conceptualization of individualist-integration. While it would be a leap to assume that 
respondents read individualism into “our liberal values,” this should be an avenue for future 
research.   
Discussion 
 
In total, the hypotheses tested perform in a mixed fashion. Only two of the thirteen 
hypotheses tested were completely supported by the empirical data, and three were partially 
supported. 
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Overall, the typologically informed hypotheses fared worse than the social psychological 
ones. We do see some acknowledgement of interculturalism being group oriented, and 
multiculturalism individual oriented in hypothesis two, which is encouraging. However, the 
ethnic feelings attached to multiculturalism are confusing, as is the individual focus of 
“liberalism as identity”.  These observations are so peculiar and counterintuitive that it makes 
forming a typology at all very challenging20. If vignettes emphasizing “tolerance” (Belgium) and 
“working together” (Netherlands) are evaluated as making ethnic culture more important than a 
vignette emphasizing “language and history”, then the concept of ethnicity in advanced western 
democracies needs to be re-examined.   
Because the social psychology informed hypotheses perform better, the implications of 
this study are less clear. Convergence towards a more moderate vignette is seen in each country 
(interculturalism as more popular than multiculturalism in Belgium, and LAI as more popular 
than assimilation in the Netherlands). Furthermore, the vignettes did produce better normative 
results than assimilation/multiculturalism in Belgium, and partially in the Netherlands. Here 
“liberalism as identity” again causes some confusion. In the Netherlands, it is the worst 
normative performer, and in Belgium, it does not exhibit the same gravitation against 
assimilation as interculturalism does against multiculturalism (hypothesis four).  Liberalism as 
identity calls for further research, as it created significant variation when compared against 
multiculturalism for every question asked in the University of Ghent student subsample. While 
typologically far from multiculturalism (and therefore surprising to generate significant results), 
                                                 
20 The first formulation of this dissertation tested a hypothesis informed by a typology inspired by the work of 
Greenfeld 1998. This typology adopted and expanded upon her scales of collectivism and ethnicity and performed 
even worse than the hypothesis presented here. For example, Greenfeld classifies both assimilation (“civic-
collective”) and multiculturalism (“civic-individualistic”) as civic minded policies. However, in both the 
Netherlands and Belgium we see large differences in how people evaluate the two vignettes’ abilities to make 
“institutions and obligations as citizens” important. This brings into question the external validity of Greenfeld’s 
typology. 
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it is always more significant (in the Ghent subsample) than assimilation, and over a wider range 
of questions.  
 The data also points to many interesting findings that lie outside of the hypotheses for the 
paper. Of particular note is the performance of interculturalism. The vignette inspired by the 
intercultural approach prompted the most normatively desirable results in both countries. It also 
had the highest ability to strengthen national identity in Belgium, and second-highest ability in 
the Netherlands. This consistent strong showing suggests that it may be beneficial to be study 
interculturalism further.  Secondly, in both countries, multiculturalism exhibits superior potential 
in making immigrants seem trustworthy and like other nationals. Setting aside interculturalism 
and liberalism as identity, these findings are useful in providing empirical support for the 
ongoing debate between multiculturalists and assimilationists that tend to dominate the political 
landscape on integration. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
 
 This study represents a wide ranging exploration of integration policies and the 
ideologies that inform them. The dissertation discovers new findings, as well as more riddles. As 
many European governments are relying more heavily on civic integration policies, making sure 
the full universe of options are understood and available will be very important. Furthermore, 
some knowledge of their effects, especially on the understudied native population, will help 
future policy-makers make the best choices among them.  
Theory  
 
 The dissertation argued for the abandonment of the traditional assimilation-vs.-
multiculturalism dichotomy. It proposes a continuum-based understanding of integration 
ideologies, backed by empirical studies. The dissertation demonstrates the existence of four 
distinct ideologies, and supports a conceptual ordering of multiculturalism, then interculturalism, 
liberalism as identity, and assimilation (MILA). This support is clearly observed through the 
responses from the spring 2014 subject pool, as well as in tables twenty one and twenty two 
below. In the Netherlands, the ordering of the means for civic and projection measurements are 
also ordered according to this pattern. 
My research also arranges these ideologies into a typology informed by less studied 
integration characteristics. This typology was tested in the dissertation’s quantitative study and 
frequently failed to conform to the typology’s predictions. An exception to this was the general 
performance of interculturalism, which both supported its group-oriented focus in both countries 
and over both comparisons of means and regression-based analysis.   
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 The most interesting avenues for future research in the dissertation’s theory chapter come 
from its ordering study. What is particularly interesting is the third most popular ordering, which 
consists of interculturalism, followed by multiculturalism, assimilation, and liberalism as identity 
(IMAL). This is interesting, as it bucks the trend of putting assimilation and multiculturalism at 
the poles of their ordering. This trend is present in both the top two choices, as well as in the 
fourth most popular choice. According to the logic of my argument, multiculturalism and 
assimilation should not be placed so close to each other.  
More intriguing still, this pattern is not uncommon in the data, as demonstrated by tables 
29 and 30 below. We see IMAL ordering in the meaningfulness and civic measures in Belgium, 
as well as in the ethnic measure in the Netherlands. It also reflects Belgium’s aggregate 
preference for integration policies. What could bring the two most-extreme poles inwards like 
this?  One explanation is that it could relate to the directionality of the vignettes, as 
interculturalism and multiculturalism are both two way vignettes, whereas assimilation and LAI 
are both one way. But then why should we not see the MILA arrangement of vignettes, which 
would fulfill the same requirements? Another possibility could be that there exists some kind of 
conceptual discontinuity between multiculturalism and assimilation (within IMAL that is). If that 
is the case, then we would observe both sides go from more restrictive to less21. But then what 
would explain such a conceptual reset between multiculturalism and assimilation?  A follow-up 
study asking people to explain such an ordering would be insightful in unraveling this riddle. 
 
 
                                                 
21 With the ordering being interculturalism to multiculturalism first, followed then assimilation to liberalism as 
identity.  
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Qualitative Study 
 
 Following this reconceptualization of integration, the study moves towards a government 
level analysis of integration policies found in the Netherlands and in Flanders. Despite these 
lands similarities in geography, history, and economies, the policies at work could not be more 
different. The Dutch utilize a more coercive, hands-off, idea driven system that focuses on 
presenting integration as a demanding but high-quality service standardized to be appropriate and 
applicable to everyone. The Flemish, on the hand, have created a flexible, hands-on, individual 
and community focused system that adapts to the needs of those going through it and reaches out 
to members in the community to streamline this process. These prioritizations are seen not only 
in the body of the programs, but pervade throughout their entire governments. Echoes of these 
attitudes are also seen in their regulations against wearing burqas and their grant requests to the 
European Union.     
 The most promising future research on the level of government policy seems to be in 
exploring the macro-consequences of these systems. The quantitative study begins this process 
by observing the differences in how native people think about integration as a whole. In my 
interview with a representative from the Flemish Interior Ministry, the representative mentioned 
that there was frustration at a lack of results from their integration policy, confirmed by the 
number of foreign fighters in Belgium and overall levels of migrant poverty. Exploring what is 
going wrong in Belgium would be fascinating and instructive.  
Further exploring regional variations in native attitudes may be a useful avenue for future 
research. Different onthaalbureaus (welcome desks) reach out to native Flemings in different 
ways and observing the regional variances among them (as well as gauging the attitudes of 
Flemings living in those regions) could be illuminating. As Scholten 2013 notes in his discussion 
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of integration policies in Rotterdam and Amsterdam, political differences between cities can be 
vast, even under the leadership of a national government with a central vision. Bak Jorgensen 
2012 even notes that in Denmark, some municipalities have policies in direct contrast to the 
national policies! In the Flemish case, such a study would be particularly interesting as these 
onthaalbureaus are all run the same regional organization, which may or may not impact the 
variety of their offerings.  
In regions where outreach is more plentiful, this may correspond to a decline in 
xenophobic attitudes. Similarly, there may be interesting neighborhood outreach efforts, such as 
those observed by De Zwart 2005. While Flemings in Ghent expressed some preference for 
intercultural policies in the large-n quantitative study, and this does align with the overall 
position of the Flemish government, would this finding hold in all of the Flemish provinces, such 
as in more conservative Antwerp or francophone Brussels? And how would this variation impact 
the daily life of ethnic Flemish citizens?   
Quantitative Study  
 
 Finally, the dissertation conducts a large-n quantitative study about attitudes towards 
various integration policies. The survey served multiple purposes, asking opinions on questions 
related to the paper’s typology construction, certain elements inherent in each policy, the 
normative implications of certain policies, and respondent preferences between them. The survey 
unfortunately provides conflicting results, sometimes working in one country and not the other, 
or sometimes working only for certain ideological pairs. 
 Some promising avenues for future research here involve the curious findings of this 
research. We see that interculturalism often performs very well, most notably providing the most 
desirable normative combination of trust creation without projection. This calls for more 
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attention to interculturalism as a superior policy alternative. Likewise, liberalism as identity is 
generally not well received (with the Dutch being a little more welcoming to the ideology than 
the Flemish). Despite its frequent negative impact on the dependent variables of interest, these 
impacts are frequently statistically significant. The outcomes for liberalism as identity are 
surprising as the ideology was conceptualized as a policy more liberal-leaning than assimilation. 
Considering that liberalism as identity is becoming a popular phenomenon in the Dutch far right, 
this ideology should not be ignored. A follow-up study focusing only on this type of identity 
would be useful in understanding how people relate to LAI. It is possible that perhaps the 
identity is too abstract, with liberalism falling into a middle ground that is not appealing to 
anyone. Or perhaps it is charged with connotation drawing from the US-lead “War on Terror”, 
which is often framed as a battle between the liberal west and the illiberal east. Further research 
here would help in establishing a more conclusion. 
 Flanders and the Netherlands make interesting cases of study, because of their 
similarities. However, the Netherlands is a nation and possesses certain powers that the Flemish 
region does not. While there is certainly nationalism in Flanders, it does not control elements that 
would be very important in nations, such as border control and a degree of coercion in enforcing 
its integration policies. The study shows that the Flemish have considerably weaker feelings of 
attachment to the federal nation of Belgium than the Dutch do to the Netherlands. We see this 
reflected in their choice of favored policy, the group-oriented, two-way policy of 
interculturalism. Future studies would be helpful in strengthening a claim for causality here. 
However, this exploration supports an interpretation that Flemish government seeks to promote 
unity amongst its people in a robust and binding manner. Perhaps this is due to their lack of 
national powers that would be able to accomplish this normally.  
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 By learning from social psychology, scholars can observe exciting new policies like 
interculturalism. It is from the hope of these new policies that they can provide superior policy 
making tools to navigate an increasingly complex world. My dissertation suggests that this 
promise is real and that through daring social science research, social cohesion and harmony can 
be more effectively achieved. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figures 
 
Figure One – Optimal Distinctiveness Model 
 
*Source: Brewer, 1991 
 
Figure Two – The Integration Policy Continuum 
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Figure Three – Table One Overlaid onto Figure One   
 
Figure Four – Flemish Integration Goals 
 
Source: East Flemish integration materials (Powerpoint) 
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Figure Five: Word Cloud “Naar Nederland” 
 
*Service: http://worditout.com/word-cloud/make-a-new-one 
 
Figure Six: Word Cloud “Migreren Naar Vlaanderen” 
 
 
*Service: http://worditout.com/word-cloud/make-a-new-one 
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Figure Seven – (Turkish) Speaker Two  
 
Figure Eight – (Russian) Speaker Two 
 
Figure Nine – (Arabic) Speaker Four 
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Figure Ten – Compilation of Different Speakers 
   
 
 
Figure Eleven – Speaker One from Naar Nederland 
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Figure Twelve – Speaker Two from Naar Nederland 
 
 
Figure Thirteen – Geography of the Survey Cities 
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Figure Fourteen – Distances between the survey cities and the Dutch-Belgian Border 
  
Tables 
 
Table One – An Alternative Conception of Integration 
 Outward Focused Inward Focused 
One-Way Liberalism as Identity Assimilation 
Two-Way Interculturalism Multiculturalism 
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Table Two – Vignette responses according to ideological dyad 
Belgium        
Type  Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 
A and L  0.10 0.86 0.01* 0.00* 0.92 0.59 
L and I 0.00* 0.04* 0.08 0.00* 0.02* 0.03* 
I and M 0.46 0.92 0.32 0.01* 0.92 0.11 
A and I  0.02* 0.05* 0.38 0.02* 0.02* 0.08 
A and M  0.11 0.06 0.91 0.75 0.01* 0.00* 
L and M  0.00* 0.05* 0.01* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 
        
Netherlands       
Type  Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 
A and L  0.27 0.36 0.69 0.30 0.32 0.55 
L and I 0.07 0.02* 0.01* 0.03* 0.03* 0.51 
I and M 0.08 0.36 0.34 0.00* 0.61 0.41 
A and I  0.46 0.00* 0.01* 0.20 0.14 0.17 
A and M  0.01* 0.00* 0.19 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 
L and M  0.00* 0.00* 0.10 0.27 0.00* 0.15 
-Values shown are p-values testing the proposition that each vignette pair is drawn from a single 
population. P values rounded up to the nearest hundredth.  
- * Indicate values that reject the hypothesis with statistical significance (p ≤ 0.05) 
- A = Assimilation, L = Liberalism as Identity, I = Interculturalism, M = Multiculturalism 
- Source: Responses from 902 Dutch and Belgian residents surveyed in the Autumn of 2013 
 
 
Table Three – Frequencies of Hypothesis Supporting Sequences 
 Actual Frequency Expected Frequency 
Hypothesis Supporting 
Sequences 
57 23.25 (2/24) 
Hypothesis Refuting 
Sequences 
222 255.75 (22/24) 
- Source: Responses from 279 American students surveyed in the Spring of 2014. 
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Table Four – Top Six Most Common Combinations 
Ordering Frequency 
ALIM 30 
MILA 27 
IMAL 21 
AILM 20 
IMLA 19 
* Ordering column represents the way the four vignettes are ordered, left to right from first to 
last. They use the following acronyms: A: Assimilaton, L: Liberalism as Identity, I: 
Interculturalism, M: Multiculturalism.  
- Source: Responses from 279 American students surveyed in the Spring of 2014. 
 
Table Five: Word Distribution 
 
Shared Only Netherlands  Only Flanders 
Language Good Follow 
Other Own Family 
Dutch Country Government 
Work Holland Everyone 
Learn One First 
Come Here Home 
Children Exam Child 
School Well Flanders 
More All Flemings 
Live Because Many 
 People Always 
 Netherlands New 
 Important  
 Really  
 Education  
 Need  
*Flanders, Top 22 words (frequency of seven or more) 
*Netherlands, Top 26 words (frequency of twenty-six or more) 
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Table Six – Typology Outline 
Ideology Coerciveness Content Sidedness 
Assimilation “requires” “our history and 
language” 
“not” 
Liberalism as Identity “requires” “our liberal values” “not” 
Interculturalism “requires” “cooperation” “---” 
Multiculturalism “suggests” “tolerance” “---” 
 
Table Seven – Sample Composition 
  
N=902 The 
Netherlands 
N=401 
Belgium 
N=501 
Street 
Sample 
N = 349 
City: 
Eindhoven 
N: 246 
City: Ghent 
N:103 
Student 
Sample 
N = 553 
City: Tilburg 
N: 155 
City: Ghent 
N: 398 
 
Table Eight – Ordering effects among vignettes (Belgium) 
Type  Nat ID C.Priorit Ethnic Individ. Trust Projection 
AX and IA  0.01 0.01 0.70 0.02 0.85 0.54 
AX and LA 0.23 0.51 0.09 0.30 0.00 0.39 
AX and MA 0.18 0.80 0.73 0.15 0.97 0.83 
IX and AI  0.19 0.66 0.95 0.18 0.01 0.23 
IX and LI  0.42 0.05 0.16 0.58 0.92 0.73 
IX and MI  0.36 0.10 0.66 0.12 0.64 0.32 
LX and AL  0.64 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.50 0.09 
LX and IL  0.68 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.01 
LX and ML 0.55 0.44 0.24 0.01 0.83 0.17 
MX and AM 0.28 0.41 0.12 0.19 0.97 0.00 
MX and IM 0.52 0.76 0.93 0.01 0.14 0.00 
MX and LM 0.44 0.20 0.89 0.97 0.98 0.27 
*Values below are p values. 
*A = Assimilation, L = Liberalism as Identity, I = Interculturalism, M = Multiculturalism, X= 
Any vignette 
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Table Nine – Ordering effects among vignettes (Netherlands) 
Type  Nat ID C.Priorit Ethnic Individ. Trust Projection 
AX and IA  1.00 0.35 0.80 0.47 0.48 0.18 
AX and LA 0.09 0.93 0.21 0.50 0.36 0.29 
AX and MA 0.22 0.62 0.63 0.35 0.20 0.64 
IX and AI  0.96 0.46 0.88 0.72 0.04 0.34 
IX and LI  0.90 0.56 0.89 0.99 0.01 0.30 
IX and MI  0.88 0.88 0.33 0.73 0.20 0.23 
LX and AL  0.15 0.13 0.29 0.63 0.06 0.17 
LX and IL  0.13 0.02 0.81 0.00 0.47 0.03 
LX and ML 0.51 0.54 0.49 0.17 0.44 0.10 
MX and AM 0.35 0.29 0.31 0.10 0.23 0.98 
MX and IM 0.59 0.52 0.70 0.27 0.75 0.05 
MX and LM 0.37 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.58 
*Values below are p values. 
*A = Assimilation, L = Liberalism as Identity, I = Interculturalism, M = Multiculturalism, X= 
Any vignette 
 
Table Ten – Number of responses per question per country (Belgium) 
Type  Nat ID C.Priorit Ethnic Individ. Trust Projection 
Assim  209 205 235 203 197 242 
LAI 238 189 154 157 198 198 
Intercult 236 193 238 236 194 242 
Multicult  234 228 223 190 229 148 
*Values are the number of responses for each question 
 
 
Table Eleven – Number of responses per question per country 
Type  Nat ID C.Priorit Ethnic Individ. Trust Projection 
Assim  200 190 196 196 200 197 
LAI 196 193 190 185 132 193 
Intercult 185 148 182 151 186 149 
Multicult  196 190 165 161 165 197 
*Values are the number of responses for each question 
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Table Twelve – Mean responses per question (Belgium) 
 
  Nat ID C.Priorit Ethnic Individ. Trust Projection  V 
Assim  0.41 0.46 0.51 -0.44 -0.19 0.54  -0.73 
LAI  0.21 0.44 0.18 0.08 -0.20 0.46  -0.67 
Intercult  0.67 0.67 0.41 -0.77 0.14 0.74  -0.60 
Multi  0.59 0.66 0.52 -0.40 0.15 0.95  -0.80 
*Values are the mean values for the non-order biased vignette evaluations 
Table Thirteen – Mean responses per question (Netherlands) 
 
  Nat ID C.Priorit Ethnic Individ. Trust Projection  V 
Assim  0.62 0.22 0.29 -0.44 -0.12 0.55  -0.66 
LAI  0.47 0.35 0.23 -0.28 -0.25 0.64  -0.90 
Intercult  0.71 0.67 0.62 -0.63 0.13 0.75  -0.62 
Multi  0.93 0.78 0.48 -0.09 0.22 0.87  -0.65 
*Values are the mean values for the non-order biased vignette evaluations 
Table Fourteen – Linear Modeling the Effects of Vignettes (Belgium) 
 
IV /// DV  Nat ID C.Prior Ethnic Individ. Trust Project 
Intercept 0.65*** 
(0.10) 
 
0.62*** 
(0.09) 
0.54*** 
(0.10) 
-0.55*** 
(0.12) 
0.17 
(0.11) 
1.00*** 
(0.13) 
Assimilation -0.18 
(0.12) 
 
-0.20 
(0.11) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
-0.31* 
(0.14) 
-0.41** 
(0.14) 
Interculturalism 
 
0.05 
(0.11) 
 
0.00 
(0.11) 
-0.10 
(0.12) 
-0.38** 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
Liberalism as ID -0.42*** 
(0.11) 
 
-0.22* 
(0.11) 
-0.37** 
(0.13) 
0.48 
(0.16) 
-0.33* 
(0.14) 
-0.48** 
(0.15) 
Female -0.00 
(0.08) 
 
0.00 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.09) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
Older -0.11 
(0.14) 
 
0.12 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.15) 
0.70*** 
(0.19) 
0.16 
(0.17) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
National 
Attachment 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
n 873 773 810 751 783 793 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 
Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses 
Dependent variables are displayed on the columns, independent variables are displayed 
on the rows 
*** p-value < 0.001 
** p-value < 0.01 
* p-value < 0.05 
- Source: Author’s calculations from self-collected data 
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Table Fifteen – Linear Modeling the Effects of Vignettes (Netherlands) 
 
IV /// DV  Nat ID C.Prior. Ethnic Individ. Trust Project. 
Intercept 0.68*** 
(0.12) 
 
0.61*** 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.30* 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
0.74*** 
(0.13) 
Assimilation -0.28* 
(0.13) 
 
-0.52*** 
(0.13) 
-0.18 
(0.14) 
-0.31* 
(0.15) 
-0.31* 
(0.15) 
-0.30* 
(0.15) 
Interculturalism 
 
-0.18 
(0.13) 
 
-0.09 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.14) 
-0.50** 
(0.16) 
-0.06 
(0.16) 
-0.08 
(0.15) 
Liberalism as ID -0.44*** 
(0.13) 
 
-0.41** 
(0.14) 
-0.26 
(0.15) 
-0.14 
(0.17) 
-0.45** 
(0.15) 
-0.20 
(0.15) 
Female 0.19* 
(0.09) 
 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
0.30** 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
Older 0.01 
(0.10) 
 
0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
0.40** 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.12) 
National 
Attachment 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.21*** 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
n 755 704 712 676 663 717 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses 
Dependent variables are displayed on the columns, independent variables are displayed 
on the rows 
*** p-value < 0.001 
** p-value < 0.01 
* p-value < 0.05 
- Source: Author’s calculations from self-collected data 
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Table Sixteen – Linear Modeling the Effects of Vignettes (Belgium) 
 
Model /// DV  Nat ID C.Prior. Ethnic Individ. Trust Project. 
Intercept 
 
-0.64 
(0.96) 
-1.82 
(1.02) 
-2.72* 
(1.10) 
3.33* 
(1.32) 
-0.34 
(1.29) 
-1.29 
(1.14) 
 
Assimilation 
 
-0.05 
(0.17) 
-0.29 
(0.16) 
-0.12 
(0.17) 
-0.03 
(0.22) 
-0.37 
(0.20) 
-0.34 
(0.21) 
 
Interculturalism 
 
0.13 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
-0.08 
(0.17) 
-0.07 
(0.21) 
0.08 
(0.21) 
-0.23 
(0.21) 
 
Liberalism as ID 
 
-0.21 
(0.16) 
-0.44** 
(0.17) 
-0.49* 
(0.20) 
0.60* 
(0.24) 
-0.45* 
(0.21) 
-0.50* 
(0.22) 
 
Female 
 
0.06 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(0.13) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
0.10 
(0.15) 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
 
Year 
 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
 
National 
Attachment 
 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
 
Education 
 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
 
Income 
 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.09* 
(0.04) 
 
Religiousity 
 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.00 
(0.06) 
 
Immigrant 
Friends 
 
0.12 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.24** 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
 
Immigrant 
Coworkers 
 
0.07 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
0.17 
(0.10) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
Political ID 
(Left-Right) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
N 412 363 381 347 367 376 
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 
Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses 
Dependent variables are displayed on the columns, independent variables are displayed 
on the rows 
*** p-value < 0.001 
** p-value < 0.01 
* p-value < 0.05 
- Source: Author’s calculations from self-collected data 
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Table Seventeen – Linear Modeling the Effects of Vignettes (Netherlands) 
 
Model /// DV  Nat ID C.Prior. Ethnic Individ. Trust Project. 
Intercept 
 
1.58 
(1.28) 
 
1.20 
(1.43) 
-2.06 
(1.62) 
-1.24 
(1.67) 
3.68* 
(1.67) 
2.10 
(1.59) 
Assimilation 
 
-0.08 
(0.19) 
 
-0.62** 
(0.21) 
-0.15 
(0.23) 
-0.24 
(0.25) 
-0.21 
(0.24) 
-0.44 
(0.24) 
Interculturalism 
 
-0.17 
(0.20) 
 
0.06 
(0.21) 
0.23 
(0.24) 
-0.79** 
(0.26) 
-0.05 
(0.27) 
-0.07 
(0.25) 
Liberalism as ID 
 
-0.10 
(0.21) 
 
-0.42 
(0.24) 
-0.37 
(0.25) 
-0.21 
(0.29) 
-0.28 
(0.26) 
-0.11 
(0.27) 
Female 
 
0.15 
(0.16) 
 
-0.04 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.15 
(0.21) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(0.20) 
Year 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
National 
Attachment 
 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.10 
(0.08) 
Education 
 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
Income 
 
-0.07 
(0.04) 
 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
Religiousity 
 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.10 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
Immigrant 
Friends 
 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.00 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
Immigrant 
Coworkers 
 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.17* 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
Political ID 
(Left-Right) 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
N 245 222 232 231 218 234 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.02 
Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses 
Dependent variables are displayed on the columns, independent variables are displayed 
on the rows 
*** p-value < 0.001 
** p-value < 0.01 
* p-value < 0.05 
- Source: Author’s calculations from self-collected data 
 
Table Eighteen – Belgian Respondent Choices (Aggregate) 
 Freq. Presented First Freq. Presented Second Freq. Chosen 
Assimilation 27.4% 23.2% 21.8% 
Liberalism as ID 24.6% 26.2% 16.3% 
Interculturalism 23.2% 26.6% 33.0% 
Multiculturalism 24.8% 24.0% 29.0% 
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Table Nineteen – Dutch Respondent Choices (Aggregate) 
 Freq. Presented First Freq. Presented Second Freq. Chosen 
Assimilation 25.7% 25.6% 17.4% 
Liberalism as ID 23.9% 24.3% 18.3% 
Interculturalism 25.4% 24.8% 31.7% 
Multiculturalism 24.9% 25.3% 32.6% 
 
Table Twenty – Respondent Choices (By Dyad) 
Belgium N First (%) Second (%)  Netherlands N First (%) Second (%) 
         
Assim. vs. 
LAI 36 58.3 41.7  
Assim. vs. 
LAI 28 39.3 60.7 
Assim vs. 
Intercult. 37 21.6 78.4  
Assim vs. 
Intercult. 27 25.9 74.1 
Assim vs. 
Multicul. 32 46.9 53.1  
Assim vs. 
Multicul. 29 24.1 75.9 
LAI vs. 
Assim. 35 40.0 60.0  
LAI vs. 
Assim. 26 50 50 
LAI vs. 
Intercult. 32 28.1 71.9  
LAI vs. 
Intercult. 28 28.6 71.4 
LAI vs. 
Multicult. 30 40.0 60.0  
LAI vs. 
Multicult. 27 25.9 74.1 
Intercult. vs. 
Assim. 26 69.2 30.8  
Intercult. vs. 
Assim. 28 64.3 35.7 
Intercult vs. 
LAI 35 80 20  
Intercult vs. 
LAI 26 61.5 38.5 
Intercult vs. 
Multicult 33 54.5 45.5  
Intercult vs. 
Multicult 29 44.8 55.2 
Multicult. 
vs. Assim. 32 56.2 43.8  
Multicult. vs. 
Assim. 30 70 30 
Multicult. 
vs. LAI 34 76.5 23.5  
Multicult. vs. 
LAI 25 76 24 
Multicult. 
vs. Intercult. 38 57.9 42.1  
Multicult. vs. 
Intercult. 29 34.5 65.5 
*Values represent percentage chosen 
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Table Twenty-One - Relationship for national attachment and vignette choice (Belgium) 
 Chose:     
 Assimilation LAI Interculturalism Multiculturalism N 
Least attached 22.2% 44.4% 11.1% 22.2% 9 
Second least 22.8% 24.6% 29.8% 22.8% 57 
Neutral 15.7% 17.4% 40.5% 26.4% 121 
Second most 24.5% 12.9% 28.8% 33.7% 163 
Most attached 27.7% 8.5% 36.2% 27.7% 47 
*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers 
per attachment group 
 
Table Twenty-Two - Relationship for national attachment and vignette choice (The NL) 
 Chose:     
 Assimilation LAI Interculturalism Multiculturalism N 
Least attached 20.0% 0.0% 60.0% 20.0% 5 
Second least 11.4% 25.7% 37.1% 25.7% 35 
Neutral 13.2% 10.5% 34.2% 42.1% 38 
Second most 20.6% 17.4% 26.5% 35.5% 155 
Most attached 14.9% 20.2% 37.2% 27.7% 94 
*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers 
per attachment group 
 
Table Twenty-Three – Different levels of attachment within Belgium and the Netherlands 
 Mean – Attachment 
to state 
Netherlands 0.65 
Belgium 0.51 
 
Table Twenty Four – Relationship between sex and vignette choice (Belgium) 
 Chose:     
 Assimilation LAI Interculturalism Multiculturalism N 
Males 22.8 16.0 33.3 27.8 162 
Females 20.6 16.2 33.3 29.8 228 
*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers 
per gender 
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Table Twenty Five – Relationship between sex and vignette choice (The Netherlands) 
 Chose:     
 Assimilation LAI Interculturalism Multiculturalism N 
Males 16.7 22.0 28.8 32.6 132 
Females 18.0 15.5 34.0 32.6 228 
*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers 
per gender 
 
Table Twenty-Six – Relationship between age and vignette choice (Belgium) 
 Chose:     
 Assimilation LAI Interculturalism Multiculturalism N 
Young 22.2 15.1 33.3 29.3 351 
Middle Aged 14.3 25.0 35.7 25.0 28 
Elderly 16.7 25.0 25.0 33.3 12 
*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers 
per age group 
 
Table Twenty-Seven – Relationship between age and vignette choice (The Netherlands) 
 Chose:     
 Assimilation LAI Interculturalism Multiculturalism N 
Young 14.8 18.2 31.0 36.0 203 
Middle Aged 26.1 16.3 26.1 31.5 92 
Elderly 10.8 21.6 51.4 16.2 37 
*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers 
per age group 
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Table Twenty-Eight – Linear Modeling the Effects of Vignettes (Ghent Student Sample) 
 
Model /// DV  Nat ID C.Prior. Ethnic Individ. Trust Project. 
Intercept 0.51 
(0.36) 
 
1.19** 
(0.36) 
0.91* 
(0.43) 
-1.14* 
(0.48) 
-0.82 
(0.47) 
0.83 
(0.45) 
Assimilation -0.09 
(0.13) 
 
-0.30* 
(0.12) 
-0.16 
(0.14) 
-0.18 
(0.16) 
-0.35* 
(0.16) 
-0.36* 
(0.16) 
Interculturalism 
 
0.11 
(0.12) 
 
0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.38* 
(0.15) 
-0.01 
(0.16) 
-0.15 
(0.15) 
Liberalism as ID -0.34** 
(0.12) 
 
-0.34** 
(0.12) 
-0.47** 
(0.15) 
0.36* 
(0.17) 
-0.37* 
(0.16) 
-0.39* 
(0.16) 
Female 0.02 
(0.01) 
 
0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
0.20 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
Age -0.00 
(0.00) 
 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
National 
Attachment 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
Education 0.00 
(0.02) 
 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Religion -0.02 
(0.09) 
 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
-0.24* 
(0.11) 
Left-Right 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
n 669 592 615 573 597 603 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses 
Dependent variables are displayed on the columns, independent variables are displayed 
on the rows 
*** p-value < 0.001 
** p-value < 0.01 
* p-value < 0.05 
- Source: Author’s calculations from self-collected data 
 
Table Twenty Nine – Vignette ordering for each question (Belgium) 
  Nat ID C.Priorit Ethnic Individ. Trust Projection 
Assim  3rd  3rd 2nd 3rd 3rd 3rd 
LAI  4th 4th  4th 1st 4th  4th  
Intercult  1st 1st  3rd 4th 2nd  2nd  
Multi  2nd 2nd  1st 2nd 1st  1st 
* Values represent the magnitude of the responses per variable from most (1st) to least (4th) 
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Table Thirty – Vignette ordering for each question (Netherlands) 
  Nat ID C.Priorit Ethnic Individ. Trust Projection 
Assim  3rd  4th  3rd 3rd 3rd  4th  
LAI  4th  3rd  4th 2nd 4th  3rd  
Intercult  2nd  2nd  1st  4th 2nd 2nd  
Multi  1st  1st  2nd  1st 1st  1st 
* Values represent the magnitude of the responses per variable from most (1st) to least (4th) 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
 
KOMPAS- Ghent 
1.) Some people say that integration policy can be described as multicultural or assimilationist. 
How would you describe the integration policy found here? Does the policy always translate well 
into practice, or do you find your organization needs to be flexible some times.  
 
2.) Does your office ever receive feedback as to the difficulty or ease for the process of 
assimilating into this country? Do you find it normally comes from immigrants, or from 
concerned citizens? 
 
3.) Has the region’s integration policy ever invited any attention from [The Party for Freedom / 
Vlaams Belang / the National Front / a Far Right political group]? Could you tell me a little more 
about that? 
 
4.) Is your office generally satisfied with the progress of its integration policy? Is there any area 
it feels it needs to devote more attention to?  
          
5.) Does your office have any concern about hate crimes or discrimination happening in your 
region? Would you say there has been more, less, or the same amount of these crimes as usual? 
 
6.) How much emphasis does the local integration policy on ethnic elements within its 
integration policies. For example, emphasizing [Dutch/Belgian] history, culture, cultural 
holidays and “normal” ways of life. 
 
7.) How much emphasis does the local integration policy place on civic elements in its 
integration policies. For example, informing migrants about the [Dutch/Belgian] government, 
national holidays, flag, and anthem? 
 
8.) How much emphasis does the local integration policy place on the importance of group 
obligations and duties in becoming a [Dutch/Belgian] citizen? For example, voting, serving one’s 
country, paying taxes, etc.  
 
9.) How much emphasis does the government place on the importance of individual rights and 
the freedom of a person to act in ways they are comfortable and familiar with?  For example, 
protection of speech and  religion, tolerance, and a celebration of diversity.  
 
10.) What would you say are the ideal (if any) characteristics of a “good [Dutchman/Belgian]”? 
 
Bureau ICE 
 
1.) How did the Bureau ICE get the ability to write the Dutch integration exam? Was an open 
call put forward? Were there competitors? 
 
2.) Are there multiple versions of the KNS portion of the integration exam? How does ICE 
combat cheating and/or question-leaking? 
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3.) What guidance does ICE provide to test-prep firms? How do people know what to study for 
for the exam? 
 
4.) Has the KNS been revised over time (esp. between the old and new style exams?) 
 
5.) Is the KNS (or practice materials) provided in the ICE’s TOA package? 
 
6.) Who provided the framework or test matrix for this exam? Did the government give ICE 
certain guidelines? What were they? 
 
7.) Who was consulted in the exam making process? Answers for this kind of exam are not as 
clear as say a language test where set rules exist. Who was consulted to lend authority to this 
exam? 
 
8.) Were other government integration or citizenship exams used as models? 
 
9.) How did 70% become the pass-benchmark? How was this decided? Is it true that the exam 
was tested on four thousand people? Was 70% decided before or after the questions were 
created? 
 
10.) Why is the KNS in Dutch? Isn’t there a risk of mixing up language skills with KNS skilled? 
Are they viewed as one in the same? 
 
 
Agency for the Interior 
 
1.) What brought about the need for the MO exam? Were there complaints that the classes were 
too simple or not helpful? 
 
2.) Is it in Flemish or in other languages? If Flemish, is there a concern that it is unfair to people 
who have difficulty with languages but who know the culture well? 
 
3.) How is the exam structured? Is it on paper or on a computer? Are there multiple versions or a 
bank of questions? 
 
4.) Why is it currently only available in three cities? Is there a concern about calling it out to all 
of the onthaalbureaus? Or is there something the government wishes to see first? 
 
5.) The test was developed by the University of Antwerp, is that correct? Was the development 
competitive, such as between different schools or firms? 
 
6.) How do people know what to study before taking the exam? Is there a guide or some 
recommendations 
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7.) Were foreign integration or citizenship exams (such as the Dutch one), used to guide the 
development of the MO exam? 
 
8.) Is there an older version of the exam or prototype that I could see? 
 
9.) What was involved in the development of the exam in particular? What kinds of people are 
they? Did migrants have a voice in this process? 
 
10.) How objective is the exam? How are the questions justified? 
 
11.) How is the test monitored and regulated? 
 
12.) If allowed, could I have contact information for the developers of the exam? 
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Appendix B: Integration Documents Word Count Results 
 
 
Rank Order Naar Nederland Migreren Naar Vlaanderen 
1st Dutch Flanders 
2nd People Flemings 
3rd Here, Holland Work 
4th The Netherlands Children, many 
5th Language Dutch, government 
6th Work Other, everyone, live, new, school, child 
7th All There, house 
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Appendix C: Complete Collection of Flemish Video Speakers 
 
Turkish 
 
Speaker One 
 
 
 
Speaker Two 
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Speaker Three 
 
 
 
Speaker Four 
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Arabic 
 
 
Speaker One 
 
 
 
Speaker Two 
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Speaker Three 
 
 
 
Speaker Four 
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Russian 
 
Speaker One 
 
 
 
Speaker Two 
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Speaker Three 
 
 
 
Speaker Four 
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Appendix D: Sampling Procedure and Characteristics 
Non-Student Sampling Procedure 
 
The following procedure was used to gather respondents for the man-on-the-street 
portion of the study. Three public squares were randomly drawn from a series of sites located in 
the center of the city. These public sites were located in different parts of the main shopping 
center of the city. The first chosen site was where sampling initially began. This first-choice was 
semi-random, as the pool had to be restricted to accommodate local laws. For example, weekly 
markets often take place on certain days in these squares. The following tables contain the sites 
used for this survey and stipulations associated with them. Eindhoven had a fewer number of 
plein-candidates, as the city’s re-development after the Second World War de-emphasized the 
older style of square-oriented city planning.  
 
 
Belgium Sites - Ghent 
 
 
 
Site City Site Name Number of 
Responses 
Stipulations 
1 Ghent Groentemarkt 20 Closed Friday-Sunday 
2 Ghent Kalendeberg 32 None 
3 Ghent Korenmarkt 13 Frequent Solicitors 
4 Ghent Kouter 10 Closed Sundays, Low traffic after 
5pm 
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5 Ghent Sint-Pietersplein 17 Student traffic on weekdays only, 
Primarily economics majors 
6 Ghent Vrijdagmarkt 8 Closed Fridays and Saturdays 
7 Ghent Boetermarkt 3 Covered Square, used on rainy days 
only 
 
 
Netherlands Sites – Eindhoven 
 
 
 
  
Site City Site Name Number of 
Responses 
Stipulations 
1 Eindhoven September 18th plein 56 Frequent Solicitors, Closed 
Thursday  
2 Eindhoven Catharinaplein 35 None  
3 Eindhoven Kennedyplein 23 Student traffic on weekdays only 
4 Eindhoven Markt 89 Closed Thursday 
5 Eindhoven Piazza 43 Covered public space, used on 
rainy days only, in mid-December 
had periodic stage shows 
 
In addition to periodic availability, weather and solicitors played roles in determining my site 
selection. Since this research was done in the fall and winter, rainy weather had to be constantly 
accommodated. During inclement weather, surveying was necessarily confined to covered 
locations present in each city. 
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A less controllable force concerned the frequent presence of solicitors at most locations (and 
especially at those locations where it is noted in the tables above). Locations with solicitors 
present were avoided, as their activities competed for the attention of potential respondents. 
Additionally, these solicitors seemed to negatively pre-dispose pedestrians from participating, as 
they create an incentive for quicker, more narrowly-focused movement into and out of the square 
being surveyed. While my usage of a sign for recruitment helped to mitigate this damage, the 
impact of their presence remained considerable. When solicitors entered the vicinity of my 
surveying site, this triggered a movement to an alternative, randomly chosen site until they 
relocated.  
 
Student Sampling Procedure 
 
Student sampling occurred in four total classes. All of the classes were social scientifically 
oriented, occurring in the disciplines of Political Science, Sociology, and Cultural Studies. The 
distribution and details can be found below. Like the street sample, students were screened on if 
they were a third generation immigrant or higher. Unlike the street sample, however, students 
were not required to live where they attended school. Because the Netherlands and Belgium are 
such small countries with developed mass transit systems, commuting students are common. In 
fact, their rail passes are often subsidized by the government. I do not anticipate this to bias the 
most-similar case study because these students do spend a substantial portion of their day in their 
city of study. Furthermore, if they do commute, it will be primarily from neighboring cities, as 
longer commutes will become exceedingly costly in terms of time and money (especially when 
comparable universities are found closer by, which they tend to be). Any difference between 
these neighboring cities and the cities of study will be negligible. This is especially true in the 
Netherlands, where many commuting students are from Eindhoven, a city already incorporated 
into the study. Other possible cities students may be commuting from include Breda and ‘s-
Hertogenbosch, cities so similar to Eindhoven and Tilburg in their interests that they have 
formed an administrative network called BrabantStad or Brabant City for deep cooperation and 
collective negotiation.  
 
Student Samples 
 
City Site Name Number of 
Responses 
Notes 
Ghent Introduction to Political Science 398 Surveyed on 10/15/2013 
Tilburg Introduction to Sociology 107 Surveyed on 10/08/2013 
Tilburg Politics of Globalization 17 Surveyed on 11/08/2013 
Tilburg Research Design: Ethnography 31 Surveyed on 11/13/2013 
 
Overall Sample Characteristics 
 
 Because respondents self-selected into the survey, and because of the ways respondents 
were selected, the sample is skewed in a number of different directions. While the sex of the 
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respondents were relatively evenly distributed, it does lean female. Similarly, because student 
sub-samples were utilized, the overall sample does lean towards younger respondents. This is 
also due to that group’s increased willingness to select into surveys. Finally, because the sample 
was pre-screened to incorporate third-generation immigrants and older, it does lean 
predominantly, but not exclusively, white.  
 
Sample Characteristics - Sex 
 
 Male Female 
Belgium 201 281 
Netherlands 157 240 
 
Sample Characteristics - Age 
 
 Young Middle Age Old 
Belgium 438 32 16 
Netherlands 254 102 41 
 
Sample Characteristics - Ethnicity 
 
 White Non-White 
Belgium 99 2 
Netherlands 239 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘ 
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Appendix E: Sign Design 
 
In order to recruit respondents, this study used signs for recruitment. These signs were printed on 
an “A2” sized piece of paper (16.54 in. x 23.39 in.). These signs were printed in Dutch and 
double laminated for outdoor durability. Pictures of the signs used can be found below: 
 
       
 
In English, the signs translate to the following: 
 
Can You Help Me?  
 
Student in search of Ghentians/Eindhovenians for a short survey. 
 
* Only 14 questions! * No money necessary! *About five minutes! 
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Appendix F: Survey Text  
 
Vignettes 
 
“Imagine that the government is considering a new policy to help better integrate immigrant 
populations into the Netherlands. You hear on the evening news the following information about 
the policy: 
 
(Assimilation): The policy requires attending a government-run integration course for 
immigrants entering the country from outside the Netherlands. The importance of our history 
and language would be especially emphasized under this policy. This message would not be 
communicated to native citizens.  
 
(Liberalism as Identity): The policy requires attending a government-run integration course 
for immigrants entering the country from outside the Netherlands. The importance of our liberal 
values would be especially emphasized under this policy. This message would not be 
communicated to native citizens.  
 
(Interculturalism): The policy requires attending a government-run integration course for 
immigrants entering the country from outside the Netherlands. The importance of cooperation 
would be especially emphasized under this policy. This message would also be communicated to 
native citizens. 
 
(Multiculturalism): The policy suggests attending a government-run integration course for 
immigrants entering the country from outside the Netherlands. The importance of tolerance 
would be especially emphasized under this policy. This message would also be communicated to 
native citizens.
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Integration Survey 
 
{Section included only in student surveys} 
 
* I live here in Eindhoven:      Yes    O  No  O 
 
* Both of my parents were born in the Netherlands     Yes    O  No  O 
{Below included in all surveys} 
 
Please chose the option that best describes your understanding 
I identify very closely with   O O O O O I do not identify with 
the 
The Netherlands        Netherlands at all.  
 
First Vignette Here 
 
If this new policy became law, please chose the option that best reflects your understanding of 
how it would affect this country 
 
According to me: 
  
Column 
A 
Strongly 
Agree 
With 
Column 
A 
Agree 
with 
Column 
A 
No 
Change 
Agree 
with 
Column 
B 
Strongly 
Agree 
with 
Column 
B 
 
Column  
B 
Do 
not 
know 
This new 
immigration 
policy would 
harm what it 
means to be a 
Dutchman 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy would 
strengthen 
what it means 
to be a 
Dutchman 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
our institutions 
and obligations 
as citizens 
very 
important 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
our 
institutions 
and 
obligations as 
citizens 
unimportant 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
our shared 
ethnic culture 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
our shared 
ethnic culture 
unimportant 
 
 
   O 
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very 
important  
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
individuals 
seem more 
important than 
groups 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
groups seem 
more 
important 
than 
individuals 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
immigrants 
seem as 
trustworthy as 
people born 
here in the 
Netherlands 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
immigrants 
seem not as 
trustworthy 
as people born 
here in the 
Netherlands 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes it 
impossible for 
a foreigner 
living here to 
be just as 
Dutch as a 
Dutchman 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
it possible for 
a foreigner 
living here to 
be just as 
Dutch as a 
Dutchman 
 
 
   O 
 
Second Vignette Here 
 
If this new policy became law, please chose the option that best reflects your understanding of 
how it would affect this country 
 
According to me: 
 
 
Column 
A 
Strongly 
Agree 
With 
Column 
A 
Agree 
with 
Column 
A 
No 
Change 
Agree 
with 
Column 
B 
Strongly 
Agree 
with 
Column 
B 
 
Column  
B 
Do 
not 
know 
This new 
immigration 
policy would 
harm what it 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy would 
strengthen 
 
 
   O 
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means to be a 
Dutchman 
what it means 
to be a 
Dutchman 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
our institutions 
and obligations 
as citizens 
very 
important 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
our 
institutions 
and 
obligations as 
citizens 
unimportant 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
our shared 
ethnic culture 
very 
important  
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
our shared 
ethnic culture 
unimportant 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
individuals 
seem more 
important than 
groups 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
groups seem 
more 
important 
than 
individuals 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
immigrants 
seem as 
trustworthy as 
people born 
here in the 
Netherlands 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
immigrants 
seem not as 
trustworthy 
as people born 
here in the 
Netherlands 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes it 
impossible for 
a foreigner 
living here to 
be just as 
Dutch as a 
Dutchman 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
 
 
   O 
This new 
immigration 
policy makes 
it possible for 
a foreigner 
living here to 
be just as 
Dutch as a 
Dutchman 
 
 
   O 
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Circle One 
 
Given the choice, I would prefer if [the first policy] [the second policy] were enacted into law. 
 
 
Optional Demographics Questionnaire 
 
- What year were you born in? 
 
19____ (write in last two digits)  
 
- What is your gender? 
 
1.) Male  
2.) Female 
3.) Other  
 
- What is the highest educational level that you have attained? If you are a student, what is the 
highest level you expect to complete? 
 
1.) No formal education  
2.) Incomplete primary school  
3.) Complete primary school  
4.) Incomplete Technical High School 
5.) Complete Technical High School 
6.) Incomplete University Prep. High School 
7.) Complete University Prep. High School 
8.) Incomplete Technical/Vocational College 
9.) Complete Technical/Vocational College (B.A.) 
10.) Complete Technical/Vocational College (M.A.) 
11.) Incomplete University 
12.) Complete University (B.A.) 
13.) Complete University (M.A.) 
14.) Incomplete Post University Education 
15.) Complete Post University Education 
 
- The choices below represent a range of incomes from people living in Europe. In what range 
does your household fall? Please specify the appropriate range, counting all wages, salaries, 
pensions, and other incomes 
 
1.) € 0 - € 10.000 
2.) € 10.000 - € 20.000 
3.) € 20.000 - € 30.000 
4.) € 30.000 - € 40.000 
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5.) € 40.000 - € 50.000 
6.) € 50.000 + 
 
- Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? 
1.) No 
2.) Yes 
 
- Which religion or religious denomination do you identify with? 
 
1.) No religion 
2.) Roman Catholic 
3.) Protestant 
4.) Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.) 
5.) Jew 
6.) Muslim 
7.) Hindu 
8.) Buddhist 
89.) Other 
 
- Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these 
days? 
 
1.) More than once a week 
2.) Once a week 
3.) Once a month 
4.) Only on special holy days 
5.) Once a year 
6.) Less often 
7.) Never, practically never 
 
Do you currently have a job? 
 
1.) Yes – Full Time 
2.) Yes – Part Time 
3.) Yes - Homemaker 
4.) No – Unemployed 
5.) No – Student 
6.) No – Retired / On Pension 
 
-Do you have any friends or close acquaintances that were not born in this country, but now 
permanently reside here? 
 
1.) No 
2.) Yes (one or two) 
3.) Yes (two to five) 
4.) Yes (more than five) 
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Do you have any colleagues at work that were not born in this country, but now permanently 
reside here? 
 
1.) No 
2.) Yes (one or two) 
3.) Yes (two to five) 
4.) Yes (more than five) 
 
- In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views 
on this scale, generally speaking? 
 
Left            Right 
1   2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9   10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
169 
 
Appendix G: Subject Pool Dataset 
 
The dataset drawn from the Political Science Department’s subject pool at the University of 
Illinois Urbana Champaign during the Spring of 2014 can be found in the file “Subject Pool 
Dataset.csv”. This departmental subject pool is IRB pre-approved.  
 
The text of the question students were asked to respond to was: 
 
“Read these alternative policies designed to better incorporate immigrants into our country. 
Arrange them from what seems to be the best policy (1) to what seems to be the worst (4).” 
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Appendix H: Public Survey Dataset 
 
The dataset drawn from the student and public surveys during the Fall and Winter of 2013 can be 
found in the file “Public Survey Dataset.xlsx” 
 
A copy of the survey participants filled out can be found in Appendix F. The associated IRB 
number for this research is #13797, PI: Carol Leff. In Belgium, permissions for this study can be 
referenced through its case number: DOS 2013 01545-006 XB, on file at the Commission for the 
Protection of Privacy.  
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